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Abstract                                                                                                  
Anne McLaren and the Human Embryo Research Debates in Britain, 1982-1990: 
Sociological Biography in the Analysis of Public Debate, Marieke Louise Bigg 
I describe the role of the scientist Dr Anne McLaren in the public and parliamentary debates 
on human fertilisation and embryology (HF&E) in Britain between 1982 and the resulting 
Act in 1990. A focus on McLaren’s contributions to these debates elucidates how the case 
in favour of embryo research was constructed. Drawing especially on the use of the 
contested term ‘pre-embryo’ by the pro-human embryo research lobby to describe the 
subject of experimentation, and the development of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) over the same time span as the debates, I show how a pro-research case was built 
around the idea that biology could be used towards broadly shared clinical goals. I tie this 
evolution of a case to McLaren’s expertise, and show how McLaren combined an 
authoritative scientific understanding with the idea of moral purpose and social good, 
necessitating a language that could reflect both. I go on to draw on McLaren’s biography, 
showing how she cultivated a ‘style of practice’ that relied on the non-literal translation of 
biological information to arrive at public consensus. 
I engage with several areas of literature, beginning with the literature on the HF&E 
debates and analyses of the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ in science and technology studies, 
and feminist cultural studies. I add a more detailed description of the specific biological 
arguments made by the pro-research lobby and show how these reflected a shifting position 
for the scientist in public debate. I also contribute to material-semiotic methodologies used 
in feminist cultural studies by scholars such as Donna Haraway, Evelyn Fox-Keller, and 
Susan Squier, showing how close readings of key documents can be used to extrapolate 
from an individual’s life to better understand the causality of a public debate.  
My combined archival research and interviews with McLaren’s former 
collaborators leads me to foreground a particular tension around the legacy of the biological 
model used in the debates. I show how the scientists I interviewed repeatedly distanced 
themselves from the relativistic biological case they helped invent in the 1980s, describing 
their role instead as a literalist transmission of biological facts. An analysis of the work that 
McLaren did, I argue, serves as a reminder of the iterative process that scientists performed 




explicate this process, a term used by McLaren to describe her own approach to policy-
making, as well as in the writing of C. H. Waddington, who was a formative inspiration to 
her as a scientist. The metaphor helps to describe McLaren’s method of layering social, 
legal, clinical, emotional and scientific arguments in order to build consensus based on 
overlapping concerns, and allows me to develop McLaren’s role as a case study in 
broadening the conventional use of ‘translation’ in the post-millennial climate of 
biomedicine. I conclude that a multi-faceted understanding of the process of translation 
offers a productive and inclusive model for policy discussions, and one which continues to 
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In 1978, Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe achieved a milestone in the history of 
reproductive biology: they had managed to fertilize an egg in vitro and place it in the womb 
of its mother, who then carried the child to term, leading to the birth of Louise Brown – the 
first ‘IVF baby’. The advent of clinical IVF raised the possibility that research on human 
embryos might become part of clinical, as well as experimental, work on early human 
embryos and with this came the ethical implication that experiments would be needed to 
continue to improve the technique. The implications of this birth not only extended beyond 
their successful clinical application but marked a point of convergence between clinic and 
laboratory (Lee and Morgan 2001; Squier, 1994; Van Dyck, 1995). Indeed, the somewhat 
blurred distinction between clinical and experimental has been characteristic of IVF since 
1978, as the IVF cycle as a clinical cycle continues to reveal basic scientific information, 
feeding into new research designs and applications, such as Pre-implantation Genetic 
Diagnosis (PGD), stem-cell science, and artificial gametes (Deech and Smajdor, 2007; 
Franklin, 2013b; Lee and Morgan, 2001).  
The clinical translation of IVF made reproduction in general, but IVF in particular, 
a matter of public concern and the renegotiation of what was to be considered 
‘experimental’ IVF became a point of public contestation (Mulkay, 1997; Yoxen, 1990). 
Various groups of the population demanded legal regulation, including feminists alarmed 
at the level of control these developments gave scientists over female bodies (see, for 
example: Burfoot, 1990; Crowe, 1990; Haimes, 1990; Price, 1990; Steinberg, 1990), as 
well as scientists as they confronted risks of being held liable for unpredicted or undesirable 
outcomes. In an attempt to address these concerns and to fill the legal vacuum generated 
by the emergence of IVF, the UK Government set up the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology under the chairmanship of philosopher Mary Warnock in 
1982. The Committee consisted of medics, social workers, lawyers and clerics, and was 
tasked with advising the Government, Parliament and the general public on the matter of 
human fertilisation and embryology. The Committee released its report in 1984, which was 
followed by six years of parliamentary and public debate. This lengthy period of 
contestation was characterised by governmental reluctance to take definitive action on the 
controversial issue of research, leading scientists to establish various bodies to provide 
information and reassurance to a generally uninformed and wary public (Crowe, 1990; 
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Deech and Smajdor, 2007; Franklin, 2013c; Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 2005; 
Lee and Morgan, 2001; Spallone, 1987; Steinberg, 1990; Strathern, 1992). This pro-
research lobby was predominantly galvanised into action by the anti-research lobby’s 
determination in pushing a Private Member’s bill that, effectively, sought to ban research 
on human embryos in 1985 (Mulkay, 1997; Theodosiou and Johnson, 2012).  
Scientists began to realise just how committed the opposition was to a campaign of 
action along lines employed previously in relation to the law on abortion, to which the only 
effective response was to form their own organised lobby (Mulkay, 1997, p. 42). In this 
process, the pro-lobby set up various organisations, including a Voluntary Licensing 
Authority (VLA), a joint initiative of the Medical Research Council and the Royal Society 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in 1985, which began to issue the first licences for 
externally supervised research on IVF embryos. The VLA has been credited with providing 
the public with a sense that research could be regulated (Mulkay, 1997, p. 146), and, indeed, 
that this was already in effect. Another key organisation was PROGRESS, established in 
the same year as the VLA under the joint leadership of scientists, physicians and 
parliamentarians, who launched a campaign at the House of Commons intended to increase 
public understanding of, and support for, embryo research. This slowly shifted the weight 
of opinion in favour of research. In 1987, a White Paper was finally published, outlining 
proposed legislation, and presented to Parliament in 1989. The White Paper was then 
debated, amended, and eventually enacted in 1990.  
The Committee’s discussions began at a time when parliamentary and public 
opinion was especially hostile to basic scientific research on human embryos. In fact, as 
professors of law Morgan and Lee (2001) note in their text on human fertilisation and 
embryology, it is surprising that, considering the fervency of the opposition in 1984, 
Parliament came to approve research in the 1990 Act at all (p. 57). The period saw a 
conservative backlash to the permissive legislation of the latter half of the 1960s in ‘matters 
of conscience’, such as abortion (Chadwick and Wilson, 2018; Mulkay, 1997; Wilson, 
2014). This meant that the debate was initially framed, like the abortion debates of the 
1960s, as a question regarding the status of the entity that was considered to be the object 
of experimentation – the human embryo – and associated with the same pro-life arguments 
that placed the start of human life at conception, making experimentation, like abortion, 
equivalent to infanticide. In addition to this, the period was marked by an ambivalence 
towards science in general, both by left-wing scientists and intellectuals who reacted to the 
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injustices conducted by governments through science, as epitomised by the Vietnam War, 
and then by a Conservative government under Thatcher, which presented itself as sceptical 
of ‘experts’ (Chadwick and Wilson, 2018; Wilson, 2014). The Act proved, however, that 
the majority of parliamentarians had been swayed in favour of research that was previously 
considered to contravene the rights of the embryo as a potential human being. 
In this thesis, I revisit this era of renegotiation of the relationship between lab and 
clinic, experimental and clinical, science and society, in the context of these debates. I do 
this from the perspective of the role played by a notable scientist who made a particularly 
consistent and foundational contribution to the arguments used by the pro-research lobby.  
Dr Anne McLaren (1927–2007), renowned for her pioneering work in mammalian 
embryo development, both on the techniques that made IVF in humans possible and 
beyond, was the only embryologist on the Warnock Committee and was key in providing 
its members with a scientific understanding of the process of conception and its 
consequences for social and political organisation. McLaren has often been accredited by 
the community of policy-makers in Britain with providing a ‘biological rationale’ for one 
of the inquiry’s key policy innovations, a cut-off point for human embryo experiments 14 
days after fertilisation – the so-called ’14-day rule’. The 14-day rule has been regarded as 
a key factor in securing public support for embryo research, and essential to what has been 
called the HF&E Act’s ‘social contract’, in which the public allowed research on human 
embryos to continue in exchange for strict regulation (Franklin and Roberts, 2006).  
McLaren’s contributions to the committee, as Warnock has been all too eager to 
emphasise in her various talks on her process (e.g. The Anne McLaren Fund 10th 
Anniversary Conference, December, 2017; see also Warnock, 2001), extended well beyond 
providing scientific information. McLaren was keenly aware of the social questions at 
stake. From the moment she provided the Warnock Committee with her biological report, 
largely replicated under the same title in a 1984 published version Where to Draw the Line? 
McLaren became intimately involved in public discussions and displayed an awareness that 
the debate was not going to be based on scientific facts alone. The question of the 
permissibility of human embryo research, she believed, should instead be used to negotiate 
the relationship between science and society. The question of whether experimentation 
would be allowed to continue, after all, required a definition of what ‘experimentation’ was 
in light of the state of knowledge in the field, and this led McLaren to comment as much 
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on the prospects for clinical translation, as she did on her proper area of study – the basic 
science. This meant that, as much as people wanted to know that science would not go too 
far, they also needed to know what basic research meant to them, and what it could do for 
them. McLaren repeatedly made the point that, without legalising basic experiments to 
improve the technique, society would be condoning experimentation on women’s bodies. 
Her biological case became part and parcel with this effort to define what was to be 
considered ‘experimental’ – a discussion that required science, ethics, law, and feelings. In 
this thesis, I describe Anne McLaren’s role in the debates on human embryo research in the 
UK 1982–1990, in order to detail the process by which the pro-research lobby, driven by 
scientists, formed its case. 
The biological model revisited  
Despite Warnock’s insistence on McLaren’s indispensability to the Committee, McLaren’s 
biological case for the 14-day rule also came to be associated with a less widely celebrated 
and, indeed, largely contested innovation – the introduction of a new biological distinction 
denoted by the term ‘pre-embryo’. Despite broad critique of the arbitrariness of the term, 
some scholars have defended its efficacy, claiming that it allowed the pro-research lobby 
to begin to portray specimens younger than 14 days as an organism “ontologically 
distinguishable” from the embryo (Wilson, 2014, p. 164), and thus a suitable object of 
experimentation (Mulkay, 1997; Jasanoff, 2005). The British sociologist Michael Mulkay 
(1994; 1997), for example, claims, in his analysis of the mechanisms of the debate, that 
these arguments were key to the formation of a clear strategy by the pro-lobby, allowing 
them to give “coherent expression to the new image of the embryo” (Mulkay, 1994, p. 628) 
that undermined the “opponents’ use of the phrase ‘unborn children’ while conveying to 
lay people that the potential subjects of laboratory experiment were not even proper human 
embryos” (Mulkay, 1997, p.31). Further arguments that were key to the pro-lobby victory 
included the possibility that research could reveal methods for controlling genetic disease, 
as well as a rhetoric of hope that promised the future reduction of suffering and an increase 
in people’s access to normal family life (ibid). Despite the recognition of the term’s role in 
the pro-research case in these accounts, it is thus considered to be one distinguishable 
aspect of the pro-lobby’s case and of limited importance in delineating an ontological entity 
that would be a suitable research object (see e.g. Crowe, 1990; Jasanoff, 2005; Lee & 
Morgan, 2001; Mulkay, 1997; Spallone 1987). To the ‘pre-embryo’ these authors add 




In my interviews with scientists who participated in the pro-research lobby during 
the debates, there is a similar tendency to acknowledge the efficacy of the use of the term 
in the context of public deliberation, but to delineate it as one independent factor, often also 
as ‘arbitrary’, of limited importance, and secondary to the more decisive role of the 
arguments made for the benefits of genetic screening that would emerge from continued 
research. The term also, despite appearing repeatedly in the information material used by 
the pro-research lobby during the debates, was not used in the Warnock report itself, nor in 
the final legislation contained in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 1990. 
After introducing the term in public information pamphlet produced by the Voluntary 
Licensing Authority in 1985 (Minutes of the MRC and VLA, 26 March, RCOG Archives), 
it became the source of fervent critique in parliament and public press and produced open 
divisions in the scientific community throughout the debates that followed the release of 
the Warnock Report (see Davies, 1986; Chargaff, 1987; Kelly, 1990; Short, 1987 for 
critiques of the term, as well as my interviews with scientists in this thesis). Despite its 
utility, then, in convincing a wider public that research was acceptable, the ‘pre-embryo’ 
fell out of use in scientific publications and public discussions once the HF&E legislation 
had been secured. The ‘pre-embryo’, according to these histories and the interviews 
exploring its legacy included in this thesis, is repeatedly cast as part of a specific rhetorical 
strategy that marked a momentary and uncomfortable foray of a group of scientists into the 
unscientific domain of public debate; a historical artefact that is repeatedly, albeit 
confusedly, discredited.  
In this dissertation, I look more closely into the precise construction and specific 
uses of the arguments around the ‘pre-embryo’ as they were developed by McLaren. I 
analyse her use of the term while IVF was still in the making, within the Warnock 
Committee through the six-year long debates that followed, and in retrospect. As well as 
reconstructing the history of the use of the term through close readings of various archival 
documents taken from Anne McLaren’s archives at the British Library, the Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the National Archives at Kew, I talk to scientists 
about the legacy of the term today, and how they perceive and interpret its role in the 
debates of the 1980s. My analysis in Chapter 1 shows that the term ‘pre-embryo’ was part 
of a strategy in which the biological case cannot be separated from those for genetic 
screening or the hopes presented by other future applications; that they all formed part of 
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the same iterative model of deliberation that McLaren developed over the course of the 
debates.  
The efficacy of the ‘pre-embryo’ in delineating an ontological entity is only part of 
a broader effort to reframe the debates as centred around the reproduction of a society as a 
whole. I develop this analysis of the strategy used by the pro-research lobby in Chapter 2, 
where I show how the prospect of a clinical translation, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), became an important reference point in the debates and the locus of a set of 
overlapping values, feelings and biological, legal and ethical arguments. The model as I 
describe it, can be used to deduce wide-ranging implications about the role of the scientist 
in public debate, the relationship between science, society, law and ethics, the public 
perception of biological facts and the role of science in reproduction, and the legacy of the 
debates in policy discussions about reproduction today.  
Most importantly, an analysis of McLaren’s framing of the biological account 
allows me to show exactly how the biological case in favour of human embryo research, 
now encoded in the HF&E Act, is entangled with the social, legal and ethical questions of 
how to govern human embryo research. I show how the biological facts are what Sarah 
Franklin (2013a) has called ‘biologically relative’ to a set of other domains of knowledge. 
This leads me to reflect on the relationships between the scientific model used in public 
debate and the role of clinical translation, and to develop the theme of ‘translation’, using 
McLaren’s role in the debates as a case study in broadening the conventional use of the 
term in the post-millennial, ‘translational’ climate of biomedicine. McLaren, then, helps 
me recover the legacy of the debates, to frame their interpretation as a discussion of clinical 
translation, as opposed to one of the biological facts of development, or the status of the 
embryo, thereby recapitulating the process McLaren herself performed in the 1980s. I go 
on to describe more fully the approach to policy problem-solving evident in McLaren’s 
contributions to the debates, by showing how the same approach – what I call her ‘style of 
practice’ – is evident across her scientific and political work in Chapter 3, developing the 
ways in which science factored into an ethical model of doing science, which, for McLaren, 
was deeply social. I thereby contribute to previous studies of the ways in which scientific 
authority was constituted during the debates that have foregrounded political and 
governmental machinations to explain legislative outcomes (e.g. Crowe, 1990; Jasanoff, 
2005; Mulkay, 1997; van Dyck, 1995) by adding, in contrast, the account of one scientist’s 
role. I hereby deepen an understanding of the process of policy-building in this era. In 
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Chapter 4, I go on to show how a multi-faceted understanding of the process of translation 
can offer a productive and inclusive ethical model for policy discussions that is as relevant 
to discussions about the 14-day rule today as it was in the 1980s.  
In this dissertation, I look at McLaren in the 1980s and the intersectional and 
translational role she played between policy, parliament, government, ethics, law, science, 
and medicine. I draw on her ‘style of practice’, a term used by Science and Technology 
Studies scholar Evelyn Fox-Keller (1983), to describe the idiosyncratic approach taken by 
a scientist to making sense of their findings, how they engage with their research object, 
how they conduct, devise and interpret their experiments, and how they discuss that 
process. In this thesis, I characterise this style by reference to McLaren’s expansive archive, 
as well as interviews with former collaborators, and trace how this is expressed not only in 
her science, but more broadly throughout her policy activities and social activism, in order 
to expose a dimension of the debates previously under-explored, namely the role of 
biological facts and of the biologist herself in the negotiations between science and society. 
I demonstrate the principle argued by previous scholars on the debates, that biology 
during this era became relative to social questions (Franklin, 20013; Strathern, 1992), and 
reveal the implications of this shift by tying it to McLaren’s role in the active shaping of 
the messages that were, or were not, received, in order to offer a developed analysis of the 
1980s debates on embryology in Britain, as well as its legacy in the ongoing discussions 
about translation and regulation in biomedicine. My methodology thereby positions me in 
line with previous feminist science studies and cultural studies scholars, who understand 
scientific authority as being constituted through discourses, and consequently search for 
new stories to enter the “contest for public knowledge” with science, by choosing which 
texts to read and how to read them (Haraway, 1991, p. 82). Escaping “the fantasy of ‘the 
one true meaning’” (Haraway in Davis and Turpin, 2015, p. 257, cited in Squier, 2017, p. 
3) in this case “shifts the scope of debate, revealing a new vision of possibilities and limits” 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 83). This process of what has alternatively been called ‘creating a 
labyrinth of narratives’ (Ormiston and Sassower 1989), ‘webbing’ (Haraway 1992), or 
‘mapping’ (van Dyck, 1995), treats reading as “a creative act that translates seemingly 
incompatible discourses into a cohesive symbolic representation” (van Dyck, 1995, p.60). 
I use this method to bring to light a new model for policy-building around reproductive 
biomedicine that prioritises social and systemic questions.  
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Methodology: Explorations in sociological biography 
It was not clear from the onset how I was going to write a sociological biography, nor even 
exactly what this meant. I knew that, given McLaren’s polymathic involvement with 
science, policy, politics, socialism, and public engagement with science more generally, I 
wanted to use McLaren as an indexical case study to reveal the broader social changes 
shaping the outcome of the human embryo research debates in Britain between 1984 and 
1990. I wanted to use McLaren’s role in the debates over embryology in the 1980s to 
analyse how the debate was shaped, influenced and constructed. I would focus in particular 
on her contributions to the legislative innovation that is arguably her most explicit 
contribution to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, the so-called 14-day rule that 
limited experimentation on human embryos outside the human body to 14 days after 
conception, but would also look at her ‘style of practice’, a term used by Evelyn Fox Keller 
in her biography of the geneticist Barbara McClintock (1983) that describes the 
idiosyncratic approach taken by a scientist to making sense of their findings – how they 
engage with their research object, how they conduct, device and interpret their experiments, 
and how they discuss that process. Given her involvement in establishing the field of 
experimental biology since the 1950s, the development of the techniques that made 
possible therapies using embryonic stem cells, the fertility treatments such as IVF and 
PGD, her contribution to the Warnock Inquiry and subsequent debates, and her plethora of 
social and political roles in the Communist Party, the advancement of women in science, 
and family planning in developing countries to name a few, I wanted to draw on McLaren’s 
intersectional role between policy, parliament, government, ethics, law, science, and 
medicine in the 1980s to ask how I could characterise her style of practice as a scientist and 
contributor to public debate, as well as what this style of practice revealed about the wider 
context in which she was operating. I wanted to analyse her values, professional attitude, 
and position and, in turn, to see how a close assessment of how these were implemented 
could inform an understanding of the causal factors driving the debate and its eventual 
resolution. 
Feminist cultural studies  
In order to develop my method, I drew on precedents set largely by scholars in feminist 
cultural studies, and arguably inaugurated by Donna Haraway with her 1989 monograph, 
Primate Visions, and her method of material-semiotic readings of history. In this method, 
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Haraway uses the analysis of the linguistic devices, framings and allusions of cultural 
artefacts to situate these in a history of making material ideological western values, and 
thereby instantiated the idea in feminism that national political economy can be read in 
representations of biology. Susan Squier (1994), in her book, Babies in Bottles, in this tack, 
draws on biography to show how the development of scientific ideas in reproductive 
science happened through interactions between literature and science that emerged from a 
network of families who were socialists, authors, and scientists, thereby situating her 
readings of specific texts in a broader historical era through an understanding of the 
networks of meaning and practice that shapes them. Squier draws on the lives of 
individuals, and the texts they produced, to interpolate their broader historical, political, 
social, economic context. She shows that science cannot be understood outside the 
idiosyncratic practice of individuals and the acts of persuasion required to achieve scientific 
consensus by these scientists, acts that in turn link these practitioners to a web of discourses 
and dominant ideologies that enable and restrict their concepts, their techniques, and their 
role in the development of scientific ideas.  
Similarly, I focus on McLaren’s participation in the debates leading to the 
enactment of the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act to offer an indexical view 
of the forces and levers that shape the evolution of scientific knowledge. I do this primarily 
through close readings of McLaren’s texts. Following cultural studies critics like José van 
Dyck (1995), Donna Haraway (1989), and Susan Squier (1994; 2017), I analyse the 
rhetorical construction of her arguments, the framing and appeal to discourses in specific 
texts used in the debates, to put these analyses together as a portrait of an era. I see science 
as constructed through discourses, defined as the “complex of signs and practices which 
assigns differential membership to a social or professional group”, encompassing “the 
‘signs’ but also, the ‘practices’ involved in language use, and that are unrestricted to the 
realms in which they arise” (van Dyck, 1995, p. 19). Science, in this view, achieves its 
cultural status through a “series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that one’s 
manufactured knowledge is the route to a desired form of objective power” (ibid., p. 577). 
Texts include Where to Draw the Line (McLaren, 1984), based on the document presented 
to the Warnock Committee as they developed their recommendation, McLaren’s written 
contributions to the Voluntary Licensing Authority and Ad Hoc group on Legislation on 
Human Pre-Embryo Research (1987–1990), her work on the Medical research Council 
Advisory Committee, as well as presentations and reports presented to a plethora of 
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committees and working groups in the wake of the Act, such as The Human Embryology 
and Fertilisation Authority, and her ethics lectures at the World Health Organisation (1989). 
In what follows, I describe the method I have outlined in more detail by reference to key 
literature.  
Critique as participation  
Haraway, in Primate Visions (1989), shows what her approach to the cultural analysis of 
scientific knowledge can reveal about the ideologies inherent to knowledge creation. At 
one level, this is a book about the history of primatology, and about how ideas of nature, 
life and biology were shaped by the Cold War and other industrial changes to do with 
communication and control of information. Haraway also wants to show, however, how 
this military-industrial complex is very evident in the way that biological facts, such as 
accounts of evolution, are understood. She shows this through specific analyses, such as 
the diorama at the American Museum of Natural History dedicated to Roosevelt in 1936, 
and in turn how this inscribes a certain vision of empire into the animal kingdom, how this 
vision comes to substantiate the body politic as part of a ‘natural’ order, and how this body 
politic becomes how people think about themselves (e.g. as non-animal and civilised as 
opposed to unmediated, primitive nature). The book thereby sets out a distinctive method. 
It is a cultural feminist analysis of science. The analysis of the linguistic devices, framings 
and allusions of cultural artefacts is used to situate these in a history of making material 
ideological western values, and thereby instantiated the idea in feminism that national 
political economy could be read in representations of biology. Haraway explains what this 
method means in terms of her understanding of the history of scientific knowledge: 
By history I mean a corrosive sense of the contradictions and multiple material-
semiotic processes at the heart of scientific knowledge. History is not a completed 
past simply waiting to be applied to deepen a time probe or to give perspective. It 
is a discipline reworked by postmodern insights about always split, fragmented, and 
multiple subjects, identities, and collectivities. All units and actors cohere partially 
and provisionally, held together by complex material-semiotic-social practices. In 
the space opened up by such contradictions and multiplicities lies the possibility for 
reflexive responsibility for the shape of narrative fields. 
Haraway, 1989, p.172 
The critic can now challenge scientific knowledge through active participation in 
the construction of meaning, rather than confrontation with a stable domain of science. By 
drawing on existing discourses and contributing new ones, feminists can renegotiate the 
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relationships that come to constitute meaning and practice in science. Moreover, as van 
Dyck (1995) explains, “the awareness that power is always coextensive with discursive 
structures funnels her attention to discourse and language” so that “feminist assessments of 
new reproductive technologies do not only lead to the investigation of gender constructions, 
but also of genre constructions: a reconsideration of conventional ways of knowing and 
representing the reproductive body” (p. 103). Feminism, in this sense, becomes “a search 
for new stories, and so for a language which names a new vision of possibilities and limits” 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 82). Feminist cultural studies, in turn, becomes about entering into the 
“contest for public knowledge” with science (ibid) by choosing what texts to read and how 
to read them. This is the process of the ‘recontextualization’ of discourses. Others have 
called this ‘creating a labyrinth of narratives’ (Ormiston and Sassower 1989), ‘webbing’ 
(Haraway 1992), or ‘mapping’ (van Dyck, 1995). In each of these conceptualisations, 
reading is “a creative act that translates seemingly incompatible discourses into a cohesive 
symbolic representation” (van Dyck, 1995, p.60).  
 I implement this idea of searching for new texts in order to map a debate. I read 
McLaren’s scientific texts, speeches to scientific, political, and public audiences, and 
journal articles alike as instances of her negotiating scientific facts. In this way, I open up 
the discussion of what science is, of what it is allowed to entail. Moreover, I describe 
McLaren’s style of practice to show how she herself saw science as much more 
encompassing than the assertions contained in the scientific article, or even the laboratory 
work that is done to substantiate them. Both my reading of McLaren and McLaren’s 
practice itself comes to open up a view that demands faculties and new domains 
conventionally not associated with the narrow remit of the laboratory scientist, as 
engagement with public debate and policy discussions becomes central to their practice.  
The individual and mapping debate  
The project was, in part, also a methodological experiment in using individual biography, 
rather than paradigms, to understand an era and a public debate. Unlike the models of action 
developed to describe the emergence of scientific consensus in Actor Network Theory in 
science studies (e.g. Callon, 1986; Fujimura, 1987, 1988; Hacking, 1983; Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979; Pickering, 1995; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Law, 1990) that draw on 
networks of interconnected actors to describe how scientific ideas are adopted, I was going 
to depart from the description of an individual and attempt to deduce causal connections 
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from her own personal, intellectual, and political formation and the means she used to 
influence public debate. While in my analysis I acknowledge the existence of what Sheila 
Jasanoff calls ‘cultural framings’ that define the regulatory problems presented by new 
biotechnologies on a national level (2005), I also hold that, as Paul Rabinow shows in his 
ethnography of the invention of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) (1996), individuals 
can reframe culture too. I ask how one such individual is linked to the social whole, how 
we can explain and understand an individual’s role and how this features in a sociological 
analysis of public debate. Drawing on her role in the debates, as well as her involvement 
on other committees, as a Marxist, in the scientific community, against the background of 
her earlier years, and in light of her scientific legacy, I use McLaren’s role in the debates to 
test previous key analyses of the causal drivers in the pro-lobby success in the debates on 
human embryo research, especially British sociologist Michael Mulkay’s (1997) detailed 
analysis of the parliamentary record and news coverage. In turn, I use this analysis to draw 
conclusions about more macro-sociological phenomena, such as the role of scientific 
expertise in the UK debate and the specificity of the public debate in the UK. I now turn to 
a comparison between two biographies of the same scientist to show how the method of 
material-semiotic reading described above provides a particularly apt approach to 
biography, especially when drawing on the individual’s role to map a debate.  
Biography and science 
In thinking through how I would use the account of an individual to reflect on a broader, 
public debate, the biography of the geneticist Barbara McClintock was a key resource. In 
1983, the scientist-turned-historian of science, Evelyn Fox-Keller, wrote a biography that 
was to become a cornerstone in the feminist critique of science. In the biography, Keller 
tells the story of McClintock’s career, especially her theory of gene transposition developed 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but which was not recognized by the scientific 
community until the 1970s. Keller draws on this case to reflect on the construction of 
consent within a scientific community. “A new idea”, she writes, “is born in the privacy of 
one man’s or one woman’s dreams” but “for that conception to become part of the body of 
scientific theory, it must be acknowledged by society of which the individual is a member” 
(Keller, 1983, p. xx). Scientific knowledge thus depends on the interaction between 
“individual creativity and communal validation” (ibid). Keller offers an explanation, a 
causal account of a particular discovery in the history of science, and approaches this not 
by referring to existing paradigms, but through a detailed and textured account of an 
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individual’s style. She explains,  
… the individual … the idiosyncrasies of autobiography and personality that incline 
an individual scientist to a particular set of methodological and philosophical 
commitments, to resisting or accepting the dominant trend within a field – but 
always against the backdrop of community. Of necessity, therefore, this book must 
serve simultaneously as biography and as intellectual history. It’s starting point is 
the recognition that science is at once a highly personal and a communal endeavour. 
Keller, 1983, p. xxi 
Keller implements this approach in a method that relies centrally on an extensive, 
immersive interview with McClintock herself, and draws on this to describe closely how 
McClintock practiced science. From this she deduces what the epistemological 
implications of this approach are and shows how this differed from the dominant models 
in the field of genetics at the time. Key to this approach, then, is a meticulous description 
of McClintock’s so-called style: an “account of the individual’s “style” as a scientist – a 
style partly learned and partly self-generated” (ibid., p. xxi). Keller does not, as she might 
have in a conventional historical account, explain McClintock’s initial marginalisation in 
her field in terms of the criteria for knowledge of the discipline – or at least, not only. Keller 
uses her interview with McClintock partly to show where her style of ‘doing science’ 
resonated with dominant ideas in genetics at the time and where it did not, but she also 
importantly lays out McClintock’s account of her own career, how she thought through 
scientific questions, and the obstacles she had to negotiate in order to understand her 
scientific problems. She adds to the history of science a detailed account from McClintock’s 
vantage point to show exactly how her approach developed, that describes her divergence 
in terms of a style of practising science and that shows how her findings were not always 
‘heard’ because she did not adhere to conventional modes of expression in science. Keller’s 
interest in the criteria for knowledge in science thus leads her to a discussion of language, 
in what she comes to conceptualise as specific acts of ‘persuasion’. The delay in the 
response to McClintock’s theories was not only a result of its “revolutionary implications” 
in the historical context of genetics, nor even just her “particular nature of her knowledge 
and understanding” (ibid., p. 268), but also in concrete terms, in the specific language used 
to convince.  
These acts of persuasion shape the interpretation of evidence, relate it to existing 
knowledge in a particular way, and determine the success or failure of a discovery. Also, 
importantly, communication relies on common understandings and assumed practices, or 
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conventions. When science is placed in this space of hierarchical and material acts of 
persuasion, science itself becomes a social practice, emphasising the critical importance of 
understanding an individual’s idiosyncrasies in their attempts to disseminate their findings 
to their professional community. Keller’s close reading of an interview set against a specific 
historical series of events thus offers not only an account of why McClintock’s discovery 
of transposition was not immediately taken up, but also allows her to show how this 
negotiation plays out in practice and thus illuminates the causal levers that determine which 
scientific ideas rise to the fore. Keller uses McClintock to make a point not only about the 
role of ‘non-scientific’ elements in discovery, but also in persuasion: 
The importance of what are sometimes called extrarational or extralogical 
components of thought in the discovery of a new principle or law is generally 
acknowledged….But the role of these extralogical components in persuasion and 
acceptance (in making an argument convincing) is less frequently discussed, partly 
because they are less visible. The ways in which the credibility or effectiveness of 
an argument depends on a realm of common experiences, on extensive experience 
in communicating those experiences in a common language, are hard to see 
precisely because such commonalities are taken for granted. Only when we step 
outside of the “consensual domain” – when we stand on the periphery of a 
community with a common language – do we begin to become aware of the 
unarticulated premises, mutual understandings, and assumed practices of the group. 
Keller, 1983, pp. 145–146 
McClintock provides a case in point: the ways in which McClintock was marginal 
to the consensual domain are multiple, extending beyond her use of the very particular 
language of cytogenetics, to an overarching style characterised by an openness about her 
process and practice in science. Yet Keller’s interest is not only in how a discovery relates 
to dominant paradigms for understanding, but in how we can open up the process by which 
a discovery becomes accepted to inspection. This question demands a close, meticulous 
description and analysis of the words McClintock herself uses to describe her process. Not 
only does the story of Barbara McClintock allow us to “explore the conditions under which 
dissent in science arises”, but a detailed description opens up a way of understanding the 
exact “function it serves, and the plurality of values and goals it reflects” (Keller, 1983, p. 
xx). “It makes us ask”, Keller writes, “What role do interests, individual and collective, 
play in the evolution of scientific knowledge?” (ibid). Keller thus enacts her commitment 
to unearthing marginal or excluded languages by taking seriously the language of an 




Keller’s biography, as well as McClintock’s science, have both found recognition 
since the early 1980s. The American historian Nathanial Comfort (2001), in his alternative 
account of McClintock’s life’s work, describes the afterlife of Keller’s biography. He 
claims that Keller and McClintock “fuelled each other’s fame” and that Keller’s book with 
its “timely” message became the foundation for a story that “seemed to epitomise women’s 
experience in science” and was taken up as a case in point in the feminist critique of science 
(p. 6). He argues that Keller’s biography was then taken up in a broader “manifesto of 
feminine science” (Keller, cited in Comfort, 2001, p. 6), which Keller herself bemoaned, 
on the grounds that she had hoped to open avenues for thinking about science that extended 
beyond binary, gendered norms. In this critical literature, Comfort claims, McClintock 
represented a different way of doing science, a ‘feminine’ approach, that focused on the 
individual in such a way as to combine the rational and emotional sides of intellect, in a 
way that was not masculine, “dominating, controlling, reductionist, rational, and linear” 
but “holistic, intuitive, interactionist, even mystical” (Comfort, p. 6).  
It is worth at this point comparing Comfort’s methodological approach to Keller’s 
in order to explicate how Keller’s approach reflects her research question, how this differs 
from Comfort’s question, and how her project is liable to being misunderstood. For 
Comfort, the afterlife of the Keller’s biography of McClintock outlined above is cause for 
an intervention. The fact that the biography was taken up by feminists to assert a different 
way of doing science appears unnecessarily essentialist to Comfort, perpetuating gendered 
models of doing science, and not an accurate reflection of McClintock’s contributions to 
the field of genetics. His critique, however, seems to skirt over the nuance of Keller’s 
original biography, focusing more on the book’s reception than the book itself. His critique 
of Keller seems to be that her book has been politicised, which he suggests is unscholarly, 
and that this propensity to politicisation is already reflected in certain biases in Keller’s 
methodology. Comfort explains how, unlike Keller who focused on a single interview, he 
draws on “correspondence and research notes” as well as the McClintock’s research papers, 
which are notoriously difficult to read, to give a story “much more complex” than “the one 
McClintock gave reporters and interviewers” (Comfort, p. 5). It seems that he sees in 
Keller’s method an uncritical and blind acceptance of McClintock’s account. To rectify this 
misinterpretation of the McClintock story, Comfort proposes a different methodological 
approach, in the form of ‘history’, as opposed to ‘mythology’: 
In the course of my research, many people have told me that McClintock detested 
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the status she attained as a feminist icon. Peeling back the mask reveals what is left 
out of the myth: the intimidating intellect, and fierce independence of McClintock 
the woman; her high visibility and continuing presence in the genetics community; 
and the complexity and historical situation of her science. In short, by examining 
her not as representative of a class but as a unique individual, we get to know a new 
Barbara McClintock, one with a distinctive style and a misunderstood contribution 
to the history of biological thought. 
Comfort, 2001, p. 8 [emphasis added] 
As opposed to Keller’s narrow focus, Comfort claims to add the perspective offered 
by comparison between various interviews and new archival material. This allows him, he 
contends, to reconstruct the experiments in order to place them in a broader context 
consisting of various scientific fields, and allows the implications of certain events, like the 
rediscovery of transposition in 1970s, to be more fully understood. He argues that this is 
needed to move beyond the politicised, misconstrued version of McClintock in feminist 
criticism. He, ironically, despite his critique of the essentialist model of feminine science 
made by feminists, makes a distinction between the figure as a public myth and their 
‘essential identity’, what he calls the ‘figure under the carpet’, the woman behind the mask. 
While he and Keller seem to agree, then, on the importance of describing a scientist’s style 
of thought, Comfort is interested in describing a singular, true version of McClintock and 
in using this to situate her in relation to an existing set of fields and paradigms in science; 
her attempts to explain her idiosyncrasy within the accepted language offered in the 
conventional modes of science. He says of what was described by Keller as McClintock’s 
‘feeling for the organism’: 
McClintock’s allegedly holistic, intuitive scientific style was in fact highly rational 
and based on immense experience and reading. All good scientists develop a feel 
for their experimental material. McClintock was distinctive in the speed and facility 
with which she solved problems and in her emphasis on the synthesis that follows 
reduction in any complete solution to a scientific problem. 
Comfort, 2001, p. 9  
Comfort counters the ‘unscientific’ language of affect used by Keller and others to 
describe McClintock’s style, betraying his aim to make her understood within an accepted 
set of scientific ideas and tradition of thought. Keller’s interest, however, lies in describing 
exactly how McClintock and her ideas came to relate to the scientific community, and to 
show what this tells us about the work of doing science itself, the causal dynamics by which 
it takes shape from the perspective of the individual. Keller is not interested in describing 
McClintock’s idiosyncrasies in order to situate her, but in using an interpolation of her 
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specific utterances to reflect on the criteria for truth in science, in what she is saying about 
doing science, not about who she is or the place of her discoveries after the fact in a history 
of a discipline. For Keller, like Comfort, McClintock was not remarkable for her 
commitment to holism. She shared with many ‘rational’ scientists “the credo that nature is 
lawful, and the dedication to the task of articulating those laws” as well as “the additional 
awareness that reason and experiment, generally claimed to be principal means of this 
pursuit, do not suffice” (Keller, 1983, p. 200). Many scientists have thought this way, Keller 
writes, and the vision of a rational science has coexisted with an image of science expressed 
as a “deep reverence for nature, a capacity for union with that which is to be known” 
throughout history” (ibid). She continues, 
In all this, McClintock is no exception. What is exceptional is her forthrightness of 
expression – the pride she takes in holding, and voicing, attitudes that run counter 
to our more customary ideas about science. In her mind, what we call the scientific 
method cannot by itself give us “real understanding”. “It gives us relationships 
which are useful, valid, and technically marvellous; however, they are not truth” 
(McClintock, 1978). And it is by no means the only way of acquiring knowledge. 
Keller, 1983, p. 201 
An emphasis on McClintock’s ‘style’, for Keller, is a way of focusing on her relation 
to the process of negotiating knowledge, a move away from essentialising notions of 
‘personality’, but a description of a specific approach, deduced from contextualised 
utterances, where the individual is always read against a backdrop of ‘community’. Keller’s 
approach requires detailed close readings, taking the supposedly limited source-material 
offered by a single interview seriously, and taking McClintock’s own language, metaphors, 
and paradigms seriously, in order to develop an understanding of how meaning is made 
through the interaction between individual and the multiple discourses in which they find 
themselves. For Keller, what is interesting about McClintock is her ability to articulate and 
describe in detail the aspects of scientific practice that are not expressed in the language of 
scientific journals or the rhetoric of scientists in general. Not only the story of the 
acceptance of her work, but her style as a whole, which encompasses the way she talks 
about science, her method, the way she engages with scientists, and the way she writes 
about it, make her a remarkable and rich case study for assessing how scientific knowledge 
is constructed.  
McClintock represents not only an object of study, but her language itself provides 
a tool or a lens through which to think through the negotiation of knowledge. Comfort 
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extensively describes McClintock’s style of thought as a set of ideas on the boundary of 
several disciplines and their respective criteria for knowledge. What a detailed description 
of a style of practice adds, is the ability to trace how ideas are expressed and formed, to 
locate the resistances and tensions that arise, and thereby the boundaries of paradigms for 
understanding in science as they take shape, in order to bring unacknowledged elements in 
the construction of knowledge to light.  
In my thesis, then, Comfort’s reading of Keller helps me describe the distinctiveness 
of Keller’s approach as a sociology of science. While I can appreciate some of Comfort’s 
concerns about the reception of Keller’s work and her heavy reliance on a single interview, 
his reading of her biography is reductive in exactly the sense that he claims Keller’s view 
of McClintock is, namely that he reads it only as a gendered argument. A more generous 
reading of Keller would show how she is constructing, through her focus on McClintock’s 
style of practice, a biography that appeals to a set of reference points outside of the history 
of a discipline or character traits of the individual, in order to bring to light the causal 
dynamics of the constitution of a particular set of facts, and to tell a life in its deeply 
embedded social context. In doing so, Keller offers a model that I draw upon in this 
dissertation.  
In developing my methodology, I thus take inspiration from Keller, also vis-à-vis 
my reading of Comfort, which, in itself, is a reading of Keller, which is a reading of 
McClintock’s interview. This is just one of the ways in which my methodology relies on 
‘readings of readings of readings’, a conceptual point that comes to bear on my analysis in 
important ways. My reading of Comfort helps foreground an important parallel between 
Keller’s work on McClintock, and my reading of Anne McLaren’s writing, namely the 
sense in which McLaren’s style of practice serves as an object of study, a life that needs to 
be explained, as well as a tool through which to understand the process of knowledge 
production itself – sociologically. An example helps to show how this resonance has 
enriched my methodology. 
In one of the most striking passages in Keller’s biography of McClintock, 
McClintock uses the analogy of a computer to describe how she cognitively processes her 
experimental observations. The mind, she says, functions “like a computer” – processing 
and integrating data far more complex than we can be conscious of. As she observed the 
corn in her experiments, all she was conscious of doing was “looking at these fine stripes 
of recessive tissue”; she says the computer did the rest. “And I never made a mistake” (cited 
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in Keller, 1983, p. 102). She goes on, 
It is done with complete confidence, complete understanding. I understood every 
plant. Without being able to know what it was I was integrating, I understood the 
phenotype. … It means I was using a computer that was working very rapidly and 
perfectly. I couldn’t train anyone to do that.  
McClintock in Keller, 1983, p. 103  
McClintock describes a process of integrating her data by referring to what Keller 
calls an internalised “point of reference” (p. 126), based on the sum total of her 
experimental observations and thinking that serves as an “organising scheme” (ibid) for the 
data she needs to interpret and represents a type of understanding that surpasses what she 
is directly conscious of. Keller explicates this method of doing science to reflect on the 
nexus between affect and knowledge. This computer was “mediating between the spots, 
the patterns they formed, and her internal vision” (Keller, p. 126). The internal vision, 
which McClintock describes using the impersonal, ‘unfeminine’, technical language of 
computation, is based on an intimate, affective, ‘feeling for the organism’ developed 
through an intimate relationship over time, and results in a striking confidence and 
conviction in her scientific interpretation. This unconventional description of her scientific 
process, Keller argues, explains the unreceptive response to her findings in the scientific 
community – it was the language she used to describe her methodology that fell outside of 
the conventions of the field.  
Comfort’s critique of Keller’s ‘unscientific’ use of limited source material betrays 
his misunderstanding of the role that McClintock’s account plays in Keller’s analysis. As 
we have seen, Keller wants to explain McClintock’s role in the history of her field(s), but 
this is done through an analysis of McClintock’s own language, in order to build upon these 
reference points as a basis for an account, exploring how these came to connect, or not, to 
dominant discourses at the time. It is in this sense that McClintock serves as both the object 
of study to be explained, and the tool through which a new account is built. Keller reads 
this methodological duality in McClintock’s account of her own process. Here, too, the 
corn provides both the object of study, at the same time that it is translated into experimental 
data that is integrated into an evolving internal, conceptual model of the relationships she 
is explaining – it is about understanding the corn and understanding through the corn; it is 
thus this self-reflexive process of modelling that eventually explains how the inanimate 
computer of the mind provides the basis for a ‘feeling for the organism’, how both 
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mathematical model and affect are involved in the ongoing negotiation of the relation 
between scientist and object, or social scientist and interviewee.  
Hermeneutics of practice  
The centrality of the process of interpretation to Keller’s reading of McClintock, and the 
way in which this process is recapitulated by Keller herself in her immersion in 
McClintock’s own reconstructions through language, is an approach that informs my 
understanding of my relationship to McLaren’s texts in this project. The approach I take is 
hermeneutic, by which I allude to the practice of textual interpretation in the humanities, 
derived from biblical study, in which deep readings of a text transcend the text in so far as 
they provide insight into the ‘meta-textual’ that, at the same time, is inherent to the nature 
of the word itself; the word always acquires its meaning within a historical, political, social 
context. Hermeneutics has been integral to poststructuralism in sociology and was deployed 
by members of the ‘interpretative turn’ in the 1970s, as a radicalising force for the 
understanding of social science. Anthropologists Paul Rabinow and Robert Sullivan (1979) 
wrote in Interpretative Social Science that they were drawing on the analogy between text 
and action, textual meanings and social meanings, to revitalise social science and move it 
away from an economistic, scientistic, rationalistic paradigm towards a humanities 
paradigm in which we can understand social meaning to be as impactful as social structure. 
Unlike the previous epistemological models in the sciences, such as logical empiricism, 
and even the later systems approaches, such as structuralism, within the human sciences – 
all based on the opposition between subjective and objective – the interpretive approach 
rejects the possibility of reducing the world of signification to the stable “products of self-
consciousness” (p.5). Instead, they assert, interpretation must always begin from within 
“the web of meaning” that “constitutes human existence” (p. 5). As the philosopher Charles 
Taylor reiterates in his contribution to the anthology, “meaning is for a subject, in a 
situation; it is about something; and it exists as part of a field; there are no simple elements 
of meaning” and this, in turn, means that “human life … cannot be shielded from open 
interference and studied in a vacuum or a scientifically controlled environment”, but 
instead our “capacity to understand is rooted in our own self-definitions”, in a cultural 
world consisting of the “web of signification we ourselves have spun” (ibid). There is no 
outside or detached standpoint from which to observe. On the contrary, when we try to 
understand the cultural world, Taylor writes, “we are dealing with interpretations and 
interpretations of interpretations” (Taylor, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 6). 
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In trying to develop a methodology in which, given this understanding of meanings 
as interpretation, we might still mediate and judge between conflicting versions, scholars 
of the interpretive turn looked to a “transformed version of textual criticism in the 
humanities” (ibid). To understand a text is to follow its movements from “sense to 
reference”, from what it says to what it talks about, and so the role of the critic becomes to 
“display the power of disclosure implied in” the author’s “discourse beyond the limited 
horizon of his own existential situation” by exposing the conditions of its existence 
(Ricoeur, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 100). In this approach, “understanding 
any action is analogous to textual interpretation” (ibid).  
This means that the intelligibility of any action requires reference to its larger 
context: a cultural world. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1972), in this way, 
describes the Balinese cockfight as a cultural script, by progressively incorporating other 
essential national symbols, institutions, and practices that he shows are necessary to an 
understanding of this “event” (Geertz, p. 84). Again, the role of the critic is itself one of 
interpretation, that re-enacts the epistemology on which the method is based. The aim for 
Geertz is “not to uncover universals or laws but rather to explicate context and the world” 
(Rabinow and Sullivan on Geertz, 1958, p. 13) by using the cockfight not as an object to 
be understood, but as a node in a web of meaning to be contextualised. It is in this sense, 
like McClintock for Keller, or corn for McClintock, that the critic performs a process of 
understanding ‘with’ and ‘through’. 
In my reading of McLaren, I use a similar hermeneutic approach in order to 
explicate the ‘meaning’ of a life. I show how a particular style of practice was exercised 
across sectors, describing the particular cultural and social worlds through which this was 
enacted through close readings of texts, to draw together these meanings in my own 
interpretation of this life as indexical of a cultural-political moment in the legislation on 
biomedicine. I read McLaren, like Geertz’s cockfight, as a cultural script, as a condensation 
of meaning that needs to be unravelled through readings of her utterances in their always 
deeply embedded context. I also use this hermeneutical reading of a style of practice as a 
way of reading history ‘sociologically’, by which I mean that I read the history of the public 
debate on human embryo research in Britain as a history of social transformation, a history 
of the birth of a law not just in terms of what the sociologist Michael Mulkay (1997) 
describes in his analysis of the debates as the outcome of political machinations, but 
through the actions of the people who had a transformative role. Their role was not just as 
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individuals in a situation, but as individuals over a lifetime by establishing a style of 
practice that was influential over and over again across different sectors in a way that was 
transformative. Meaning, in my account, only emerges in a context, as ‘meaning for’, and 
can only be summarised an accumulation of these instances.  
I furthermore show that McLaren’s role was transformative precisely because she 
also had an unconventional understanding of the role that scientists should play in public 
debate. She brought this transformative insight to social situations. In McLaren’s view, as 
I show throughout this dissertation, scientific models were developed very much through 
what I call the ‘translational’ work of reconciling conflicting meanings in order to arrive at 
a way forward in the form of a model relationship between domains – biological, legal, 
clinical, ethical –in answer to a particular question. This solution makes sense 
pragmatically, but not, in her view, ‘definitively’ or ‘objectively’, as much as that word 
even applies in a discussion of an ‘open-system’ that can only ever be understood from the 
vantage point of the embedded individual. McLaren, then, exercised a method and filled a 
role that resonates with the interpretive approach, in that her epistemological model 
displaces the fixed subject–object relation with an iterative, interactive model.  
As we see in Chapter 3, in her scientific work McLaren also relied on a method of 
modelling gene–environment interactions in the mouse across the fields of reproductive, 
developmental and molecular biology. These experiments presented analogies, she 
explains, for the same theoretical problem, and helped consolidate her understanding of 
this dynamic over the course of her career, filling out a model of how an organism gets 
‘from one generation to the next’. Here, as with McClintock according to Keller, we see 
another expression of an unconventional nexus between the conventionally dichotomous 
domains of knowledge and affect, tool and object of study. McLaren uses the scientific 
tools available to her to model an organism, building what we might call a feeling as the 
organism, using all the scientific tools she can from a variety of fields, communicating and 
translating the problem within these domains in order to build an understanding through 
assimilation of individual experiments into an expanding internal model – working with 
and through her object to build a scientific picture. McLaren did, after all, have her own 
computational influences, not only in her training with the ecological geneticist E. B. Ford 
at Oxford, but also as a result of her early experiments alongside Donald Michie, whose 
background in artificial intelligence as one of the leading code-breakers at Bletchley Park 
during the war is palpable in McLaren’s methods of schematising her results in such studies 
 
23 
as the maternal influence on the number of lumbar vertebrae in mice in the early 1950s, 
and on. But these computational models were developed through a trained and intricate 
understanding of the biological system model at hand. Marylin Monk (2001), in this way, 
recalls how McLaren used to teach her students using blunt instruments and bad 
microscopes with suboptimal magnification, training them to work semi-blind so that the 
power they gained from suitable equipment, once they were assigned to a big problem, was 
magnified. She recalls,  
But Anne taught me that, by honing my own skills of dexterity and visual sense, I 
could observe more accurately than the most elaborate expensive machines and 
equipment. I learnt to work at the lowest magnification possible to ‘leave room’ for 
later more exacting work in the microenvironment of the embryo.  
Monk, 2001, p. 497 
As for McClintock, in McLaren’s style of practice, too, the tool is only part of a 
process that is centrally about the individual’s capacity to build an understanding of the 
organism incrementally through cumulative experiments in which she exercised the same 
approach to modelling relations, integrating these into a growing internal model through a 
process of relating – results, people, tools – in order to read with and through the organism 
to arrive at a working model. McLaren, then, like McClintock, was practicing a different 
way of relating to her object through a hermeneutical process based on models that served 
as analogies, making explicit her interpretive lens and showing how the scientist is 
intimately involved with their object of study.  
There is a sense in which I echo McLaren’s approach in order to explicate her 
position. What I call a ‘hermeneutics of practice’ links McLaren’s style of practice with my 
own method, which has in common the same assumptions, namely that repeatedly bringing 
an underlying understanding to a situation is transformative and that this effect is 
cumulative. By reading McLaren’s texts across sectors, in the context of the HF&E debates, 
her scientific work and her political writing, I show how her life can be summarised as a 
pattern that results from her distinctive approach of feeling, communicating, connecting 
and facilitating within specific contexts. I show how this constituted a distinctive pro-
research argument and how this provided a model for the relations between science and 
society more broadly. This close reading of individual acts of persuasion that accumulate 
to build a view of McLaren’s style of practice allows me to trace her specific negotiation 
of scientific facts in a public debate to ask how tensions within these texts reveal modes of 
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thinking and doing that ran counter to certain dominant notions of ‘scientific’ at the time.  
In combination with interviews that explore the legacy of McLaren and her policy 
contributions, I am able to ascertain to what extent McLaren was able to communicate, to 
persuade – how the relationship between science and society during the HF&E debates, of 
which she is an indexical case study, changed. I repeatedly bring this interpretive practice 
of close reading to the question of McLaren’s style of intervention, which was itself based 
on a distinctive understanding, thereby offering a reading of a life through the lenses of 
cultural and political worlds, fulfilling the credo to “display the power of disclosure implied 
in” the author’s “discourse beyond the limited horizon of his own existential situation” 
(Ricoeur, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 100).  
McLaren’s work in science, policy and politics provides another powerful example 
of the validity of a scientific approach that centralises the process of interpretation through 
feeling, communicating, modelling and conceptualising, and here also forms the basis of 
my sociological project, both substantively by documenting McLaren’s approach, and 
methodologically by taking an individual’s utterances as my point of departure in order to 
build a portrait of an era. It is in this sense that my readings of Keller allow me to bring 
under-theorised models for thinking about science as hermeneutical to light through 
McLaren, at the same time that it guides my thinking as I develop a new sociological model 
for explaining the evolution of scientific facts in public debate through the hermeneutics of 
practice – all by foregrounding the process of interpretation.  
Theoretical background: Sociologies of translation  
In the previous section, I introduced the guiding methodology for this dissertation, which 
is based on the insight that McLaren’s style of practice was actually a broadly 
encompassing ethos based on an understanding of science as very much a part of society. 
Key to this approach in the context of the human fertilisation and embryology debates, was 
McLaren’s use of the prospect of clinical translation in her arguments. The account of 
McLaren’s conceptualising of the biological model in the wake of the clinical translation 
of IVF, as well the PGD in the making, revealed how McLaren used the prospect of clinical 
translation to build social consensus. The centrality of clinical translation in McLaren’s 
deliberative process, and the ways in which this conceptualisation differs from 
contemporary ‘pipeline’ models that has come to characterise post-millennial policy 
rhetoric, made this a key thematic focus as I drew the lessons from my case study that might 
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be applicable to policy discussions today. This leads me in this dissertation to develop a 
model, drawing on McLaren’s own language, for translation in the context of negotiating 
science policy today. I make a case for a broader understanding of the meanings 
encompassed by the sociological and scientific uses of the concept of ‘translation’ as the 
basis for a more clearly defined role for scientists in public deliberation. 
My emphasis on translation has been inspired by the project, Life in Translation, 
led by Professor Sarah Franklin, Dr Noémie Merleau-Ponty and Karen Jent of the 
Sociology of Reproduction (ReproSoc) group at the University of Cambridge. This is a 
project that aims to broaden the scope of practices that are considered when describing the 
process by which “biology is brought into conversation with, directed at and converted into 
applications” (Life in Translation, University of Cambridge website, Accessed 15 August 
2018). Whereas conventional definitions of translation used in science policy today 
emphasise bench-to-bedside, or research-into-practice flows of knowledge, this project 
explores the relationships between regenerative medicine and reproductive technologies, 
“the biotechnical and socio-ethical dimensions of translation between reproduction and 
regeneration paying attention to increasing emphases on inter-disciplinarity and public 
engagement” (ibid). Its interest is in the turn to dialogue in science policy and how this 
might invoke new relationships “between science and society”, and to bring to light how 
translation can often be “more productively addressed through its misconceptions and 
misunderstandings” (ibid).  
The case I describe in this thesis exemplifies many of these hidden connections and 
dimensions of translation. In this thesis, I contribute a set of ‘translations’ that emerge 
through the telling of an individual’s role in public debate, as well as her biography. Here I 
will refer to two key sociological literatures on translation, in order to situate my thesis and 
my agenda as part of the project of bringing sociologists and scientists together over the 
shared problem of translation. I return in Chapter 4 to a discussion of the specific lessons 
that can be drawn from McLaren’s role, to inform science policy discussions in the field of 
reproductive and regenerative medicine today.  
First, I draw on translation as a paradigm that captures how concepts can connect 
researchers across labs and research groups, providing common, workable ground. This 
was a key theme in the literature on the sociology of translation of the 1980s. For scholars 
such as Michel Callon (1986) and Bruno Latour (1987), translation is an analytical 
category, used to describe how scientific objects, theories and evidence are made. Theorists 
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such as Joan Fujimura (1987, 1988) and Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer (1989) 
have, in this vein, described scientific translation specifically as a process of negotiating 
coherence across disparate professional communities through shared conceptual or 
physical resources and practices that travel geographically and between fields in order to 
solve overlapping problems. McLaren, too, I will show, was particularly adept at finding 
common ground by developing conceptual models, as well as physical tools, as she 
travelled between domains of knowledge, disciplinary fields, and political regimes. 
Interestingly, she often does this by referring to clinical translation, by showing how it 
represents a set of values and feelings shared by various groups – scientists and potential 
patients alike. McLaren’s case thus offers insight into the ‘sociological’ translation involved 
in arriving at ‘scientific’, clinical translation.  
This emphasis on shared conceptual tools, can be used to explicate the priorities, 
aims, and ideologies contained in a fixed translational goal, by revealing the potential 
trajectories and research directions that are omitted, discarded or suppressed. In what 
follows, I offer various examples of the way in which McLaren made use of models based 
on a layering of perspectives to show how these overlapped over a shared clinical objective. 
McLaren, in this way, can also be placed in a tradition of biologists who believed in the 
power of visualisation, models, and paradigms, to reframe the questions in science. Most 
notably the embryologist and polymath C. H. Waddington, with his diagram of 
embryogenesis in the form of a ‘visual metaphor’ called the epigenetic landscape (Squier, 
2017), served at first to connect scientists across embryology and genetics, but later, as the 
cultural critic Susan Squier (2017) shows, came to serve as a ‘neutral epistemic object’ 
across a variety of fields and professions. This reveals the efficacy of metaphorical 
thinking, of fluid concepts, in connecting and providing workable common ground.  
As I describe McLaren’s models and style of practice, I also come to offer my own 
translational models that serve as summaries of the thinking and language McLaren herself 
used. I introduce these in recognition of the ways in which these can be used to connect 
across fields, and entire domains – not just science and sociology, but also ethics, feeling, 
policy, and the law. Through this thesis, I hope to invoke scientists and policy-makers to 
replicate the kind of thinking that is in part reminiscent of the sociology of translation of 
the 1980s, and of McLaren herself, in finding shared languages. These concepts are often 
neither strictly scientific nor sociological, but hybrid and abstracted, and essential to setting 
clinical goals in a way that is representative, democratic and fair.  
 
27 
The way that ‘translation’ is understood by scientists today, is based on a discourse 
that emerged within the life sciences in response to a largely policy-driven, heightened 
sense of urgency about the delivery of tangible benefits for human health in the late 1990s. 
This approach emphasised the need for deliverables in what became known as the 
translational ‘pipeline’ and was accompanied by a host of pressures, tensions and confusion 
among laboratory scientists. Indeed, the first empirical research on clinical translation 
initiated by sociologists in science studies at the turn of the millennium emphasised the 
gaps that were experiences by stakeholders in the actual process of arriving at a clinical 
translation (see e.g. Cambrosio et al., 2006; Löwy, 1996). These studies explored the gap 
between the laboratory and the clinic that translation supposedly filled with a seamless 
pipeline model.  
Interestingly, ethnographies of clinics and interview-based research have also been 
used to develop a new approach to public deliberation and bioethics. Wainwright and his 
colleagues, for example, explain how science and technology studies work by “exploring 
scientists’ views on the ethical issues relating to their research (e.g. Michael and Birke, 
1994)” and showing “the ways in which ethical dilemmas and reasoning occur in the 
clinical setting” can provide models for the wider policy discussions of biomedicine, 
contrasting this approach to the “dominant, disembodied ways in which ethical reasoning 
is traditionally presented in philosophical bioethics (Haimes, 2002, Hedgecoe, 2004) and 
in philosophical science ethics (Resnik, 1998)” (Wainwright et al., 2013, p. 43).  
The gaps between lab and clinic, brought to light by scientists themselves, and a 
systematic account of how these are negotiated inform not only a sociological account of 
knowledge production, but a sociological model for ‘doing ethics’ through collaboration. 
The paradigm of translation provides a common language between sociologists and 
scientists, as they map the trajectories and issues as they emerge in specific contexts. The 
field of regenerative medicine provides a particularly effective case study in this sense, as 
the very biological models being used to utilise technologies, such as stem-cells, reflect the 
complexity that the unilinear pipeline model does not accommodate. The language of 
scientists, as they describe these models in the context of translation, provides particularly 
fertile common ground for sociologists and scientists as they attempt to broaden the 
frameworks used to understand how the actual and potential connections between the lab 
and the clinic are formed in the negotiation of science and society.  
Just as sociologists of clinical translation have done, I focus on the multiple and 
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contradictory nature of translation. Indeed, post-millennial sociological scholars of clinical 
translation have emphasised the complexity of the world of translational biomedicine 
leading to a need for conceptual and methodological expansion. Social analyst Michael 
Fischer (2012), for example, lists the various contexts in which translation occurs, thereby 
indicating the need for a broader conception of the term:  
Translation (across science fields and technological scales; from bench to clinic, or 
from green fingers to stable techniques and scalable production; and from 
experimental therapy to standards of care) and capital (financial, legal, symbolic, 
scientific) are the two linchpins of both the Alice in Wonderland worlds and the 
indirection of scientific opportunistic development. Both are lively, fluid, ever-
moving.  
Fischer, 2012, p. 388 
This is an ambitious project, requiring mixed methodologies and new concepts. I 
attempt, in this thesis, to map several of the shifting and multiple forms of translation as 
they arise in my description of Anne McLaren’s role in the HF&E debates, thereby 
contributing to the interrogation of the process of translation by adding a detailed and 
textured account. Not only does this add to the multiple senses in which we can describe 
and schematise the process of translation, I also explore the role of the under-theorized 
‘human’ perspective can play in such accounts, of how a detailed focus on the individual 
might relate to a systematic mapping of actors in the process of translation. This should be 
a welcome addition to the sociology of translation, considering that, as Fischer writes, 
“actor-network theory admits that the theory doesn’t handle personhood or culture or 
people very well” (2012, p. 386). Yet this is about more than adding a ‘human’ side to 
accounts of clinical translation, as Fischer explains: 
This is not a call for journalistic “human interest” or “genius scientist” writing, but 
a meditation on the mix of detailing – organisational, historical, intellectual- 
genealogical, political-economic, material-technological, as well as the 
singularities of events, passions, and competitive bootstrapping – required to 
upgrade ethnographic work on the biosciences so that it can be in conversation with 
the understandings of practitioners.  
Fischer, 2012, pp. 386–7 [emphasis added] 
I have devised a methodology that does just this – that moves between the macro-
social, the individual, the historical and genealogical, the singular and the interactive, to 
develop a model that might be of use to both sociologists in their attempts to model 
translation, as well as to scientists, as a case in point of the role they might play in the 
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scientific-social-political-affective-ethical process of translation.  
In my account, I expose the gaps described in the field of biomedicine above, as 
they appear in the process of moving from the Warnock recommendations to the HF&E 
legislation and beyond, in the legacy of the Act. Gaps characterise, I show, the process of 
arriving at consensus over a clinical application. Consensus is built on fracture, on partial 
agreement and alignment over a temporary common goal. By including in my 
understanding of translation both the emphasis on shared objects of the sociology of 
translation of the 1980s and the post-millennial emphasis on the gaps between lab and clinic 
– the glitches in the pipeline – I hope to show how both characterise the process of 
translation; the existence of gaps does not preclude consensus but defines it. Just as the 
sociology of translation of the 1980s showed how disparate elements were brought together 
to constitute knowledge, the sociology of clinical translation shows the gaps in the process 
of arriving at common ground. This understanding of the relationship between gaps and 
consensus informs an ethical model that can be applied to discussions on science policy in 
biomedicine today, as I argue in Chapter 4.  
My account focuses on a time that precedes the rise of translational science in the 
1990s; nonetheless it is useful to refer to this literature in my analysis because the questions 
that were being addressed in the context of the HF&E debates, the implementation of IVF 
– the place of research, the development of PGD – all raised similar questions and in many 
ways created the legislative environment for this translational turn in Britain in the context 
of reproductive biology and regenerative medicine (Banchoff, 2011). Moreover, questions 
regarding how legislation should respond to new clinical possibilities are just as pertinent 
today, with the discussions, for example, around the extension of the 14-day rule and the 
plethora of new clinical possibilities in regenerative medicine posing new regulatory 
challenges.  
I draw on a case study from a time when clinical possibilities were being broadly 
discussed – also, unusually, by scientists in the public – as testament to the efficacy of 
combining sociological and scientific perspectives when thinking through science policy 
around clinical translation – in this case in the field of human reproduction. This is not just 
an argument for introducing sociological concerns or concepts into scientists’ discussions 
about clinical translation, but like the researchers behind the Life in Translation project, I 
hope to show that sociologists and scientists share a common question with regard to 
translation. The question of how and why clinical translation today takes the shape that it 
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does for sociologists, and the question of how to negotiate these translational pressures for 
scientists, both revolve around the same central tension (noted in postmillennial 
sociological scholarship on translation) that has always existed – the gap between the 
toolkit available to the medical scientific community and the ongoing difficulty of curing 
human disease. ‘Translational thinking’, I will show, helps define the task of the scientist 
and the sociologist over a shared challenge that reframes the ‘ethical’ questions in 
discussions of biomedicine, in contrast to the bioethical emphasis on the status and value 
of biological materials, as a social problem. Positioning ourselves on the cusp between our 
current technological capabilities and projected, shared research goals defines the task of 
clinical translation for all those involved.  
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Chapter 1  
Carrying forward the Warnock model: Translating the 
‘pre-embryo’ 
The first translation: Biological vision 
In 1984, when the Warnock Report was released, the Government gave little indication of 
how they intended to act, seemingly still reluctant to dirty their hands on the controversial 
issue of research on human embryos, which had never been legislated on by any 
government (Edwards et al., 1993; Franklin and Roberts, 2006; Lee and Morgan, 2001). In 
the six years that passed between the release of the Report and government legislation in 
1990, there were extensive parliamentary and public debates that, unlike the Warnock 
Report and its emphasis on infertility, focused predominantly on the issue of human embryo 
research (Mulkay, 1997). The difficulties of trying to fill a legal vacuum, as well as this 
governmental reluctance to act, characterised the staggered nature of the debate, as it 
moved through committees and bodies either indirectly set up by the Government or 
independently initiated in lieu of any official response. This unfolding also saw the gradual 
awakening of embryologists to their role in the debates. Many of the scientists I 
interviewed, who were active alongside McLaren on the pro-research lobby, described to 
me how they became aware of the extent of the public hostility to research, which they saw 
as primarily the product of inadequate understanding of early embryonic development (e.g. 
Gardner and Graham, interview with author, 27 September 2018; Pembrey, interview with 
author, 17 October 2018; Winston, interview with author, 26 September, 2018). The 
discussions between scientists and non-scientists in the debate were thus initially 
problematized by ignorance on both sides – both by the scientists’ lack of awareness about 
the state of public knowledge, and the non-scientists’ lack of knowledge about the events 
of pre-implantation embryonic development.  
This bilateral myopia provided the background against which communication 
would have to take place in order to reach a consensus understanding of the entity initially 
at the centre of the discussions – the human embryo. In developing a case in favour of 
research, the pro-research lobby was initially hard-pressed to find a convincing alternative 
to the dogmatic stance taken by pro-lifers that asserted that life began at conception, and 
that any research on human embryos was, therefore, immoral (Mulkay, 1997). The pro-
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research rhetoric eventually became characterised by a term that McLaren introduced into 
the debates – the ‘pre-embryo’. While the term itself was highly contested and eventually 
disappeared from official legislation as well as embryological literature, it acts as a nexus 
for the broader contestations around the role that scientists and scientific information would 
play in the pro-research case.  
My focus on McLaren’s particular role in developing the case for the ‘pre-embryo’ 
introduces some important nuances into previous analyses of the term (e.g. Crowe, 1990; 
Deech and Smajdor, 2007; Franklin, 2013c; Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 2005; 
Lee and Morgan, 2001; Spallone, 1987; Steinberg, 1990; Strathern, 1992). While many 
scholars of the debates have shown how the term was key to the organisation of a pro-
research lobby (Birke, Himmelweit and Vines, 1990; Mulkay, 1994), in these analyses, the 
‘pre-embryo’ is usually presented as part of a reactionary argument, merely providing an 
alternative locus to which to attach the same values, and the special status of early human 
life that the anti-research lobby ascribed to the human embryo from conception. My 
analysis shows that the term was indeed part of an iterative process of rallying support in 
favour of research, but that, in doing so, the biological model denoted by the term ‘pre-
embryo’ represented a set of facts that was used to make a case in favour of research that 
was justified in terms of the good it could do for society.  
The pro-lobby case, therefore, did not hinge on the ontological distinction between 
‘pre-embryo’ and embryo-proper, but on a systemic ethical argument, instantiated by Mary 
Warnock’s framing of the debate in the Warnock Report (1984). This social way of framing 
the question at hand differed vastly from the model of the anti-research lobby that revolved 
around defending the rights of the embryo as an abstracted entity. Indeed, the history of 
McLaren’s use of the ‘pre-embryo’ allows me to trace a shift in which the biological model 
becomes increasingly relative to a set of clinical applications that are framed and defended 
in terms of the good they can do to society, denoting a different role for both scientific 
information, and the scientist herself, in public debate. In this chapter, after outlining the 
approach taken by Warnock and describing McLaren’s contributions to the Warnock 
Committee, I will reconstruct the role that the scientific narrative played in the pro-lobby 
case by referring to my interviews with the scientists involved, as well as through a series 
of close readings of the public information material produced by McLaren over the course 
of the debates. 
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The Warnock embryo  
The Warnock Committee, in 1982, faced the unprecedented task in the context of UK 
policy-making, of examining the “social, ethical and legal implications of recent and 
potential developments in the field of human assisted reproduction” with an eye to advising 
Government on legislation (Warnock, 1985, p. vi). As Mary Warnock stressed in an 
interview with me, she saw this as a problem of defining the embryo: 
… an embryo alive in a dish in the laboratory was an entity that had never existed 
before, so there was absolutely no way that one could find any analogy from any 
other ethical dilemma. So, it was quite frightening actually, having to lay down the 
law based on what was morally acceptable with regard to an entity that had never 
existed before. And it was really, branching out into completely new territory at that 
time.  
Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018 
Warnock thus saw her most difficult task as the ethical1 and legal problem of 
defining the embryo as an entity. As it turned out, she took a tack for which she was 
criticised by philosophers, even the so-called ‘applied’ philosophers, who, unlike the meta-
ethicists, believed that philosophy could incorporate “description of the complexities of 
actual choices and actual decisions, and also discussion of what would count as reasons for 
making this or that decision” (Warnock, cited in Wilson 2014, p. 143). When it came to 
advising the Government on the status of the embryo, Warnock saw limitations to every 
philosophical approach, arguing that even the philosophical position with which she was 
often associated, utilitarianism,2 would not in itself solve the issue of what the embryo is, 
 
1 I use the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ in the first instance to reflect their use by Warnock and McLaren 
themselves throughout the Warnock discussions and the wider debates. Warnock has confirmed in personal 
correspondence that their use of the terms did not reflect any particular philosophical distinction but was used 
colloquially: ‘morality’ more generally with reference to individual behaviour rather than group behaviour or 
public measures. ‘Unethical’ and ‘medical ethics’ were, for example, used as opposed to ‘medical morality’. 
I later develop the sense of an ethos to describe a model for ethical policy-making. Here, my use of the term 
‘ethics’ is closer to that of sociologist Charis Thompson in her book Good Science (2013), where ethics refers 
to the “activities … in which various actors … advocate for some way of proceeding with … research over 
others on the grounds that they would be better for some people or things in some way” (p. 26). 
2 Generally, I use ‘utilitarianism’ to refer to the philosophical position, and ‘pragmatism’ to describe the 
approach Warnock took to justifying the 14-day rule, which, as Warnock (1985) has written, and as I show in 
this chapter, was utilitarian up to an extent but also ‘sentimental’, in that it the committee deemed research 
 
34 
as this decision would always require ethical feelings, as well as rational arguments. As 
Duncan Wilson (2014) suggests in his assessment of Warnock’s contribution to the 
development of what he calls ‘British bioethics’, this meant that, for Warnock, “a 
philosopher could help to clarify the properties and consequences of a particular moral 
standpoint” but “could not prove or otherwise show conclusively that one view is to be 
preferred to another” (p. 168). She took instead what might be called a sociological view, 
arguing that disagreement was “unavoidable’” in a pluralistic society that always lacks “an 
agreed set of principles which everyone, or the majority, or any representative person 
believes to be absolutely binding” – especially in “areas of moral concern which are 
radically and genuinely new” (Warnock, 1985, p. xi). She therefore also opted for a kind of 
sociological pragmatism that aimed to find a resolution that would be acceptable to most 
people so that the law would reflect the “minimum requirement for a tolerable society” 
(Warnock, 1985, p. 3). This approach diverged from contemporaneous attempts to make 
recommendations for the regulation of IVF and embryology, such as the Glover Report 
(Glover, 1989), presented to the European Commission, which foregrounded individual 
choice and freedom, as opposed to the social problem that is the organising principle in the 
Warnock Report. 
Warnock received criticism for her ‘compromise solution’ from philosophers, 
opponents and proponents of research alike. Warnock was convinced from early on, 
however, that supporting scientific progress in aid of new clinical applications was morally 
right. She nonetheless also believed that this would entail setting strict limits in law that 
would not be crossed. She intended to do all this while avoiding the question of embryonic 
status, which, especially given the irreconcilable ‘ethical feelings’ referred to, she saw as a 
dead end. Instead, she reframed the question in line with her philosophy and her moral 
conviction, as one of how to treat the embryo, or, “at what stage do you have to treat the 
human embryo as needing to be protected in the way that one treated the child that had 
been born as needing protection?” (Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018). The 
 
desirable because its potential benefits were so great, but that the decision that research should be capped at 
14 days was based on the sense that the connection between these cells and a future baby is “extremely 
remote” and therefore “based on their own feelings and those expressed in evidence”, and so also based on a 
broadly shared sense of morality, “once again, social, an idea of social morality” (pp. 517–518). I describe 
later how this pragmatism can also be regarded as distinctly sociological. 
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Warnock investigation thus became one of establishing limits to practice based on solid 
justifications, as opposed to definitive bans or any claims to the status of the embryo ipso 
facto. This pragmatic framing of the question thus required a solid, scientific case for a 
proposed set of applications that incorporated biologically justifiable limits that could be 
translated into law; Warnock needed what McLaren eventually referred to as ‘landmarks’, 
or transition points, in early human development that could provide a rationale for a broadly 
applicable set of regulations. This meant that Warnock came to rely heavily on McLaren, 
who was the only practising embryologist on the Committee. As we shall see, the case that 
was developed primarily by Warnock and McLaren and then later carried forward by the 
pro-research lobby following the publication of the Warnock Report, depended on two 
central translations, enumerated to reflect their order of precedence in the case developed 
by McLaren. The first was the translation of biological facts of early embryonic 
development into a socially meaningful account. The second was a translation of this 
biology into clinical applications – a demonstration of the possible interventions into this 
process that could improve on natural reproduction, that itself, as we shall see, required 
another set of translations. 
McLaren’s role on the Warnock Committee, then, was one of providing a biological 
rationale for legislation. As it turned out, though, this required more than imparting a 
standardised description of early embryonic development. McLaren’s account of the facts 
of life was from the onset attune to the Warnock framing – of how the embryo should be 
treated in a tolerable society. In the account McLaren provided for the Committee, she made 
a case for thresholds in biology based on an awareness that these were drawn for social 
reasons. Her biological account was therefore never only biological but was framed by a 
legal and sociological question. This is evident in the case she developed for the so-called 
‘pre-embryonic’ period of development; not only the arguments she provided in support of 
the distinction, but also how she used her role as a scientist to build an allegiance around 
it.  
First, I will describe how McLaren delineated the ‘pre-embryonic’ period in her 
biological account for the Committee. I will then move on to show how McLaren carried 
this term forward post-Warnock Committee, and how this reflected her evolving 
understanding of her role as a scientist in the public debate.  
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Social framings: Landmarks in a continuum 
 
Figure 1. The Spiral. In “Where to Draw the Line”, Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, 56, 
1984, p. 106. 
In this diagram McLaren schematises embryonic development as a process that extends 
across the generations, encompassing the pregnant mother, her baby, and the baby’s 
developing germ cells. She uses the diagram to show that development is a cyclical process 
in which any line that is drawn will, therefore, be biologically arbitrary and will always 
rely on social, legal and ethical considerations to be meaningful. McLaren makes less use 
of the cyclical argument as the human embryology debates progressed, opting instead for 
linear diagrams that helped her make a stronger case for the ways in which the particular 
transition in development at the primitive streak was socially, ethically and legally 
meaningful, and that would come to substantiate the arguments for the 14-day rule.  
The paper, Where to Draw the Line, was published in 1984, but an earlier version 
presented by McLaren to the Warnock Committee had provided the biological rationale for 
legal lines that Warnock had sought. As Warnock stated in an interview with Sarah Franklin 
and Martin Johnson,  
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[W]hat Anne had provided us with was a kind of rationale, I mean we could justify 
picking on that particular day, at 14 days, because of what Anne had taught us about 
the development of the embryo and the date after conception at which 
differentiation began. And once we’d got that into our heads, then in a way, 
everything flowed from that. ... [O]nce you got a regulatory line beyond which, if 
you passed beyond which, you committed a criminal offence, then you needed some 
justification for having the line – the essential thing was to have a line. And so we 
didn’t say anything like that the embryo before 14 days or fifteen days, was 
completely different from the embryo after the fifteen days, we just told the story 
of the development of the embryo, the appearance of the primitive streak, the 
subsequent differentiation, and the fact, too, that identical twins could form up to 
fifteen days, all that – there’s a sort of combined rationale for having put 14 days as 
the time.  
Warnock, interview with M. Johnson and S. Franklin, London, 11 June 2008, Mammalian 
Developmental Biology Interviews, British Library 
In this paper, McLaren makes explicit the extra-scientific considerations that 
structure the account of embryogenesis used by the Committee – the need for laws and 
limits that represent consensus in a society. As the Inquiry moved forward with its 
recommendations, as Warnock indicates, this social framing of the biological narrative was 
left much more implicit and the distinctions it makes are increasingly presented as objective 
biological facts – evident in the increasingly common use of the new scientific term ‘pre-
embryo’ – to denote the mass of cells up to the emergence of the primitive streak around 
14 days after fertilisation.  
However, McLaren helpfully lays out the reasoning underpinning the divisions that 
she made in the biological narrative (For an analysis of this paper, see also: Franklin, 2019). 
She opens the paper by discussing the relationship between biology and ‘landmarks’. The 
landmarks she considers are “birth” and “infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood”, 
which never map perfectly onto biological change – their relationship differs depending on 
the individual or the biological system being studied, and they are “arbitrary” as biology is 
in fact a “continuum” (McLaren, 1984, p. 102). McLaren thus describes the social basis of 
these landmarks in development after birth; they reflect biological events, but these 
categories only acquire their meaning in relation to specific questions asked about biology 
and at best reflect a population average. She then notes that the lines drawn in law, as 
opposed to biology, are expressed “in terms of chronological age, rather than in terms of 
biological landmarks” but that, “given that developments in biomedical science make the 
embryo more accessible to interference”, this will be necessary in the case of early 
embryonic development (ibid).  
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McLaren thereby frames the problem that she is trying to address with her 
biological narrative as one particular negotiation of the relationship between biological 
facts and the law. She has also indicated how this negotiation might be conducted, namely 
through a process of layering social concepts onto biological information – a 
superimposition that will never be seamless but is unavoidable when trying to identify 
“landmarks in the continuum of biological development” (p.101). The description of early 
embryonic development that follows is accordingly structured around several socially 
relevant landmarks. These criteria are “uniqueness, which is a genetic phenomenon; the 
addition of new genetic material; individuality, which relates to the organism as a whole; 
brain function, which is necessary but certainly not a sufficient condition for consciousness; 
and viability” (p. 107). McLaren then opens her biological account by describing the early 
formation of germ cells that precede the formation of the embryo. She explains,  
When you look at a pregnant woman, you are actually looking at three generations: 
the woman herself, the baby in her uterus, and the germ cells inside that baby’s 
gonads, which are already well-developed and playing their part in the germ-cycle.  
Where to Draw the Line, 1984, p. 107 
Against the backdrop of this continuous biology, she goes on to “clothe” the 
“potentially immortal germ cell cycle in the trappings of mortality” to describe those 
aspects that might provide meaningful landmarks (p. 105). This point comes at “about three 
weeks after fertilisation when the primordial germ cells can first be identified” and “we can 
also identify the progenitor cells of the other main systems in the tissue layers of the body” 
(p. 105). It is only now that, “for the first time we can say with certainty that the descendants 
of certain cells will become nervous tissue, others will become gut … and so on” (p.105). 
She depicts this point on a spiral diagram showing how the “germ cell lineage is divided 
off from the rest of the embryo” (ibid) (see figure 1).  
McLaren only uses a dotted line to separate the germ line from the embryonic soma, 
however, to indicate that there are still “many interactions that occur between germ cells 
and somatic cells throughout life”, offering another sense in which the distinction being 
made is, biologically, arbitrary. McLaren, in the rest of her paper, goes on to discuss this 
point in development, at which the germ layers divide, in relation to the criteria outlined 
above, showing that it is only at this point that the rudiments of a unique and individual 
entity can be identified, while the criteria of brain function and viability are still not 
satisfied. This set of factors substantiates a distinction she makes between the ‘pre-embryo’ 
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or ‘early embryo’ for the first two to three weeks, and the ‘definitive embryo from then 
until eight weeks. The “early embryo”, she writes “includes all the cells derived from the 
fertilised egg, but the definitive embryo … includes only a fraction of these” (p. 106).  
Of the potential criteria listed, then, individuality is foregrounded as the most 
relevant to the question of how the embryo should be treated in research. The ‘embryo’ 
demarcates the emergence of a new individual body, while the ‘pre-embryo’, although 
genetically unique, is composed of both potentially embryonic and extra-embryonic tissue 
and is, therefore, physiologically, undetermined. Here then, is the ‘combined rationale’ that 
Warnock describes: in response to a need for regulatory lines, using a set of social criteria 
mapped onto biological landmarks, and against a backdrop of a picture of biology as a 
continuum, McLaren implies (she is careful not to make her ethical claim explicit) that 
research on ‘pre-embryos’ would precede the biological-social-legal amalgam that is 
individuation.  
Arbitrariness  
Allegations of ‘arbitrariness’ to discredit the term ‘pre-embryo’ as a distinction in 
development frequently appeared in the discussions, especially following its official 
introduction into the pro-research lobby’s rhetoric after the publication of the Warnock 
Report (Davies, 1986; Chargaff, 1987; Kelly, 1990; Short, 1987). McLaren herself also 
uses the term ‘arbitrary’ several times in Where to Draw the Line to stress the gap between 
the biological account given and the social and legal work of drawing lines. She writes, for 
example, 
I have tried to give a picture of human life as a continuous process, punctuated by 
landmarks. I have not tried to answer the questions that are listed on page 102 
[When does life begin? When does an embryo become human? When does it 
become a human being? When does it become a unique individual? When does it 
become conscious?] … any lines that you draw are going to be to some extent 
arbitrary, and where you finally draw decide to draw them must depend on the 
context, the purpose, of your decision.  
Where to Draw the Line, p. 117 [emphasis added] 
The arbitrariness of the cut-off point here refers to the fact that it cannot be derived 
directly from the biological account but is relative to the question being asked. ‘Arbitrary’, 
to McLaren, then, really means that the distinction being made cannot be understood 
‘scientifically’ or ‘biologically’ – on its own terms. In this passage, McLaren points to the 
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fact, however, that any line drawn in biology in order to legislate will inevitably be 
arbitrary, given that human life is a ‘continuous process’. The scientific vision of 
development by definition will always need to be moulded to a specific context in order to 
draw any lines at all. Drawing on the biological picture in order to devise legislation will 
always require a translation of the biological vision of continuous development into an 
account that responds to a specific, socially meaningful, question.  
I have chosen to call this translation of a biological vision the ‘first translation’, 
because this is where McLaren becomes instrumental to the Inquiry. Nonetheless, by 
beginning my account with the biological facts used in the Warnock case, I have also shown 
how these were, from the start, incorporated into a framework already established by 
Warnock, and by a scientist who was well aware of this social, legal framing of the question 
at hand, making them not primary in any theoretically meaningful way. Biological vision, 
as a translation then, encapsulates the sense in which McLaren recognised the continuity 
of development, but then drew on this scientific view to respond to a specific, socio-legal 
question. The translation, as figure 1 shows, leaves her biologist’s vision of continuous 
development intact, but draws from this the biological information that becomes socially 
meaningful when mapped onto lay perceptions of development that prioritise, for example, 
the point of individuation. This amalgamation of the biological and the social accounts of 
development can then be used to substantiate legal cut-off points that are likely to recruit 
wider-spread support now that the biological account itself seems to reflect understandings 
and priorities representative of those held beyond the scientific community alone. The 
biological translation is actually a social translation.  
The scientist as translator  
The role of the scientist in this model, is not to unilaterally impart what they know to an 
under-informed audience, but to respond to social and legal criteria by drawing from their 
repertoire the relevant information, through a deep understanding of the question at hand. 
Nonetheless, in lieu of the more public debates on human embryo research, McLaren here 
seems still reluctant to claim a role that extends beyond the scientific literalist paradigm of 
‘informing’. She presents at the end of her text a disclaimer that she has not tried to make 
ethical deductions from the biological account, suggesting that McLaren is staking out a 
narrowly defined role for herself as a scientist in these policy discussions. The question of 
‘context’ or ‘purpose’, she writes here, fall outside this remit as a scientific adviser. Despite 
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having explicitly factored social considerations in her biological rationale she distances 
herself form an ethical position, however heavily implied it may be in her biological 
account. In terms of figure 1, McLaren claims the inner circle, the ‘picture of human life as 
continuous’ as her area of expertise, choosing to ‘clothe’ this circle in the ‘trappings of 
mortality’ to inform the policy discussions, but retaining a firm separation between these 
perspectives.  
However, as McLaren continued to participate in the broadening discussions on 
human embryo research, taking the biological picture presented to the Warnock Committee 
to a wider constituency, we see how she increasingly saw it fit to comment on the ‘context’ 
or ‘purpose’ that gives meaning to these arbitrary biological distinctions. She incorporated 
this broader, social commentary into her scientific remit by describing the relevance of her 
biological account to clinical applications in reproductive medicine. In doing so, the circle 
at the centre of her embryological spiral diagram receded increasingly into the background 
as she made a more definitive, authoritative statement on how early human development 
should be exploited, centred around the concept of the ‘pre-embryo’. It is in this sense that 
I refer to McLaren’s use of the biological facts as a ‘translation’. Not only do I use the term 
to foreground how the biological model was already a translation of social concerns, but I 
also do this to describe the process by which meaning is constituted. The biological facts 
in the account I have given incorporate not only the biological facts as they are known by 
scientists given the state of knowledge, but their very induction into the debates were also 
always adapted to the specific question posed by the Warnock Committee, and become part 
of a context-specific negotiation of the facts in the process of emphasising the elements of 
the account that resonate within the framework of goals that reflect wider public interests.  
McLaren is in this sense less concerned with imparting facts but instead aims to 
recruit the public to a shared ‘biological vision’ that requires a model that incorporates their 
concerns. The ‘facts’ that communicate this biological vision to scientists, might not 
transport the same meaning to a person with no scientific training. Rather than a literal 
transplanting of facts, this view of translation is closer to the conceptualisation taken from 
the humanities. In the poststructuralist theory of translation, a ‘sense for-sense’ translation 
is preferable to a ‘word-for-word’ one (see Derrida, 2001). A good translation will not 




Non-literal translation  
The poststructuralist philosopher Jacques Derrida has written extensively about this ‘sense-
for-sense’ theory of translation. Derrida’s theory of translation can be explained in terms of 
his now famous critique of the linguistic sign embodied in his concept of ‘différance’. 
Meaning, for Derrida, is not contained in any singular utterance, but is an effect of the 
relations and differences along a potentially endless chain of signifiers. Meaning is always 
differential and, therefore, deferred: “always already a site of proliferating possibilities that 
can be activated in diverse ways by the receivers of that utterance” (Venuti, 2003, p. 240), 
according to their particular context in the web of signifiers in which they are embedded. 
It is this differential that gives language its vitality, it is only through its relationality that 
meaning emerges. In this sense, any utterance is also a translation, a product of the 
transposition of a term into a given context of signifiers.  
To the biological metaphors embedded in expressions like ‘native language’ and 
‘mother tongue’ that imply that language has somehow natural, unitary origins, Derrida 
proposes alternatives that emphasise the hybrid, cultural origins of language that functions 
as an organism, as Sarah Franklin shows: 
Thus he understands writing as a living system comparable to an organism, with a 
kinship to other technologies, for which one of his many analogies is grafting. In 
order even to begin to read a written text, one must become enjoined with its 
physiology, he claims, just as the text itself is the live offspring of previous 
couplings … He reconstitutes the reader’s living relationship to the written text “as 
an organism, indefinitely regenerating its own tissue behind the cutting trace, the 
decision of each reading” (1981: 63). For Derrida, writing is not dead or barren 
because it is a copy of an original, but instead more lively because it is recombinant.  
Franklin, 2013a, p. 304 
Franklin goes on to show how the technics of language mirror the process of the 
embryologist, whose results are often the product of a specific set of technics, rather than 
a free-standing, objective ‘reality’ – the language of biology, as well as biology itself, is 
alive by virtue of its relation to a broader context of relations, to the technics of scientific 
tools as well as language, as well as legal provisions, ethical frameworks and affect. We 
cannot speak of the scientific ‘truth’; indeed, we cannot speak of biology without 
acknowledging these relations. Franklin also shows how Derrida’s physiological metaphors 
resonate with the analogy used by anthropologist Marylin Strathern (1992b) to describe 
“merographic thinking – through which a partial connection ‘from another angle’ can 
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displace one meaning for another – a process she describes as substitution in her critique 
of the metaphysics of nature and culture” (Franklin, 2013a, p. 304).  
Scientific facts, in this view, are never definitive, because the language used to 
express them is only ever a partial perspective that signifies meaning at the same time that 
it changes the subject in question. As in Derrida’s model, meaning is never stable, is always 
in the process of being negotiated through language. It is in this way that the language used 
to discuss biology, the way in which facts are translated into new contexts and new 
domains, change and substitute the ideas people hold about the world and thus what is 
deemed reality. What is at stake in the relationship between biology and language is the 
categorisation of biology itself. This relationality of language, the connection of any idea 
to a host of others, leads Strathern to posit a moral imperative to take seriously the language 
we use to discuss the biological facts of life:  
This makes evident one of my starting points: that it matters what ideas one uses to 
think other ideas (with). Reproduction concerns everyone. Yet when human beings 
reproduce themselves, they in inevitably do so with already existing and thus 
specific forms of themselves in mind.  
Strathern, 1992, p. 10 
It is only, then, by acknowledging the relationality of biological facts, that we can 
begin to translate them consciously into discussions – both professional and public – to 
move towards interpretations of the facts that are representative of the ideas and values of 
a broader social identity.  
The second translation: Clinical applications 
Following the publication of the Warnock Report, McLaren continued to play an active role 
in making the case for the continuation of human embryo research. Immediately after its 
release, she went on to be an important member of the Dawes Committee set up by the 
Medical Research Council (MRC), on the Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA) set up in 
lieu of government action on the Warnock Report, and as an influential voice in the various 
lobbying organisations – most notably Progress. The continuity of her involvement and her 
authority as an eminent scientist, head of her own MRC Unit, and member of the Royal 
Society, meant that she was able to exert considerable influence on all of these bodies. The 
breadth of her involvement, we shall see, was reflected in the breadth of her vision and 
understanding of what would be required of the scientist and of what would be considered 
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‘scientific’ information in the debates, especially as she began to comment more explicitly 
on how the ‘pre-embryo’ could be used on the path to clinical translation.  
McLaren’s correspondence taken from her archives at the British Library provides 
one example of how she used her position on the Warnock Committee to drive an effort to 
build a scientific case around the now legally delineated period of the first 14 days of 
development. I found these papers during my scan of McLaren’s extensive archives that 
have been deposited at the British Library in two tranches over the past years. I am the first 
researcher to be working with them towards a larger project. The papers show that, in the 
lead-up to the publication of the Warnock Report, published in July 1984, the archives 
reveal that McLaren wrote to Dr D. C. Evered at the CIBA Foundation on 15 March 1984, 
to suggest organising a conference on the subject of human embryo research. She writes,  
I am increasingly feeling that there is a need for a meeting to discuss the issues 
involved in research on early human embryos. I am not betraying any Warnock 
confidences by telling you that this is a very contentious issue on which there is a 
great deal of confused thinking and public concern. What I have in mind is 
something along the lines of the 1973 “Law and ethics of AID and embryo transfer” 
symposium, which as you know has had a not inconsiderable influence over the 
years. … If you looked favourably on the suggestion, would there be any chance of 
fitting in a short meeting, say 1 to 1½ days, in early 1985? This would be good 
timing in that the Warnock Report would have died down, but the Government 
would presumably not yet have got around to formulating any relevant legislation. 
McLaren, 15 March 1984, Anne McLaren Papers, British Library, Add MS 83887, 
[emphasis added] 
The letter shows that McLaren saw it as paramount that scientists provide a 
consistent and clear pro-research case to inform a public and parliamentary debate that 
would precede any action taken by the Government. Clearly, McLaren saw this as very 
pressing, even before the much-cited vote on the Powell bill had revealed the extent of the 
opposition to research. After an initial rejection, McLaren writes to the CIBA Foundation 
again on 13 September,  
As you will realise from the Warnock Report, embryo research was the most 
contentious area that was dealt with, and one on which the Committee was deeply 
divided. It was only by the narrowest of margins that the fertilisation of donated 
human eggs for research purposes was approved. The earlier report of the Council 
for Science and Society, which you mentioned in your letter to me as having covered 
much of the ground that I had in mind for the meeting, in fact only dealt very briefly 
with the use of spare embryos for research and did not even mention the possibility 
of using donated eggs fertilized for research purposes … Obviously there will now 
be a lag of a year or more before any legislation is drafted and it seems to me that 
legislators should have some reliable source of information in this area which is at 
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present so liable to misunderstanding … The risk of course is that legislation could 
be passed which would hold back both our understanding of embryonic 
development in these important early stages, and our ability to alleviate infertility 
and genetic disorders. … I envisage such a meeting lasting for say 1½ days, with 
ample time left for discussions. I enclose the kind of programme I have in mind. 
British Library, 13 September 1984, Anne McLaren papers, British Library, Add MS 
83887 [emphasis added] 
McLaren makes the case for a conference and a specific agenda. She insists on the 
importance of tackling separately and explicitly the question of research. In doing so, 
McLaren envisions a conference that not only provides a reliable source of information, 
but also makes explicit the need for research by linking it to clinical translation. This aim 
is implemented in the following draft agenda:  
1. Introduction  
 Fertilisation and the early stages of embryogenesis  
2. Infertility  
 Nature of the problem, and clinical management  
3. Genetic disorders  
3.1  Nature of the problem, and types of genetic disorders 
3.2  Research possibilities  
3.3  Possibilities for therapeutic intervention  
4. Other issues:  
Other areas where research would be fruitful, and areas where it would not 
be fruitful  
5. The ethical acceptability of embryo research:  
5.1  Moral arguments for and against, and the problem of assessing “public 
morality”  
5.2  Ethical status of the foetus in world religions  
6. Conclusion  
 Major points of agreement and disagreement 
Figure 2. Draft agenda CIBA Symposium, 1985. British Library, Anne McLaren Papers, Add MS 83887.  
Anne McLaren’s proposed agenda for the 1985 CIBA conference offers a 
condensed summary of the relationship between basic scientific research on the early 
embryo and the goals and applications in the area of fertility and genetics. The agenda 
shows how McLaren carries forward the ‘utilitarian’ Warnock model that connects the 
biological facts to a specific therapeutic problem via basic research. Infertility, genetic 
disorders, and other issues both follow this structure. McLaren goes on to explain how she 
hopes the conference would serve to re-focus the discussion from questions of moral status 
to what she calls ‘scientific aspects’: 
The aim of this meeting was to provide a forum in which scientists, moral 
philosophers, doctors and lawyers could discuss together the issues raised by 
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research on the early stages of human development. This topic has been subject to 
much public debate in the UK: most of the debate has centred on moral issues, and 
little information has so far been made available on scientific aspects, including 
research needs and research possibilities. We hope this volume will provided new 
insights as well as relevant facts.  
McLaren, 1985, British Library, Add MS 83887 
Just as in the Warnock Report, she frames the issue as one of finding morally 
permissible applications, here in the form of therapeutic intervention, in the interest of 
moving discussions away from questions of moral status. The aim is not to counter the 
fundamentalists who will not accept research under any circumstances, but to inform those 
who believe the human embryo could, in principle, be used for research provided that the 
outcome is morally desirable. As Warnock quotes a philosopher as saying in her report, it 
is about finding a “steady and general point of view, that reflects an idea of a good society, 
to which most, but not every individual would agree” (Warnock, 1985, p.1). McLaren 
realises this aim by building an alliance around a research agenda geared towards a set of 
clinical applications. The final item of her draft agenda betrays the central purpose of the 
meeting – to build consensus by tallying agreements and disagreements. Through 
discussions of science a view to which the majority could agree was to emerge, based on a 
scientific research agenda and a set of therapeutic goals.  
It is clear here that the agenda McLaren proposes is supposed to encapsulate what 
she perceives to be the value of clinical translation expressed in a specific relationship 
between basic research and clinical application. Her active role in attempting to frame the 
wider debate on human research through the conference, and by proposing a specific 
structure and agenda, shows how clinical translation was a very deliberate goal, articulated 
in the context of political debate, that started as a broad research orientation, and then, 
through the work of collaboration, coordination and unification that conferences like this 
facilitated, increasingly came to represent both real clinical outcomes but also, as we will 
see, a consistent ‘biological’ case in favour of research. The work that McLaren does in 
devising the conference could thus be described as another form of translation, necessitated 
by a clinical outcome, namely the work of coordinating and framing for the professional 
community of scientists, of building a research agenda, thereby pragmatically 
implementing her objective of communicating the value of clinical translation by 
organising a conference to facilitate it – a form of professional translation. This is the kind 
of work that, as sociologists of clinical translation have repeatedly argued, accompanies the 
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linear bench-to-bedside models espoused by research grant providers and policy initiatives. 
A description of McLaren’s role in the HF&E debates offers another multi-layered account 
of the work involved in securing this translational pipeline – less a pipeline but a tree 
maintained by a network of roots that represent a whole set of invisible translations.  
The newly consolidated scientific case also comes with the introduction of a new 
scientific term. The talk that McLaren gave at the CIBA meeting is contained in the report 
published in the following year under the title Prelude to Embryogenesis (1986). Here she 
introduced and offered a rationale for the term ‘pre-embryo’ explicitly, which begins to 
show how her use of this term was linked to an increasing sense of clarity about her role in 
the discussions: 
At this meeting we shall be mainly concerned with the first two weeks of 
development, the ‘pre-embryonic’ stage …The CIBA Foundation has organised two 
previous symposia on early development. The timing of those meeting was 
significant. The first, on Pre-implantation Stages of Pregnancy in 1965, was held 
towards the end of a pioneering period of studies of mammalian development, when 
in vitro culture and manipulations such as the production of aggregation chimeras 
were new and exciting. The terms ‘embryo’ and ‘ovum’ were at that time used 
interchangeably. The decade that followed saw an explosive rise in research on pre-
implantation stages in mice, In 1975 the time seemed ripe to push forward into the 
technically more complex postimplantation period, so the symposium on 
Embryogenesis in Mammals made an attempt, only partially successful, to focus 
attention on postimplantation development … it was while I was trying to put 
together for the 1975 symposium a growth curve for the whole of mouse prenatal 
development that it first began to dawn on me that the ‘embryo’ as a continuous 
entity could be traced back from birth only as far as the primitive streak stage … 
and that the ‘embryo’ that develops from fertilization onwards is a different entity, 
which includes and gives rise to the ‘embryo’ that grows into a foetus and neonate 
but is in no way coextensive with it. It has taken a further ten years and some 
pressure from outside the scientific community for this distinction to result in a 
suggested change of terminology to eliminate the ambiguity of the term ‘embryo’. 
McLaren, Prelude to Embryogenesis, 1986, pp. 14–15 
McLaren’s brief history of CIBA symposia on embryogenesis links the adoption of 
new terminology to an increasingly refined and more complex picture of embryonic 
development. By placing the introduction of the term ‘pre-embryo’ in this history of 
evolving research agendas in embryology, she suggests that it is meant to delineate a phase 
in development that is of particular interest to researchers and should incite additional 
research into this little understood time. The use of the term is here justified purely in terms 
of setting a research agenda. In the context of a symposium organised for scientists but very 
much in light of the need to inform the public debates on human embryo research, McLaren 
 
48 
also no longer uses the topographical language of landmarks that she did in Where to Draw 
the Line and there is no mention of ethics or social concepts. McLaren made a point in her 
conclusion of distancing herself from the role of the ethicist: 
Where to draw the line involves ethical judgements, which I have been careful not 
to make. But these ethical judgements can and should be based on a correct 
understanding of what is actually going on at the scientific level. I have tried to give 
a picture of human life as a continuous process, punctuated by landmarks. … any 
lines that you draw are going to be to some extent arbitrary, and where you finally 
decide to draw them must depend on the context, the purpose, of your decisions.  
McLaren, Where to Draw the Line, 1984, p.117 
Despite this reluctance to make ethical claims, McLaren presented her biological 
account as informed by a social understanding of landmarks, and with an eye to legislating. 
Now, however, McLaren no longer emphasises the ‘arbitrariness’ of the limit she espouses, 
given that it is substantiated by a proposed scientific agenda which, we shall see in the 
following chapter, also makes the embryo an increasingly real and researchable entity 
through its translation into tangible clinical outcomes. It seems that McLaren now commits 
herself to an ethical position by proposing a ‘context’ and ‘purpose’ that she, as a scientist 
and an individual, deems important, thereby taking up her own challenge in Where to Draw 
the Line. Now, given that the talks following her Prelude provide examples of the outcomes 
of studying this phase in development, McLaren no longer feels the need to qualify her 
quasi-scientific fact. McLaren seems to have abandoned the explicit distinctions between 
the domains of ethics, science and society, and makes a case for a strong distinction in 
development entirely through the proxy of biological facts. The boundaries between these 
epistemologies seem to blur as she takes on more confidently her role as a scientist in the 
debates. In the CIBA chapter, she now talks only of ‘bottlenecks’ and ‘discontinuities’ in 
development. She no longer refers to the sociological logic underlying the distinction, but 




Figure 3. Linear embryonic development, “Prelude to Embryogenesis”, in Human Embryo Research: Yes or 
no?, CIBA Foundation, 1986, p. 7. This linear diagram shows the restriction of cell totipotency3 over the 
course of embryonic development. Like the spiral diagram in figure 1, McLaren points to several thresholds 
in development: genetic and physiological. In this diagram, however, McLaren omits the cyclical germ cycle 
and focuses solely on embryonic development to make a case, based on the physiological coherence of the 
embryo, for the primitive streak as a pragmatic landmark around which to build a research agenda in the area 
of developmental biology and reproductive medicine.  
McLaren’s more positivistic rhetorical approach is also reflected in a more linear 
depiction of development (figure 3). The diagram shows clearly a restriction of fate 
potential, omitting the spiral that reminds the viewer of the continuity of the germ line and 
the interactions between cell populations throughout the life course. It seems that McLaren 
has changed tack somewhat in her approach to making the ‘pre-embryo’ distinction, 
abandoning her detailed explanation of a fuller biological picture. She is now speaking in 
the authoritative language of scientific facts to an audience that she hopes to recruit to her 
model. The distinction between ‘pre-embryo’ and ‘embryo’ makes sense in light of the 
current state of knowledge in the field and also delineates an agenda for researchers. By 
introducing and defining the term at the conference, she is thus providing biological 
 
3 Totipotency describes the ability of a single cell to divide and produce al of the differentiated cells 
in an organism. 
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information while also inviting researchers to refer to, build upon, and exploit this scientific 
model. McLaren is now building a much more pragmatic case in favour of embryo research 
that echoes Warnock’s pragmatic ethics and this is expressed in a translation of the 
biological vision that becomes increasingly ensconced in this pro-research case centred 
around clinical translation.  
This history shows how the biology deemed to be ‘relevant’ changed as the case 
evolved, and this is explained by its connection to a host of other translations in the evolving 
pro-lobby case. McLaren thereby also takes on a role that is broader than the one she 
describes in Where to Draw the Line. In addition to providing biological information as a 
basis for constructive debate, she is connecting a specific period in development to an entire 
research agenda centred around clinical applications by connecting researchers and 
gathering information, as well as performing the ongoing work of calibrating these 
translations – the biological account changes to reflect the priority placed on clinical 
translation. This role as a connector, orchestrator and calibrator becomes very important to 
the development of PGD over the course of the debates, as we shall see in the following 
chapter. For now, I will go on to describe how the first two translations – one of biological 
facts and one of clinical applications (which, we have seen, includes professional 
translation) –increasingly provided common ground for scientists and potential patients in 
the form of a shared agenda that felt right.  
Connecting and feeling  
Soon after the release of the Warnock Report and the 1985 CIBA Conference, the term ‘pre-
embryo’ was introduced into the official public information material of the pro-research 
lobby. The lobbying organisation, Progress, set up under the joint leadership of scientists, 
physicians and parliamentarians in November 1985, for example, made a systematic effort 
to use the term to refer to the first two weeks of development. Member and eventually chair 
of the organisation, Virginia Bolton, recalls, 
I think we all felt a little bit uncomfortable using it [pre-embryo], because [hesitates] 
it was an artificial term I suppose, but the motivation behind using it was supported 
and there was a great need to educate people and to be able to distinguish. But it is 
a blurred line, it’s a continuum the whole developmental process, so it was an 
arbitrary term. But it wasn’t motivated in any way, none of us had any motives but 
the highest, we just wanted to avert what would have been such a retrogressive step 
for the wrong reasons. It was a bit like Brexit, if you’re going to have a massively 
important vote that is going to change the course of history then you want voters to 
be informed. So it was about making that vote based on rational judgement rather 
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than gut reaction and motivated by prejudice and misinformation. … So we had to 
try to find some way of continuing to project a scientific objective attitude, and the 
‘pre-embryo’ – we all unified and used this term all the time, we were good about 
that – then there was a sort of unified approach saying, “this is an entity, that hasn’t 
decided it’s fate, that hasn’t yet formed, and, actually, the vast majority won’t have 
the potential to go on and develop any further”. So, it was a huge message to get 
across to people.  
Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018 [emphasis added] 
Bolton reiterates the two features of the pro-research lobby case that I have 
described: the first that the scientific community had to find ways to translate a biological 
view of continuous development for the purposes of law, and that these distinctions, given 
biological continuity, would always have to be made according to ‘non-scientific’ criteria. 
This is the translation of a biological vision I have described. She then also shows, again, 
how scientists united around the use of a term and a biological account that, as we saw at 
the CIBA conference, represented a purposive, politically motivated, professional alliance 
geared towards clinical translation. This apparently purposive use of a term and an agenda, 
Bolton says, caused some discomfort to scientists who saw that, scientifically, the 
biological account they were giving was ‘arbitrary’. She goes on to describe, however, how 
this discomfort was overcome by a greater sense of purpose, a wish ‘to avert what would 
have been such a retrogressive step for the wrong reasons’. This logic in itself could be 
described as utilitarian, or pragmatic, or even Machiavellian – the ends justify the means – 
but it is also significant that Bolton emphasises the sincerity among scientists at the time, 
their genuine conviction that they were not trying to mislead, that none of them ‘had any 
motives but the highest’ but had to find a way of conveying that emotional belief to non-
scientists, by finding a language that could inform people. This is how Bolton explains the 
narrative on which the pro-research lobby landed, as an attempt to capture both the 
biological view of development and the scientific conviction that research was right. This, 
led them to find a language that did not transport the literal meaning of their biology, but 
the implicit meaning, and this translation was done by identifying where the scientific 
account resonated with public sentiment. Bolton expresses the same challenge that 
McLaren tackled with her socio-biological account, namely that scientists in these debates 
had to choose accessibility over technical, scientific accuracy. The two were mutually 
exclusive. Bolton also interestingly goes on to offer a political analogy for the decision the 
pro-research lobby made. The consequences of a failure to translate technical accounts into 
a socially meaningful language result in uninformed votes in which people vote according 
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to “gut reaction and motivated by prejudice and misinformation”, just “like Brexit”, she 
says. Bolton’s recombinant reasoning offers a political rationale for the pro-lobby 
‘approach’, for why scientists chose a translational application of a piece of scientific 
terminology. Scientists ‘unified’ behind this approach, but the approach was built on 
divisions, ambivalences and discomfort, resulting in a case that is, as Warnock has said, 
“curiously difficult to explain” (Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018). The 
cracks and divisions remained visible, but that did not undermine the efficacy of the 
approach – if anything, as Bolton shows, it was the ambivalence scientists felt having left 
their silos of scientific literalism, that made them more attuned than ever to the sentiment 
underlying their message, and so able to engage with the public over a shared understanding 
of the issue at hand.  
Bolton goes on to show how scientists were able to connect with potential patients 
over the potential of therapeutic applications: 
So in terms of persuading potential patients, because it [IVF] was so new, it was 
this beacon of shining hope for people who thought they’d never be able to have 
families. And so the language that they understood was, “IVF doesn’t work most of 
the time”, which still applies today, and “embryos are generated that don’t have the 
potential to develop and some of them do, and we want to be able to distinguish the 
ones that do from the ones that don’t”. And in order to improve the success rates, 
we need to understand what the embryos need in order to grow and develop. All of 
this is in such a rudimentary stage, there’s so much we don’t understand, and if we 
are to help all these people who want to help their families, we have to … 
Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018  
Bolton shows how the so-called ‘language’ used by the pro-lobby provided an 
emotional connection between potential patients and scientists. Clinical applications 
represented powerful examples of the benefits of scientific research on human embryos and 
in this sense translated the embryologists’ conviction that research was moral and felt right 
to non-scientists. As in McLaren’s plan for the CIBA conference above, Bolton’s comments 
show how clinical translation became a key part of the pro-lobby strategy, of developing a 
consistent scientific case, and of recruiting a larger group to a scientific agenda. Bolton’s 
statements also add, however, how this scientific rationale relied on sentiment in order to 
guide them in finding an appropriate translation of the scientific facts. The Warnock model 
became part of an attempt to find emotional common ground through a shared language of 
clinical translation. This was a bilateral process of translating public concerns into a 
language that could be considered authoritative and scientific, and of translating science 
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into something that was considered sympathetic and relatable. The above account shows 
how the biological facts in the evolving case for research represented much more than a 
shifted ontological trajectory, as has been argued in previous analyses of the term (Jasanoff, 
2005; Mulkay, 1997), but were part of a renegotiation of the very framing of the ethical 
question at hand, and how this question went from one concerning the status of the 
biological entity to a social question of the good that science could do for society in the 
form of clinical applications. Having understood the framing and evolution of the pro-lobby 
case, I will now move on more specifically to how the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ indexed 
a changing role for scientists in the policy debates.  
The ‘pre-embryo’  
The term ‘pre-embryo’ was first officially introduced into the pro-research lobby rhetoric 
by the Voluntary Licensing Authority (Franklin and Roberts, 2006; Mulkay, 1997). It was 
after they introduced the term that it spread, as if by “osmosis”, in Bolton’s words, to other 
organisations (Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018). Here, too, McLaren was a 
major player, participating in the series of meetings of the joint Medical research Council 
and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists Voluntary Licensing Authority, 
chaired by Dame Mary Donaldson. Again, as the most senior practicing embryologist, 
McLaren was able to direct the Committee on the scientific basis for their discussions. The 
minutes of these meetings clearly document how the term ‘pre-embryo’ became officially 
endorsed as the correct terminology by the VLA. The term was first used in a pamphlet 
produced in May 1985, which the committee had asked one of the Committee’s ‘lay’ 
members, Dr Penelope Leach, to write at the first meeting on 26 March 1985. The pamphlet 
was intended to provide “a statement on in vitro fertilisation that might be suitable for the 
general public’” (RCOG, C12/1). The term was then approved by the Committee at the 
second meeting held on 16 May 1985. The minutes to this meeting state that 
Members were initially divided as to the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ introduced in 
Leach’s paper. Some members consider that ‘embryo’ was too emotive a word to 
be used in the context of Guidelines on research and in other published documents, 
others suggested that to replace ‘embryo’, which the VLA has used freely to date, 
would be regarded with suspicion by the press and public. Members discussed the 
use of alternatives to ‘embryo’ and it was decided that ‘pre-embryo’ should, 
whenever possible, be used instead. 
Minutes MRC and VLA Committee meeting, 16 May 1985, RCOG, C12/1 
Dr Leach was a social psychologist, journalist, broadcaster and author, and thus 
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well-suited to the task of delineating and communicating development to a broader 
audience. Attached to the draft of the pamphlet sent to the committee, Leach outlines the 
key considerations kept in mind when writing the text, and also acknowledges that “Dr 
Anne McLaren has been most generous with information and in giving her time to reading 
an earlier draft” (ibid).  
In a phone-interview with Leach, she confirmed to me that she collaborated with 
closely with McLaren on the pamphlet, that McLaren provided the scientific information 
and she then wrote up the information on which they agreed. The term was needed, as she 
recalls, to “separate the fertilised ovum from the embryo” and when Leach reasoned, “well, 
it’s pre-, it’s a pre-embryo … Anne said, ‘that’s a good idea” (Leach, interview with author, 
1 October 2018). Leach emphasised that the term itself did not really seem to matter to 
McLaren, and that she was amenable to adopting terminology that made sense to the non-
scientist, for which she relied on Leach’s judgement. Leach’s collaboration with McLaren, 
then, helps showcase how McLaren used her position as a scientist who held information 
that was essential to the debates, and combined this with a commitment to clarity that would 
only be achieved by finding terminology that foregrounded the distinctions that were 
decisive to a broader constituency – through non-literal translations.  
McLaren clearly directed the scientific narrative used by the VLA – indeed, Leach 
recalls how the “strange constitution of the VLA”, where members were selected based on 
their relative ignorance of the embryological facts so that that the group would reflect the 
attitudes of a pluralistic public, actually gave an eminent scientist like McLaren a lot of 
influence as one of the few in possession of any scientific information, and with a lot of 
authority and experience to make this perspective heard (Leach, interview with author, 1 
October 2018). As on the Warnock committee, McLaren’s influence as the only scientist 
gave her control not only over the scientific narrative, but the utter reliance on her for what 
came to be seem as a scientific question, also meant that she was perceived increasingly as 
an authority. The amount of sway McLaren was able to have, then, points to the authority 
that science held as a domain of knowledge in the debates. We begin to see that the promise 
of scientific discovery as a narrative of hope that was so essential to the pro-lobby case (see 
Mulkay, 1997), relied on science as a privileged domain of expertise and, moreover, 
substantiated a particular type of expertise that combined ethics, feeling, and legal insight, 
through the rhetoric of science, embodied by public intellectuals like Warnock and 
McLaren in the debates, a point to which I return at the end of this chapter. 
 
55 
Leach recalls, then, that the crucial concern to McLaren, rather than the precise 
terminology used, was simply that “a distinction was made” (ibid). McLaren, as in Where 
to Draw the Line, remained clear about the need for limits, but the term used to demarcate 
these was arbitrary; it was the underlying rationale that was important. Indeed, a closer look 
at the pamphlet Leach and McLaren produced shows how she used the opportunity to make 
a stronger case for this distinction in development, now connecting it to its utility on the 
path to clinical translation.  
The pamphlet opens by rehearsing the history of the setting up of the Warnock 
Inquiry following the birth of Louise Brown. Leach then refers to the statements of the 
RCOG and the MRC following the publication of the Report as evidence of a consensus 
among “the medical and scientific professionals concerned with in vitro fertilisation” about 
“how the work should be handled and controlled”, but that it also became evident that “both 
the facts and the implications of the work remained obscure and – consequently – alarming 
to many other people” (Leach, 1985, RCOG C12/1, p. 1). In light of this fear stemming, 
supposedly, from ignorance, the pamphlet seeks to inform the public primarily on IVF – on 
what it is, its “purposes” and “implications”, and the “controls” being exercised (ibid.).  
Unlike in the CIBA symposium structure or in Where to Draw the Line, the 
biological account of embryonic development here does not introduce a discussion of 
possible applications but is presented from the beginning in the context of an artificial 
intervention, as opposed to the natural biological cycle. Leach next describes the use of 
IVF and embryo transfer as a way to bypass blocked fallopian tubes and how this work was 
only possible as a result of research on human embryos. She goes on to compare public 
views on research on gametes to those on embryo research. Resistance to the latter is based 
on a false conception of fertilisation as the start of individual life, she claims. She explains 
that fertilisation is itself not sufficient to “start a human baby but merely sets in train a 
series of events which could lead to such a beginning. Fertilisation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition” (Leach, p. 3). She goes on to introduce the now familiar narrative of 
progressive cellular specialisation following the establishment of genetic uniqueness at 
fertilisation. She also introduces into this narrative the possibility of intervention to combat 
the natural inefficiency of the process. Cell division following fertilisation, “whether in a 
fallopian tube or a glass container”, for example, can be induced by “electrical or chemical 
stimuli” (ibid, p.4.). These references to possible artificial assistance to biology, whether 
IVF and transfer, or induced cell-division, Leach writes, are not intended to incite images 
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of a futuristic biology, but to show that biological potential is always relative to its 
environment: 
The point is not that human pathogenesis is around the corner but that this egg is 
not yet a potential baby but merely dividing cells … at the eight-cell stage, when 
the egg reaches the uterus, there is no way in which cells which might be destined 
to become a foetus differ from those which might be destined to become part of a 
foetus’ support and attachment system: amnion, yolk-sac or placenta. 
Leach, 1985, RCOG, C12/11  
This sentence, then, expresses the crux of the pamphlet, which resonates given the 
framing of the piece, namely that biological development is contingent on a receptive 
environment, and this environment can be both ‘artificial’ or ‘natural’ – in either case, the 
embryo itself is never sufficient to express any type of potential. It is at this point that Leach 
introduces the term ‘pre-embryo’ to name the “cluster of undifferentiated cells” (ibid.). She 
then goes on to describe how the ‘pre-embryo’ might implant in the uterus “if conditions 
in the womb are exactly right”, and if they are not, how the “pre-embryo will simply be 
passed in the menstrual flow” which is the case for over “half of all pre-embryos” or, more 
whimsically put, “the shedding of fertilised eggs, unrecognised and unmourned, is an 
everyday occurrence in the unending cycle of human fertility” (ibid.). Now Leach returns 
to the individuality argument, that it is not until the formation of the primitive streak that it 
is “possible to speak with any scientific accuracy of individuality or potential individuality 
in the product of fertilisation” as it is only now that we can say that “if there is one primitive 
streak there will be (if all goes well) one foetus” and if “there are two or the primitive 
streaks there will be (if all goes well) twins or triplets” and so “now, and only now, has the 
pre-embryo developed into an embryo” (ibid.). The embryo is semantically sequestered 
from the entity that might or might not lead to a child. It is only now that we return 
definitively to the body, and “only now will a normally-fertile woman begin to realise that 
her period is late and that conception has probably taken place” (ibid).  
The narrative that until now ambivalently hovered between the biological and 
laboratory environment, now returns to the woman’s body, to indicate the onset of a new 
phase in development and an entity that can be described using the conventional teleology 
of ‘embryo to child’. This shift back to the body shows how the ‘pre-embryo’ relies on a 
dual narrative – it is simultaneously treated as part of the trajectory that might lead to a 
baby, while it is also treated as a researchable entity that in no way inevitably leads to a 
child and can, therefore, be manipulated without moral qualms. This dual structure is the 
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result of a developmental story that depicts the ‘pre-embryo’ as a set of potentials that are 
expressed differently according to its environment – as assisted.  
The clinical interventions in this cycle make this contingency, this ‘biological 
relativity’, as Sarah Franklin (2013a) has described it, demonstrable. As a result, IVF 
embryos have remained what Jasanoff and Metzler (2018) call “bioconstitutionally 
ambiguous”, as “neither inanimate research materials nor full-blown human subjects, but 
entitled to constant moral revisitation as science progresses and new potential uses, and 
perceived abuses, come into view” (2018, p. 10). The ‘pre-embryo’ is defined in relation to 
a consensus application, and thus its status changes in accordance with new applications.  
The Warnock model facilitated this legislative format and it is consolidated in this 
pamphlet by drawing on a clinical framing. The clinical framing becomes coextensive with 
an effort to persuade the readers of the pamphlet that the ‘pre-embryo’ is distinct from the 
embryo-child, by showing how the early stages of development can be variously facilitated 
by offering more amenable environments in the form of artificial interventions. As we shall 
see in the following chapter, the case of PGD builds on this new biological relativity 
captured in the Warnock model, so that talking about basic science increasingly also 
becomes a case of encouraging clinical applications as a proof of concept to validate a 
biological image of contingent development in the public eye. The implications of this 
change in public perception of development has become evident post-HF&E Act. The 
notable lack of opposition to amendments to the Act since 1990 to incorporate new types 
of experiments, for example, suggests widespread acceptance in Britain of a new model of 
development allowing a new legislative model that responds to emerging clinical 
possibilities (Franklin, 2013a; 2014b). 
The public scientist as clinician 
This new biological picture also prescribes a different role for the scientist. McLaren’s 
move into the more public debates on human embryo research is coupled with her claiming 
authority on clinical translation. In responding to the perceived concerns of a broader 
constituency, McLaren has instructed Leach on the basic embryological facts but only in 
the context of clinical application. As in the CIBA correspondence, McLaren is moving 
into a public role that requires her to comment on both basic science and clinical translation. 
As Warnock said, when asked how McLaren perceived her role in the debates,  
I think it changed, in the sense that she realised much more acutely how actually 
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the gap between pure and applied science was flexible. And that she couldn’t simply 
think of herself as a pure research scientist without taking on board the fact that the 
application was always going to be hovering there, and inseparable in a way from 
the pure research. I think that came to her during the life of the committee and 
thereafter. 
Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018 
McLaren increasingly takes up a role that blurs the boundaries between basic and 
applied science or, at least, brings them together to show how they relate, in a sense 
recapitulating the clinical translation of IVF in her professional public remit. Warnock also 
highlights McLaren’s growing sense that commenting on application was her social 
responsibility as scientist – application was ‘inseparable’ from ‘pure research’, a fact that 
could not, in all sincerity, be ignored. Again, this points to the way in which clinical 
application was a reiteration of scientists’ feeling that their work was morally right. In part, 
clinical translation made this conviction tangible for an audience of non-scientists, but in 
doing so it seems that, in McLaren’s case at least, this led her to see clinical application as 
an increasingly important aspect of her scientific work – as more than a rhetorical strategy, 
but also a social responsibility that should in itself be part of the work of doing science. 
This becomes increasingly clear in the following chapter, where I describe her contributions 
to the development of PGD during the debates. For now, it suffices to comment that clinical 
translation fell increasingly under her domain of expertise in her role as a public scientist.  
Superimposition: A translational model 
If, then, McLaren’s basic science became more applied, a view that resulted from an attempt 
to build an allegiance based on a moral sense around a scientific model, the public 
perception of basic biology also changed. The effectiveness of the Warnock model in 
achieving consensus by the end of the debates shows that non-scientists had been recruited 
to a new, relative view of embryogenesis (Franklin, 2013a). This was achieved by 
packaging a description of development in a story about clinical translation. This story, as 
we have seen, nonetheless kept intact the story of the embryo-child by showing what 
research could do for potential parents; the biologist’s vision and the popular vision are 
brought together into a single account that respects public sentiments and shows how they 
might relate to those of the biologist.  
This results in a model of development in which two embryos coexist: one 
teleological and one contingent. This biological picture was different from both the 
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biologist’s and the lay perspective as it incorporated both. The case in favour of research 
post-Warnock could accordingly be described as a superimposition of these views. Both 
views, we have seen, were based on emotional conviction, and what Bolton calls the 
‘language’ of clinical translation that maps the intersections of these two, moral world-
views. The rhetorical strategy is in this way about describing the relations between overlaid 
world-views, of connecting, and thus leads us to another sense in which translation was 
used to arrive at the final HF&E legislation – in the geometrical sense, as the “movement 
of a body from one point of space to another such that every point of the body moves in the 
same direction and over the same distance, without any rotation, reflection, or change in 
size” (Oxford Dictionary Online).  
Here, bodies of knowledge, of feeling, science, law, and now clinical application, 
are all translated in accordance with a practical question of how to use the human embryo, 
in order to find points of convergence. The picture that emerges is changed for all those 
concerned, and that is only right, considering that it expresses a new consensus, a shared 
biological model. This leads to a model for policy-making that might be drawn as in 
figure 4. McLaren, following Warnock, superimposed a scientifically based vision of 
human reproduction onto a regulatory provision, and now clinical translation, to form an 
overdetermined area of convergence that provided a foundation for the Government in their 
response to biotechnological innovation. It was, in this sense, what Sheila Jasanoff (2005) 
calls a ‘settlement’ (see also, Jasanoff and Metzler, 2018) – the term she uses to describe 
how policy on biotechnology is made and how these frameworks provide the context for 
future expressions of opinion. As the geological idiom implies, it is a framing of the 
problem through a compression of layers onto each other to build a more secure footing on 




Figure 4. A model for policy-making based on superimposition. 
In figure 4 I have schematised the various ‘logics’ that Anne McLaren uses in her 
developing case in favour of human embryo research over the course of the debates. These 
epistemological perspectives are brought together to form an overdetermined area of 
convergence onto which legislation could then be built. While the various tectonic plates 
never fully overlap, this common ground allowed the pro-lobby to unite behind a shared 
research agenda and, increasingly, a shared socio-biological perspective that allowed 
legislation to be passed.  
Having described some of McLaren’s specific contributions to the development of 
the pro-research lobby case, I will now go on to further characterise the argument used by 
the pro-research lobby, and the role that arguments for clinical translation played, by 
referring to my interviews with other scientists who were active in the pro-research lobby. 
These interviews help provide a context for understanding McLaren’s choices as she 
negotiated her position in the debate, and also contribute to an understanding of how the 
pro-lobby arguments worked to position scientists in the public debates more generally.  
Scientific contestations 
In my interviews with the scientists who lobbied during the debates, two distinguishable 
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components of the pro-research case are repeatedly emphasised as key to their 
parliamentary victory. The first relates to the translation we have seen above: of the 
biological facts into something socially palatable; and the second is the role of clinical 
translation. The picture they paint, however, differs from the one I have described vis-à-vis 
Warnock and McLaren. The first translation is, for one, not presented as a negotiation of 
the biological facts in relation to the society, but as a unidirectional imparting of objective 
scientific facts. Moreover, the relationship between the biological narrative and the case for 
clinical translations is also disregarded – most scientists referred to the public mass-
education on the embryological facts of development as an important first step, and the 
prospect of clinical applications resulting from research as an additional and more decisive 
factor in the pro-lobby case. The scientists who were most senior in their careers at the time 
of the debates repeatedly claimed that the public readily accepted the scientific narrative 
used by the pro-lobby, deeming the use of a so-called ‘artificial’ term such as ‘pre-embryo’ 
unnecessary.  
There is, then, a tendency in my interviews with senior scientists who worked on 
the pro-research lobby to erase the evidence of the very translational process that they 
themselves invented. This translational amnesia is reflected in the scientific literalism of 
the statements made by the scientists I interviewed, exemplified by comments made by the 
embryologist and geneticist Richard Gardner, who was at the University of Oxford at the 
time of the debates, as well as a member of the Royal Society (Gardner and Graham, 
interview with author, 27 September 2018). Gardner acknowledges the importance of the 
underlying rationale for the ‘pre-embryo’, but sees the term itself as a ‘fudge’:  
Well, I think both Chris [Graham, fellow embryologist] and I were more on the side 
of trying to explain the status of these earlier stages, the biological status. Because 
that was one of the falling issues, that we had all been in terms of terminology, very 
lazy. Because we’d all referred to everything from the two-cell stage onwards as an 
embryo and…it’s an embryo in the case of a frog because all of it is going to go on 
to form an individual, but only a fraction of it is in mammals. And so we suddenly 
realised when we were talking about doing research on early human embryos. And 
people became exorcised as to what to do, and I think Anne was among those who 
was responsible for a fudge that actually didn’t help because it engendered 
suspicion, which was to talk about this as a ‘pro-embryo’ or a ‘pre-embryo’. 
Whereas if we’d had our wits about us, it would have probably obscured people, 
but it would have been more accurate, if we’d talked about the conceptus, the whole 
of the product of conception…only a fraction goes on to form the individual. But 
actually, in that context the ‘pre-embryo’ is very unhelpful because it was regarded 
by the public, quite rightly, as scientists trying to disguise what they were trying to 
do – terrible things to little hominids.  
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Gardner and Graham, interview with author, 27 September 2018 
Gardner here acknowledges the importance of a terminology that would reflect 
accurately scientists’ sense of the biological material they were working on, but he sees the 
term ‘pre-embryo’ as a failed rhetorical instrument that misled the public. Nonetheless, he 
says that the distinction it denotes is scientifically accurate, based on a retrospective 
relationship to embryonic and extra-embryonic material in human development. He later 
refers to the argument used to substantiate the ‘pre-embryo’ divide as one that counteracted 
the damage done by the introduction of the term ‘pre-embryo’ itself:  
I think you have to engender public confidence and by sort of making the argument-
rightly or wrongly – that at 14 days and the primitive streak you have the first point 
at which a nascent human being started to develop I think gave a lot of reassurance 
to people who may have been disquieted by the idea of the ‘pre-embryo’. 
Gardner and Graham, interview with author, 27 September 2018 
Gardner moreover sees the role of clinical translation, rather than the biological 
arguments used, as decisive and separate from the biological case made, saying “I think 
once people accepted IVF, they acknowledged there would be spare embryos, and that 
would have to be part of the package, and then they accepted it” (ibid). This idea was 
reflected across many of my interviews. Clinical geneticist, Marcus Pembrey, head of the 
Mothercare Unit of Paediatric Genetics at the Institute of Child Health in London and an 
honorary consultant clinical geneticist at the Great Ormond Hospital for Children, as well 
as a Progress campaign committee member and chair, similarly argued in his interview with 
me, that, rather than the biological mode used, the more crucial factors in gaining public 
support for human embryo research, he claims, was that “genetics came along at the right 
time and then pre-implantation diagnosis came at the right time, and that’s what persuaded 
the progression of the science leading up to it” (Pembrey, interview with author, 17 October, 
2018). 
There seems to be ambivalence around the relationship between the ‘pre-embryo’ 
and the biological facts used to inform people in the debates, as well as that between the 
arguments for a distinction in development and those about clinical translation, a trend that 
also appears in the sociological literature on the debates (see Mulkay, 1997). As opposed 
to the model we have seen, described in the comments by Bolton and enacted in the 
methods of McLaren, where the ‘pre-embryo’ served as a rallying point that allowed 
scientists to determine and then explain how the early stages of development could be 
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manipulated in aid of clinical therapies, these analyses position the biological facts and the 
clinical application as distinct. In the same way, Mulkay (1994) argues, in his analysis of 
the ‘pre-embryo’, that the links made in the pro-lobby argument to PGD were “decisive” , 
and built upon the arguments made for the ‘pre-embryo’ as a separate ontological entity, 
arguing that while “for the majority, the replacement of the embryo the pre-embryo made 
further research seem permissible”, the “displacement of the violated experimental subject 
by the genetically screened pre-embryo made its continuation appear obligatory” (1994, p. 
633). While genetic screening, as we will see in the following chapter, undoubtedly 
provided a shared goal for the public and scientists, Mulkay’s argument that this built on 
the ‘pre-embryo’ as a distinct argument overlooks how this clinical aim was negotiated. 
Interestingly, the scientists I interviewed who were in the early stages of their 
careers at the time of the debates, and most intimately involved in the public lobbying 
efforts, see the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ differently and discuss the role of the ‘pre-
embryo’ in relation to the role that biological facts and clinical translation played in what 
is described as an ‘approach’. Experimental embryologist, David Whittingham, who had 
set up the Mammalian Development unit at University College London with McLaren in 
1974, talked about this difficulty: 
The media thought of foetus with an embryo, thought of it as something 
recognisable. When you’re trying to explain that the cells are undifferentiated but 
have the potential to develop into an individual – it’s a concept that’s very difficult. 
Even today people don’t see that two or eight cells are an embryo, in their mind 
they visualize something with limbs and a head. So the argument for going as far 
as 14 days, was that up until then you don’t have a body plan. When you have the 
primitive streak, you have a foundation of the embryo or foetus. It’s a difficult one 
to argue when people feel that with fertilisation as such – once you have two cells 
– you have an individual with a soul. What happens when you get identical twins, 
do you cut the soul in two? [laughs] I’m just joking. … Those were difficult 
arguments with people who believed in life from conception – not ‘potentially’ – 
but the start of a new individual. 
Whittingham, interview with author, 3 October 2018  
Whittingham sees the primitive streak argument as, in part, an important visual 
signifier, based on a progressive account of development, that could counteract the image, 
so prominent in the media, of the embryo as a foetus. He also explains, however, that the 
argument was fundamentally limited in its persuasive power because those who believed 
that life started at conception were never going to get on board with this biological picture. 
Whittingham begins to describe how the term represented an alliance based on more than 
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biological facts, but also a basic agreement on the question being asked – namely, how the 
embryo should be used, which assumes, from the onset, that there are cases in which it is 
morally permissible to use it for purposes other than reproduction. Virginia Bolton, who 
was an early career embryologist at the time of the debates, elaborated on this alliance:  
So she [McLaren] could then alert us to the sorts of things that people feared, fears 
that we had to obey but also sort of – there were two camps in terms of the 
opposition. There were the fundamentalists, for whom nothing was going to change, 
they had to be dealt with, and she probably taught us this, but it became instinctive 
after a while, that fundamentalists you must never engage and start an altercation, 
you have to respect their views and back off because that is how they feel, and you 
have to respect their opinions no matter how misguided they might be. And you 
always had to remain dignified and detached, because there was nothing to gain 
from engaging. ... But the one that we engaged with were the ones who didn’t 
understand, who were fearful and had prejudices based on a lack of understanding. 
And that was it, it was about informing people. “Do you realize this is what has led 
to this situation? This amount of research has gone on and this has allowed what 
we have here. And had that research been banned, none of this would have been 
possible. And do you see what its potential? Reducing risk, improving IVF, reducing 
genetic disease.” 
Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018 [emphasis added]  
Bolton reiterates the point made by Whittingham, that the biological view being 
communicated precluded the support of fundamentalists because it contained certain 
assumptions that were irreconcilable with their position – namely, that it is in principle 
acceptable to use human embryos for a purpose other than producing a human baby. As we 
have seen, this assumption framed the entire remit of the Warnock Report, which gave 
answers to the question of how the human embryo should be treated, rather than its moral 
status. Bolton shows how this question translated into a pro-research campaign – under the 
banner of research in aid of clinical translations. In this sense, scientists were ‘informing’ 
a wider constituency that was in principle open to the use of human embryos for research, 
but required a moral justification, offered to them in the form of a scientific narrative that 
emphasised the ends towards which the scientists’ investigations into early embryonic 
development could be channelled. In contrast to the assertion made by some scientists that 
the biological picture served in the debates to offer an alternative to the image of the embryo 
as foetus, Bolton and Whittingham show some recognition of how the pro-lobby’s scientific 
arguments contained not just facts, but an implicit framing geared towards a specific 
audience.  
Bolton’s comment also shows the extent to which the arguments for the ‘pre-
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embryo’ and its applications prescribed a very particular role for embryologists in the 
debate. Given an implied target audience of those in principle receptive to scientific 
arguments, scientists would not have to speak to basic ethical principles, at least not overtly, 
but about biological facts and, increasingly, clinical applications. Once a target audience 
had been identified, the role of the scientist would be to describe a scientific agenda under 
which scientists and the under-informed-but-willing could unite. This explains why 
scientists reflecting on the arguments used might refer only to the scientific facts used, 
especially clinical translation, and not the underlying rationale – the model of deliberation 
over which scientists united facilitated this and positioned them as such. As in the account 
I have given of McLaren’s shifting position, these scientists refer to clinical translation as 
a proxy for the underlying ethical, legal and social assumptions of the pro-research case. 
These clinical translations substantiated the biological picture they already believed to be 
true and recruited the general public to this view.  
While interviewees such as Virginia Bolton, who was an active member of Progress 
and was thus more involved in the public engagement side of the debate than the scientists 
who chaired committees or briefed politicians, were able to explain how the ‘pre-embryo’ 
represented not just a set of biological arguments but a “unified approach” (Bolton 
interview with author, 16 October 2018), the comments by scientists who were more senior 
in the 1980s, like Gardner, seem to perform a process of ‘papering over the cracks’ of the 
superimpositions that were required in the translational process required to arrive at 
legislation. These scientists refer to a model for the role of science in public debate in which 
the scientific facts form the starting point, which are in turn imposed on the debate by 
scientists in order to arrive at legislation. Yet this model performs exactly the division that 
the consensus is supposed to ‘paper over’. Preferable would be a theory of translation 
applied to the biological facts that does not suppress fracture, that, like the Derrida’s 
poststructuralist theory I have described, positions difference as the source of meaning, that 
allows the various layers of the palimpsest to show through in order to render the scientific 
facts for a specific audience. The account of McLaren’s developing pro-research case 
reveals how scientific literalism is neither more ethical, nor more correct, but ignores the 
work that needs to be done in order to arrive at a shared understanding of the values, 
possibilities and social priorities that come with any translation of the biological facts.  
While on one level the comments by scientists may reflect a professional claim to 
the space and a need to sequester themselves from political involvement, there is also 
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undeniably a persistent confusion and difficulty that characterises attempts to explain this 
unprecedented process of policy-making in the area of human fertilisation and embryology. 
The development in the arguments used by McLaren, who consistently participated in and 
even orchestrated the debates at various levels, provides a useful index for these changing 
attitudes, and also helps explain the discrepancies in the perceived legacy of the arguments 
by scientists. As we have seen, McLaren takes an increasingly positivistic and authoritative 
approach to communicating the embryological ‘facts’ reflected in a more consistent use of 
the term ‘pre-embryo’. This is in part possible because a research agenda and set of clinical 
applications are increasingly used to substantiate the existence of the ‘pre-embryo’ as a 
researchable entity.  
The social and legal logics underlying the distinction fade increasingly into the 
background as the scientist is able to comment on the safer, more ‘scientific’ uses of the 
embryo towards clinical applications, which now serves as a proxy for social and ethical 
concerns. By describing how this ‘non-scientific’ fact came to be endorsed, we have 
nonetheless seen how the ‘pre-embryo’ can be understood as part of the pro-lobby’s 
developing case, how it responded to social attitudes, how it was part of a process of 
professional agenda-setting and of finding common ground. In this light, the term appears 
less as a deceptive ‘fudge’, less as political ‘rhetoric’, but as part of an ethical, 
compassionate model for policy-making in the area of human fertilisation and embryology.  
Arbitrary term, arbitrary scientist? 
It is also pertinent to mention at this point, the parallel that arises between the language 
used by scientists to describe the use of the ‘pre-embryo’ in the debates, and the way in 
which they describe McLaren’s role. The language of arbitrariness used by scientists to cast 
the ‘pre-embryo’ as unscientific and to distance themselves from this use of ‘rhetoric’, is 
also reflected in the way that they discuss McLaren’s career. The fact that she became more 
involved in policy work from the Warnock Committee onwards, for example, led some of 
my interviewees to say that from the 1980s she was ‘scientifically past her prime’ 
(Goodfellow, interview with author, 21 September 2018). Interviewees also repeatedly 
drew a comparison between her and Mary Lyon. The latter was a real ‘Nobel’ scientist, 
whereas McLaren was a great ‘absorber’ and a ‘connector’ (Gardner, interview with author, 
27 September 2018), a distinction is drawn between the social work of collaborating and 
doing policy work, and the work of basic science. It is difficult, apparently, to do both. Yet 
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McLaren did do both, and perhaps as a result of this connecting, absorbing, collaborative 
approach, as we will see, was also able to have a greater scientific impact. In the context of 
the Warnock debates, too, McLaren combined the logics of science, law, ethics, and feeling, 
in order to make a case for research.  
This led scientists like Robert Winston, who was involved, as we shall see, in the 
development of PGD, to use the ambivalent language of ‘emotion’ to describe McLaren in 
his interview with me. He calls her an “academic scientist” with “a humanity about her”, 
as someone who was “feeling her way through things” (Winston, interview with author, 26 
September 2018). There seems to be a tension at the heart of McLaren’s legacy as it is 
described by scientists, that makes her difficult to place. What makes her distinctive, it 
seems, is the way in which she draws together science with extra-scientific domains – 
domains often associated with human ‘values’ rather than facts.  
The fact-value distinction has been the subject of critique in a far-ranging literature 
in Science and Technology Studies (STS). These interventions have been framed around 
the outdatedness of a dichotomy in which values are associated with the public and facts 
with the domain of authoritative science. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar in the classic 
Laboratory Life (1979), for example, challenge the distinction while developing an 
ethnography of modern divides, as does Latour in We Have Never Been Modern (1993). 
These anthropologies of science show how the ‘two cultures’ of society and science are 
actually one – that facts are socially constituted, values are inherent to the process of 
arriving at the supposedly value-neutral knowledge that masks the conditions of its 
production.  
The study of translation from this perspective also makes an important addition to 
this body of work in literature by emphasising the context of the ‘postgenomic’ era of 
biomedicine. (e.g. Webster 2005). The anthropologist Kaushik Sunder Rajan and 
sociologist Sabina Leonelli (2013), for example, use the concept of translation in the ‘post-
genomic’ era as a site for challenging the very truth/value categorisation. “Translational 
research”, they argue, “is a critical site at which knowledge/value problematics emerge and 
can be theorised” (Rajan and Leonelli, 2013, p. 465). The breadth of domains and fields 
incorporated in the movements of elements that constitute biomedicine opens up a process, 
they argue, by which a plurality of values become visible: “the 
monetisable/fungible/tradable kinds of value that speak to the construction of a stronger 
commercial infrastructure for the life sciences”, the “accountability value of bureaucratic 
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audit cultures”, and the “ethical value enshrined in projects that emphasise the 
“advancement of human health” as their goal” (2013, p. 465). These, in turn, are related to 
factual knowledge in new ways in translational research, forcing us to ask, “What 
contemporary biomedical ‘knowledge’ might mean, and to whom, given the variety of 
domains and circumstances under which it is produced, circulated, and used” (ibid). 
Translational research, then, reveals a set of movements and processes that allow the critic 
of science to describe how the categories of value and knowledge are and might be 
constituted in the biomedicine today.  
McLaren’s case similarly reveals how facts and values come to be associated in the 
process of translation. As we have seen from Bolton’s comments, values played a large part 
in shaping the responses of pro-research lobby scientists during the HF&E debates. A 
description of McLaren’s role in developing the Warnock model on the pro-research lobby 
details this process of the iterative incorporation of various facts and values. The value of 
clinical translation, what it could mean for human society, the role that science should play 
in the betterment of human health, her own sense of what mattered to people, all factored 
into the case McLaren made, and came to be reflected in the developmental model of the 
‘pre-embryo’.  
It was this process of finding common ground, through science, the way in which 
she combined social feeling and scientific factual knowledge – or a commitment to 
scientific research for its own sake and a commitment to the social good it can do – that 
made McLaren’s contribution to the debates so distinctive. This only becomes clearer as I 
go on to describe her contributions to PGD. McLaren provides a case in point against a 
definitive distinction between fact and value when describing the role of scientists in public 
debate. She brings these together in a translational ethos that seeks common ground, builds 
consensus, in order encourage scientific research that is directed towards human needs, but 
allows a broad enough research remit for scientists to do their work, a model which I will 
describe more fully in the chapter on her style of practice in Chapter 3. Here it is already 
clear how values and facts were key to her argument, how she consulted people and catered 
to them using scientific arguments.  
We can also note how this combination is effective in arriving at legislation that is 
workable, representative and lasting, yet how this also comes to sit uncomfortably in her 
legacy as a scientist, an observation I will argue that reflects, as does the legacy of 
arbitrariness around the ‘pre-embryo’, a certain forgetfulness among the scientific 
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community regarding the translational model that they themselves helped invent.  
Anti-expert experts: Science and expertise in the British debate 
Through the readings of McLarens texts and an analysis of her actions and correspondence, 
it becomes clear that McLaren set herself up increasingly narrowly as a scientist, 
commenting on scientific matters as the debates progressed, abandoning the explication of 
the social and legal rationale for her ethical cut-off points in the context of the CIBA 
Foundation symposium and in the public information material provided by the VLA. The 
more strictly scientific case was characterised by an increased emphasis on clinical 
applications and a more positivistic assertion of the ‘pre-embryo’ as a scientifically distinct 
phase in development. It becomes clear, especially after reading this story in dialogue with 
the comments made by other lobbying scientists, how the scientific case in favour of 
embryo research was in part also a negotiation of the role of scientists in the public debates. 
The increasing emphasis on clinical applications and the pre-embryo become proxies for a 
set of superimposed perspectives that inform the distinctions made. On one level, this 
transition reflects an increasingly forceful and unified pro-lobby case. Yet McLaren’s role 
also needs to be seen in the context of Britain’s relation to expertise.  
Historian of science, technology and medicine, Duncan Wilson (2014), has 
explained Warnock’s influence and success in the history of what he calls ‘British 
bioethics’, distinct from the American history of the field, by showing how her personal 
philosophy resonated with the Conservative emphasis on individual consumer choice and 
anti-expertise (see also Chadwick and Wilson, 2018). Wilson describes the unusual blend 
of philosophy, pragmatism and affect in her reasoning for the Warnock recommendations 
partly as a negotiation of her role in light of a general distaste for expertise and a mood that 
favoured external regulation and external involvement in scientific and medical ethics 
under Thatcher. Warnock clearly demarcated a role for herself distinctly as a philosopher, 
in which her remit was to clarify the properties and consequences of a particular moral 
standpoint, but in which she could not “‘prove or otherwise show conclusively that one 
view is to be preferred to another’” (Warnock cited in Wilson, p. 169). Philosophy was just 
one analytical tool, to be used alongside scientific expertise and an understanding of 
people’s ethical feelings.  
As Wilson points out, unlike the bioethicists in the United States, who were 
regarded as ethical experts, Warnock made a point of positioning herself as a lay person – 
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both in relation to science, but also to morality. Wilson goes on to argue that Warnock’s 
notion that sentiment cannot be divorced from morality led her to espouse a limited role for 
the philosopher, as a moral position based on feeling was as valid as any other, claiming 
that “there is no such thing as authority. There is only a set of different opinions” (Warnock 
cited in Wilson, p. 141). This view, he goes on, “dovetailed with the neo-liberal emphasis 
on individual autonomy and echoed Margaret Thatcher’s belief that ‘choice is the essence 
of ethics’ ” and thereby became part of a Conservative effort to break the welfare state form 
of government that believed professional expertise was vital to the development of public 
policy.  
The Conservatives instead argued that policy should be shaped by ‘outsiders’ who 
functioned as proxies for different stakeholders and consumer interests. Warnock echoed 
this belief by arguing that declining trust in professional expertise transformed what were 
once “matters of professional behaviour” into “questions of public policy, which merit 
public discussion and therefore, because we are a democratic society, ultimate discussion 
in Parliament” (Warnock cited in Wilson, p. 156). Warnock can therefore be seen to be 
setting herself up in response to a political climate that would not accept moral expertise. 
Instead she hands the decision to parliament, claiming only a role as an adviser, thereby 
contributing a limited domain of understanding in order to facilitate a deliberative and 
democratic process of decision-making that will be based on multiple perspectives, as well 
as multiple epistemologies.  
Wilson’s account of Warnock’s self-fashioning as a public non-expert resonates in 
some ways with the account I have given of McLaren’s evolving stance. McLaren, as we 
have seen, was similarly careful to distance herself from the role as an ethical authority. 
Her statement in Where to Draw the Line (1984), in which she is careful not to draw ethical 
conclusions based on her scientific-social account of development and the ethical 
conclusions that follow, but also her consolidation of an argument for research based on 
the scientific ‘facts’ of embryogenesis and clinical translation, both point to the ways in 
which McLaren publicly defined her contributions as, in a similar vein to the scientists I 
interviewed, one of explaining potential applications without offering any definitive expert 
judgement.  
I have also shown how this account was premised on a specific framing of the 
question and a layering of rationales, a conversion that McLaren orchestrated. McLaren set 
the agenda and brought together the expertise and recruited the support needed to build a 
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clinical case around her model of development. The scientific case was geared very much 
towards finding a consensus position that incorporated the views of a wider constituency 
in which McLaren as an individual scientist set herself up as a facilitator, and someone with 
a limited domain of knowledge that could be used to inform the debates but whose 
judgement was not decisive.  
Nonetheless, McLaren’s case shows how Wilson’s emphasis on anti-expertise as a 
unifying concept between Warnock and Thatcher’s government is misguided in two 
important ways. First of all, McLaren’s capacity as a scientist allowed her considerable 
authority and influence on the Warnock Committee, the VLA, and generally as she 
organised conferences with CIBA, for example. Ironically, it was probably the shift towards 
anti-expertise in the Government’s approach to the forming of committees that gave 
McLaren such a prominent role in the first place. The committees that were formed over 
the course of the debates were all structured in order to be representative of a pluralistic 
society, seeking “individuals who had no connection to the profession or field under 
scrutiny” (Wilson, p. 156). Warnock was in this way, appointed to lead an inquiry into 
science and medicine, “where doctors and scientists had long been recognised ‘as key 
holders of expertise’ ” (Warnock, cited in Wilson, p. 156). This “subtle but important 
change in British politics” (ibid), however successful it was as a formula for retaining a 
role for Establishment figures in providing regulatory advice to government, in effect did 
not represent all ‘stakeholders’ equally, but skewed the balance of power towards a select 
few experts.  
Penelope Leach, as we have seen, in this way commented on what she referred to 
as the “strange constitution of the VLA”, where members were selected based on their 
relative ignorance of the embryological facts so that that the group would reflect the 
attitudes of a pluralistic public, actually gave an eminent scientist like McLaren a lot of 
influence as one of the few in possession of any scientific information, and with a lot of 
authority and experience to make this perspective heard (Leach, interview with author, 1 
October 2018). Others, like Virginia Bolton, also commented on the great authority that 
McLaren had, given her position as an eminent scientist, but also as a result of her 
consistent involvement on the various committees that had comprised the discussions.  
Well I see her role as being the rationale, grand adviser, probably the most 
knowledgeable – the person everyone would refer to as being the senior person who 
knew the most. So whenever she spoke everyone would listen because she was the 
authority … largely because of her intimate involvement with all the discussions 
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that had taken place prior to publication of the Warnock Report. So we felt that she 
had insider knowledge. Because there were dissenting voices in Warnock and the 
decision about research, so she knew the kinds of arguments that she’d had to 
confront while that was going on. So she could then alert us to the sorts of things 
that people feared. 
Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018 
Bolton’s quote shows how McLaren, who was granted access to meetings and 
committees as the token, eminent scientist, was increasingly regarded as an expert not only 
as a result of her scientific expertise, but as someone who was able to relay and represent 
the voices of dissenters, of a wider constituency. McLaren then, functioned as a covert 
moral-expert, based on her experiential knowledge of the voices and issues that needed to 
be addressed. The above shows how McLaren was able to use her position as a scientist to 
orchestrate the debates, moving between various positions in order to align them – she used 
her expertise to build consensus. In contrast to Wilson’s (2014) interpretation, McLaren 
was granted considerable influence as a result of her scientific expertise and is seen to 
appeal repeatedly to her role as a scientist in order to influence the debates. This was not a 
case of eschewing claims to expertise, but a process of humanely, compassionately, arriving 
at a position in which a public desire for healthy babies was reflected in the scientific 
research agenda, in a language that they could understand. It was an expertise of knowing 
how, under the remit of the authoritative scientist, to integrate various perspectives to find 
a consensus position: using science to do policy.  
There are two faces to this coin. On the one hand, McLaren was able to draw on her 
practical and experiential knowledge of the views that needed to be addressed, unrestricted 
by the epistemological restraints of a particular discipline, precisely because of the space 
opened up by the absence of any official moral experts. This allowed her and others to 
shape the discussions in an unprecedented way, resulting in an Act that has been resilient 
and successful. Nonetheless, as Leach’s comment suggests, McLaren was able to occupy 
this space more easily, leveraging her scientific authority to represent a constituency on 
issues that extended beyond her field. Others, who did not benefit from her professional 
eminence or experience, were not equally represented, despite the ‘pluralistic’ constitution 
of the committees.  
This analysis, then, adds an important precondition to the efficacy of the ‘pluralistic’ 
committee. If the constitution of these committees so central to British policy-making is 
supposed to be pluralistic, this analysis begs a reassessment of what that means. This 
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observation falls in line with much of the critique made in the literature on the management 
of universities in the social sciences that critique the representation of ‘society’ on their 
committees. Committee structures that are posed to represent the undefined category of 
‘society’ easily result in superficial speculation on this society’s needs, or, at worst, the 
appropriation of their voices (Levin and Greenwood, 2016; Wright and Greenwood, 2017). 
Instead, these scholars claim, engagement with society gains meaning when the public is 
involved in shaping the conversation and the issues addressed by governing bodies from 
early on – in other words, they must be involved in constituting a language that adequately 
represents the issues at stake to the public the committee purports to represent (ibid).  
Lay-representation serves no purpose unless all members are in possession of a 
common language. This is a language that McLaren tried to cultivate, trying to make her 
biological model speak to public sentiment, as well as her own sense of what was right. 
McLaren and her use of the biological account in negotiating these concerns provides a 
model, which suggests that a more explicit use of the biological facts in response to and 
guided by public concerns from the outset fulfils more fully the imperative for inclusivity. 
The model of superimposing domains relies crucially on a shared language, and that 
language, I suggest, should extend to an understanding of the role that science plays in 
arriving at social decisions if it is to be mobilised in aid of more broadly representative 
decision-making in the committee context, and beyond. This account of the various 
concerns, epistemologies and voices that McLaren incorporated into her case, should serve 
as a prompt to think through how these might be more adequately and formally represented 
in these ongoing deliberations, a point to which I return in Chapter 4. 
A second important critique of Wilson’s emphasis on neoliberal expertise as a 
common denominator between Warnock and Thatcher is that Warnock’s project, as 
exemplified in the way that McLaren carried it forward, was a deeply social project. This 
case increasingly came to represent a common ground for a shared moral feeling, a 
translation of the concerns at the heart of public and scientific attitudes to research. This 
diverges considerably from the neoliberal position which posits that there is no such thing 
as society, only individual consumers or, in Thatcher’s case, “individual men and women 
and their families” (Thatcher, 1987, interview with Women’s Own, Thatcher Foundation 
Archive THCR5/2/262).  
Both McLaren and Warnock, and the pro-research lobby that surrounded them, in 
contrast, were very much oriented towards what Warnock herself saw as “a steady and 
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general point of view” that would reflect a social idea of good, “the minimum requirements 
for a tolerable society” (1985, p. 1). The 14-day limit that they recommended in this way 
stood for the very idea of social morality itself. Considering how different these social 
visions are, we need to look further for the resonances between Thatcher, McLaren and 
Warnock, a question to which I return in Chapter 3, after a more thorough interpretation of 
McLaren’s social vision for science.  
The value of clinical translation: Consensus, pragmatism, moral good 
and social benefit  
We have seen in this chapter how McLaren used her role as a scientist to advocate a specific 
research agenda and also how this consensus was cultivated increasingly by advocating and 
describing, scientifically, a set of clinical goals. This was not about persuading 
‘fundamentalists’, or even convincing people to abandon a set of principles, but about 
showing them how their values, the values that, as Bolton’s comments showed, scientists 
themselves held too, would be enacted by permitting the research needed to secure the 
potential benefits, efficacy and safety of IVF and PGD for the benefit of society at large.  
Again, as we have seen, what I call Warnock’s ‘sociological pragmatism’, the 
principle that the Committee’s recommendations would never satisfy everyone, that 
legislation would merely have to be acceptable to most people so that the law would reflect 
the “minimum requirement for a tolerable society” (A Question of Life, 1985, p. 3), was 
implemented by McLaren in a model that was geared towards showing people who were 
in principle amenable to research , provided that the ends justified the means, the potential 
benefits of clinical medicine, also explaining to them the basic research that would be 
required to support such a programme. This was a pragmatic position in several senses: 
firstly, in the sense that there was no attempt to convince people who believed life started 
at conception, instead focusing on a strategy that was likely to lead to a workable outcome, 
but also because practical, clinical applications were posited as tangible goals over which 
a broad public could unite, a consensus that would only be consolidated by the ‘proof’ 
provided by the actual implementation of a clinical service. The scientific language of 
clinical applications, in this way, provided a pragmatic alternative to moral debate, 
redirecting discussions to what could be done for the good of society. We might return here 
briefly to what Warnock has written about her pragmatic logic, in order to understand how 
this relates to the arguments McLaren went on to make for clinical translation. Warnock 
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refers to the way in which the pragmatic need for legislation was complicated, and had to 
consider the moral sentiments of a broader public: 
And so, all the deliberations of the Committee were restricted, though not always 
explicitly, by a kind of pragmatic framework [to provide workable legislation]. At 
no time could we allow ourselves to indulge in idealism (and this was something 
that some members of the Committee found it quite hard to accept). Yet, on the 
other hand, our recommendations could not be too overtly practical or pragmatic. 
They had also, as far as possible, to be acceptable to society as a whole, and a 
society increasingly conscious of the moral dilemmas involved. It was for this 
reason that we called for, and paid serious attention to, evidence from a number of 
different organisations and individuals, and this evidence came in in great quantity.  
Warnock, 1985, pp. 505 
A pragmatic approach provided a way for Warnock to avoid idealism but had to be 
augmented with a certain sensitivity to the morals of society at large through the collection 
of so-called ‘evidence’, or statements by special interest groups. The 14-day limit, in this 
articulation, came to express the limits to this pragmatism in the form a social contract, a 
judgement that was not pragmatic or utilitarian “but intuitive and, perhaps, sentimental” 
(Warnock, 1985, p. 518). Yet as McLaren carried the case forward, this social awareness 
came to be placed not in opposition to the pragmatic project, but as part and parcel with its 
implementation. This amalgamation is expressed in the idea of clinical translation, itself a 
practical aim, which thereby encompassed both the need for social consensus, for a shared 
idea of moral society, as well the legal necessity for clear limits to practice.  
For McLaren, social values were integrated with pragmatic research goals and 
limits, again highlighting the unusual way in which she brought her science rationale and 
social values together. Clinical translation, in this way, came to represent a sociological 
pragmatism, in the form of a shared research agenda among scientists, which in turn 
reflected a general consensus on a moral position based on the idea of social benefit, all of 
which came to be expressed in the increasingly real clinical application of PGD. In terms 
of the fact/value debate in the STS literature described, clinical translation here embodies 
a plurality of values: the values of a moral code based on social benefit that reflects the 
democratic idea of consensus, but also a pragmatism that, rather than fighting abstracted 
political or idealistic feuds, is geared towards finding workable common ground. As we 
will now see, McLaren drew on these values as she made her scientific case on the road to 
PGD.  
A point here about terminology: I call the approach carried forward by McLaren, 
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‘sociological’ as opposed to, for example ‘democratic’, which has often been the context 
stressed in analysis of the 1980s debates around biotechnology (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005). While 
I am aware of the deep history of philosophical pragmatism in the evolution of sociological 
methodology by the hands of figures such as by George Herbert Mead (1964) and its 
influence on the Chicago School and symbolic interactionism (Joas, 1993), I use the term 
‘sociological’ initially in the broadest sense, to connote the systemic framing of the ethical 
problem at the heart of the HF&E debates by Warnock and then by McLaren. In contrast to 
the arguments of the anti-research lobby, I have shown how the pro-lobby case was framed 
as a question of social good based on the idea of consensus and brought about through an 
argument that relied on overlapping knowledge domains. This framing, then, made the 
ethical question a social problem of the development, structure and functioning of society 
and was pragmatic in that it looked for the best way forward given this fractured 
underpinning.  
Moreover, McLaren’s model is based on an epistemology that resonates with that 
of the interpretive school outlined in the introduction, in that meaning is constituted in 
relation to and through the self-conscious interpretation of a specific domain as an analogue 
for the question at hand – it is ‘meaning for’. In foregrounding the interpretive filters 
through which she arrives at her biological model, McLaren nonetheless makes a case in 
reference to a particular clinical application. The relevance of a translation in this method 
is determined by the “experiential or practical consequences of its application”, very much 
within the pragmatist’s paradigm (Haack, 1996, p. 643), and also within the paradigm of 
interpretive social science in which “understanding any action is analogous to textual 
interpretation” (Ricoeur, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 100), in which the 
intelligibility of any action requires reference to its larger context, a cultural world. It is 
thus primarily the social framing of the question at the heart of the debates, which evolved 
through the repeated asking of this question that sociological pragmatism here describes: a 
process of iterative engagement with domains in order to build a social case.  
This point about definitions also serves to highlight the extent to which the pro-
research use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ needs to be understood as more than a strategic 
response to the anti-research embryo in need of protection, as has been argued by Michael 
Mulkay (1997). While it is clear that a different ontological distinction was made, this 
distinction was premised on a social argument that shifted the locus of concerns from the 
status of the embryo to the question of what science could do towards the future betterment 
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of human health. This was, then, a pragmatic renegotiation, in the sociological sense, of an 
entity in relation to a new set of domains that presented an ethical case as a social question. 
It is in this sense that my analysis in this chapter and the next, provides an important 
addition to previous analyses that skirt over the precise negotiation of the pro-lobby’s 
methodological model, as I show how a change in the function of biological facts in the 
argument reflects an underlying change in the way in which biological knowledge was used 
and understood, which in turn, has implications for the ways in which ethical decisions 
were made over the course of the debates on human embryo research. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have shown that McLaren became increasingly consistent in her use of the 
term ‘pre-embryo’ as it became part of a tight pro-research lobby case consolidated over 
time. This case came to focus on the ways in which the ‘pre-embryo’ could be used towards 
clinical applications. This meant that, as the main scientific authority in the public and 
policy discussions on human embryo research, McLaren’s remit as a scientist changed from 
one of commenting on a narrow set of biological facts that could be used to substantiate a 
legal distinction to, much more broadly, framing the biological facts in an account that 
incorporated the values of scientists and a broader constituency of bettering human health, 
by positing specific applications along with a specific model relationship between basic 
research and clinical translation. In the next chapter, I will detail what this meant for 
McLaren in terms of the work she had to do as a scientist by describing her role in the 
development of PGD. The case of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis made the argument 
for the ‘pre-embryo’ as a separate and researchable entity even stronger, substantiating the 
biological definition by giving a concrete example of how the entity could be used to 
improve the lives of real human children. This clinical application therefore became central 
to the work McLaren was doing in layering clinical translation onto regulatory provision, 
social views, the feelings of scientists and non-scientists, and a specific view of 
development – in sum, building the biological picture in order to find common ground. 
This picture adds to previous accounts of the role of scientific authority in the debates 
(Crowe, 1990; Jasanoff, 2005; Lee & Morgan, 2001; Mulkay, 1997; Spallone 1987), 
showing more precisely how scientific expertise functioned. This analysis diverges from 
these accounts in that the ‘pre-embryo’ here represents not a distinguishable set of 
scientifically authoritative facts that were part of the process of “imposing on the debate 
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the cultural authority of science” (Mulkay, 1997, p. 115), but instead part of a deliberative, 
iterative model that included, from the onset, broader societal concerns that relied on a form 
of scientific expertise that incorporated these into their rationale.  
Chapter 2  
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis: Getting behind the 
working model 
We saw in the previous chapter how the prospect of clinical translation featured 
increasingly strongly in the pro-research case, consolidating an embryological account of 
development by showing how research on these early stages would translate into real 
applications for the benefit of human health. Clinical translation became part of a shared 
scientific agenda, but also represented a shared moral compass between scientists and 
potential patients, representing the positive improvements human research could deliver at 
the cost of working on embryos. Clinical translation was thereby used to consolidate the 
idea of the ‘pre-embryo’ as a distinguishable, researchable entity by providing examples of 
how this discrete stage in development could be positively exploited. The use of clinical 
translation as an argument for research also prescribed a new role for a basic scientist like 
McLaren, as one of illuminating the relationship between basic research and clinical 
applications in order to relate to her target constituency over a shared feeling of what was 
right. The story of PGD shows how McLaren was aware from early on not only of the 
technique’s potential to demonstrate the benefits of research on in vitro human embryos but 
also of the particular resonance this would have with a broader constituency in principle 
open to the use of human embryos towards a desirable end, but in need of tangible outcomes 
on which to hedge their bets. PGD increasingly became part of a working model of science 
and policy that was being consolidated through tangible techniques, and provided a clear 
example – in answer to the Warnock question – of how the human embryo could be used.  
PGD quickly became a technical possibility over the course of the debates (Franklin 
and Roberts, 2006). The technical hurdles preventing its feasibility were suddenly resolved: 
first the amplification of DNA by Karry Mullis working for the Cetus Corporation solved 
the problem of using material from a single cell, then the possibility of applying single-cell 
molecular analysis to the development of PGD by Marylin Monk at McLaren’s lab who 
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then collaborated with Alan Handyside and Robert Winston at Hammersmith Hospital on 
the biopsy of single cells from embryos to effectively diagnose defective embryos in a 
mouse model for Lesch-Nychan disease (Monk et al., 1987, in Franklin and Roberts 2006, 
p. 51), then the application of Mullis’ method of PCR to PGD by Monk and her colleague 
Cathy Holding to diagnose beta-thalassemia in a single cell from eight-cell embryos from 
a mutant mouse lacking this gene (Holding and Monk 1989, ibid.), and finally, with Peter 
Braude in Cambridge, showed it was possible to diagnose sickle-cell anaemia in a single 
polar body of the human egg (Franklin, 2006, p. 52). In light of these developments, 
Franklin writes that McLaren quickly shifted from expressing reservations about the 
technical hurdles to achieving PGD to claiming the technique was imminent, and the rest 
of the scientific community followed over the rest of the debates (Franklin and Roberts, 
2006, p. 47). McLaren was now also quick to advocate PGD’s therapeutic use in the context 
of the debates. As we shall see, however, this advocacy did not consist merely of conveying 
the technical possibility, but also of framing the technique to make it appear both desirable 
and ethical from early on.  
McLaren’s role in the PGD story brings to light an important aspect of the 
discussions on biotechnology, to which Franklin also refers in her account of PGD vis-à-
vis the work of Professor of Science and Technology Studies Sheila Jasanoff, namely how 
public discussions on biotechnology are always ‘framed’ to centralize certain questions and 
agendas. By showing how the question itself and the concepts drawn upon in these 
deliberations emerge from a background of “partiality’ and “plurality” (Jasanoff in 
Franklin, 2006, p. xviii), Jasanoff’s concept of framing shows how these perspectives may 
“partially overlap or diverge, they may stay the same or change, and they may be more or 
less recognisable or comprehensible to other social actors” (ibid.).  
In contrast to political agenda setting, then, this view begs a more detailed 
description of the concerns brought into and prioritised in policy discussions. McLaren’s 
effort to carry forward the Warnock model, and how she built on this to incorporate new 
concerns and emphasise a specific question, can contribute to the important process of 
showing “the diversity of material with which they [frames] are constructed, how they 
achieve their taken-for-granted status, and what happens to make frames change” (Jasanoff 
cited in Franklin, 2006, p. xix), in order to evaluate how and why this model may or may 
not serve its purpose. The account of McLaren’s role in developing the case for PGD also 
shows how McLaren as an individual framed the discussions, bringing into purview a 
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specific question and set of relationships. Indeed, McLaren used her ‘unusual’ position 
from early on – on Warnock and even before – in order to frame the ways in which the case 
for PGD would be made, feeding into Sarah Franklin’s insight that the prospect of genetic 
diagnosis was always already there as IVF was being developed.  
McLaren was aware of the role that the technology could play in persuading 
potential patients that human embryo research was necessary and framed the technique in 
order to address public concerns with regard to genetic diagnosis. This common ground 
came to be reflected and consolidated through a shared biological model of development 
that was assisted, while also making a clear delineation between ‘pre-embryo’ and embryo-
child. This account differs slightly from that offered in other analyses of the debates that 
separate the role of the ‘pre-embryo’ from the arguments for PGD in the pro-research case 
(Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 2005; Mulkay, 1997). As we shall see, I add to this 
analysis of the factors that contributed to the victory of the pro-lobby, showing how PGD 
and the arguments for the ‘pre-embryo’ related. The story of McLaren’s role in framing 
PGD for the pro-lobby case also helps describe her contributions as a scientist specifically, 
addressing the question of what biologists can offer to public debate, and also, importantly, 
what is at stake when we implicitly entrust this to authoritative individuals.  
Framing PGD in-the-making  
Theodosiou and Johnson (2012) and Franklin (2006) have both emphasised how the 
development of PGD mapped exactly onto the period of the debates on human fertilisation 
at embryology and suggest that the development of the technique was to some extent 
spurred along by the urgency of developing a convincing pro-research case. Franklin (2006) 
in this way points to the “role of PGD in focusing and clarifying public attitudes towards 
reproductive biomedicine” as it was being developed over the course of the HF&E debates 
(p. 39). Part of this significance, she goes on, derives from “its transformation from being 
a scientific possibility into a clinical reality – or ‘birth’ – during exactly the time period of 
legislative ‘gestation‘ of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Namely 1984–
1991” (ibid). Theodosiou and Johnson (2012) additionally suggest the strategic 
significance of focusing on genetic screening in the pro-lobby case, and they coin the 
phrase ‘genetic embryo’ to “encapsulate a variety of ways in which the genetic make-up of 
the embryo was a subject of debate and influenced the approach taken to the permissibility 
of scientific techniques” in Britain, helping them to explain why the pro-research lobby 
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came to focus their case strategically on genetic disease in the embryo research debate, 
building on the resonance from prior usage in the abortion debate in Britain (pp. 40–1).  
McLaren was a prominent figure in conceptualising this ‘genetic embryo’, 
specifically in relation to PGD as it began to emerge on the clinical horizon in the lead up 
to the HF&E debates, and then in explaining, advocating and facilitating the development 
of this technique over the course of the debates. In doing so, McLaren was part of the 
process of ‘focusing’ and ‘clarifying’ that Franklin describes.  
I will start by referring to an early statement by McLaren on the prospect of genetic 
diagnosis, and how this reflects her own ethical position on human embryo research. I then 
go on to show how she builds on this ethical position in the context of the Warnock Inquiry 
and the ensuing debates, by incorporating an understanding of social attitudes into a model 
relationship between basic and applied research. As in the previous chapter, these 
relationships and perspectives shape the embryological account given, leading to an altered 
developmental narrative that comes to represent a common moral ground over which a pro-
research lobby could unite.  
PGD pre-Warnock  
McLaren was one of the early proponents of PGD. Franklin and Roberts (2006) write that 
McLaren had been influenced early on by the work of “two of her close colleagues at the 
University College Hospital (UCH) to view pre-implantation diagnosis as an important 
research priority” (p. 44). One was Bernadette Modell, a geneticist working closely with 
the Greek-Cypriot community trying to reduce the incidence of thalassemia, and the second 
was Marylin Monk, a molecular biologist in McLaren’s lab who had already begun to 
develop the sensitive single-cell molecular analysis that later provided the basis for the first 
successful PGD. These scientists, Franklin claims, shared an understanding that patients 
should be helped in their wish for “an earlier means of diagnosis that would assure them of 
being able to begin a pregnancy free of … debilitating disease” (ibid.). Yet, even before 
PGD was becoming a clinical reality, McLaren was already practiced at framing the 
possibility of PGD. Theodosiou and Johnson (2012), in their account of the role of PGD in 
the pro-research lobby case during the HF&E debates, have shown how McLaren pushed 
for a shift in the policy of the Medical Research Council (MRC) towards research into 
genetic screening techniques for abnormalities in the late 1970s and early 1980s (p. 60). 
The MRC, initially cautious of research on, or transfer of, IVF embryos viewed these 
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techniques as purely experimental and dangerous. Indeed, McLaren herself even cautioned 
in 1971 that “a malformed baby” might be born if transfers were “carried out prematurely, 
through the desire … to be first in the field” (McLaren letter to the MRC, McLaren papers, 
British Library).  
The MRC, however, was forced to change its policy following the birth of the first 
IVF baby in 1978, which demonstrated the clinical success of IVF (Johnson and 
Theodosiou, 2012, p. 49). McLaren’s previous caution towards the techniques of IVF still 
remained, but was framed differently. In a letter to Dr Barbara Rashbass in the same year 
(1978), expressing her view on in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer to the Council, 
McLaren writes that she “thinks the use of in vitro fertilisation for research purposes should 
be encouraged” and that she “would like to see this recognised by the Council”, suggesting 
that “perhaps a review of policy in this field would be no bad thing” (July, 1978, FD 13/242, 
The National Archives, Kew). In making the case for such research she outlines several 
important lines of inquiry in the field, including testing sperm for its penetrating power and 
developing understanding of the pre-implantation period in the human embryo, such as the 
production of human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG), questions which would have 
implications for early pregnancy diagnosis, oocyte freezing, and testing for abnormalities 
in the embryo prior to transfer. Regarding the last point, she writes,  
If embryo transfer is ever to be used clinically, we need to be certain that embryos 
derived by in vitro fertilisation are not abnormal. The only ethical approach to this 
question is to carry out chromosomal and biochemical studies on a series of such 
embryos during the pre-implantation period. Such studies might well also throw 
light on the etiology of spontaneous abnormalities of implantation and early 
development.  
McLaren to Rashbass, 3 July 1978, The National Archives, Kew, FD 13/242 
As Theodosiou and Johnson (2012) point out in this letter, “the fear that IVF might 
cause abnormalities … was suddenly used as a justification to encourage, rather than 
withhold, support for research on human embryos” (p. 50). Theodosiou and Johnson go on 
to show how the MRC came to gradually adopt this approach so that, by 1982, its advisory 
group supported the use of IVF techniques in the “fields of embryology and inherited 
disease” (p.51), encouraging the pursuit of a screening device to determine the chromosome 
constitution of an embryo, and adding the genetic expertise of several scientists, including 
McLaren, to the Group, marking a shift towards the use of genetic arguments to justify 
research on the human embryo (p. 51). This leads them to show how a new position was 
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taken up by the MRC: while at first the fears of abnormalities that may be caused by IVF 
inhibited the development of the concept of the genetic embryo, eventually, “the fear of 
elusive IVF abnormalities was transformed into a desire to pursue, rather than impede, 
research on genetic abnormalities in IVF embryos” reflected in the “medico-scientific 
rhetoric from 1978 onwards, and was used by the MRC to justify a radical policy change 
on human embryo research” (Theodosiou and Johnson, 2012, p. 51).  
McLaren’s reconceptualization of the embryo in the 1978 letter therefore indexes a 
crucial shift in attitude in the scientific community towards human embryo experimentation 
that can be seen as a predecessor to those used by the Warnock Committee in favour of 
research. Genetic abnormality was increasingly cast as a characteristic of natural biology, 
justifying a greater degree of intervention in the reproductive cycle, as well as the research 
programme to support it. McLaren here already justifies research by referring to the 
prospect of genetic diagnosis – basic research is presented as first and foremost an 
inextricable component of clinical translation while any basic scientific information this 
research might yield on the ‘etiology of spontaneous abnormalities of implantation and 
early development’ is only secondary. Basic research is framed as part of a clinical project, 
meaning that any description of development is always given in reference to a specific 
application. This changes the status of the biological facts from objective or definitive, to 
relative and pragmatic, as Franklin argues in her Biological Relatives (2013a), an argument 
also made by Strathern (1992b) and Thompson (2013) in the context of the public debates 
on reproductive technologies and biomedicine.  
The description of McLaren’s role that I have given shows that this reframing of 
the biological facts of development in a clinical context also had implications for the way 
that development was communicated to and interpreted by non-scientists when the account 
was taken forward and developed over the course of the Warnock debates. As we shall see, 
it laid the rudiments for the arguments for human embryo research based on a clinical need 
for genetic diagnosis that is reflected in a biological model that is not natural but assisted.  
The clinical framing of the need for research used by McLaren in 1978 also 
indicates how McLaren would come to position herself in the debates. McLaren makes a 
judgement on the permissibility of research that she feels comfortable making in the context 
of the MRC discussions with other scientists, but which she is later hesitant to make in the 
context of the Warnock Inquiry. In Where to Draw the Line she expressly refuses to 
comment on the purposes to which human embryo should be put, offering only a scientific 
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account punctuated by landmarks to inform a broader discussion. The letter to Rashbass, 
however, shows how McLaren here feels able to comment on ethics within her remit as a 
scientist. She does so by implication, by pointing to the desirability of a clinical application, 
thereby justifying an accompanying research agenda.  
The inextricable relationship between basic research and clinical application as 
McLaren describes it in reference to genetic diagnosis not only facilitates her making 
ethical claims as a scientist, but also helps to explain her strong moral conviction that 
embryo research is justified. In an interview conducted for this study with Lord Robert 
Winston, who was another active member of the pro-research lobby, especially in 
Parliament, and who ran the unit at Hammersmith that saw the important first successful 
use of PGD to diagnose mice for Lesch-Nychan disease in 1987, he conveyed the emotional 
component of McLaren’s view on human embryo research:  
You know what? ‘Uncharacteristic’ is interesting, yes. I think in some respects, yes. 
I mean she could see that by the nature of how biologists worked on the whole field, 
there’s a big difference between the implanted embryo and the pre-implantation 
embryo, and that’s what she was really trying to identify. The pre-implantation 
embryo has no real confirmed trajectory, and she saw that very clearly. And 
interestingly, other biologists didn’t see that in the same way. I mean even though 
we were using, for example, the contraceptive coil … but then of course some of 
those were probably after implantation, and we were using some forms of oral 
contraceptive that were probably destroying embryos as well. But I think Anne felt, 
really felt quite aggrieved that they were treated in the same way – I think there was 
an emotional element in her thinking about it.4 
Winston, interview with author, 26 September 2018 
Winston here describes what he calls an ‘uncharacteristic’ use of a divisive term, 
the ‘pre-embryo’, by the usually measured McLaren. He explains this by referring to 
McLaren’s deeply emotional conviction that the early embryo and late embryo are different 
and shows how this emerged from a particular view of development, but also a broader 
perspective that saw the status of the embryo in relation to the clinical applications towards 
 
4 It has to be noted that Winston’s characterisation of McLaren as somehow emotional, as opposed to the 
rational Powell, is read with some unease. There is a history of women being cast as sentimental in a male-
dominated science in order to delegitimise their perspectives as ‘unscientific’, thereby perpetuating a long-
standing hierarchy of male, rational, and objective over female, sentimental, and subjective. It is thus with 
some trepidation that I approach Winston’s comments, but I hope that they serve to add to the characterisation 
of McLaren’s unique approach that I have offered thus far. 
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which it was being used across the field of reproductive biology. As in 1978, McLaren 
seems to arrive at a moral conviction that is strongly felt, as a result of a particular 
envisioned relationship between research and application. In an interview conducted with 
her in 2007 by Johnson and Franklin (interview Anne McLaren, British Library 
Mammalian Developmental Biology, 2007), McLaren herself describes the sense in which 
her vision of clinical application as part of a research project led her to a particular moral 
stance: 
And I remember being, it hadn’t occurred to me that there would be any ethical 
difference felt between embryos that were made for reproductive purposes and then 
not needed for the original purpose and embryos that were made directly for 
research. It just hadn’t entered my mind that there might be some ethical difference. 
And certain people on the committee … came out with this, it was almost a slogan 
cause they said it over and over again, you would just be “creating in order to 
destroy”. And I felt that one wasn’t actually creating, what one was doing was 
inseminating a donated egg. And one wasn’t just destroying, one was doing research 
which would lead to benefits.  
McLaren, interview with Franklin and Johnson, British Library, 2007 
McLaren’s moral position again derives from her broad vision that incorporates 
clinical and basic science under the same goal: “doing research that would lead to benefits.” 
Her moral stance and conviction become especially clear in the context of discussing 
clinical applications. In her ensuing contributions to the more public debate on human 
embryo research, McLaren finds ways in which to impart her ‘emotional’ sense that human 
embryos should be used towards clinical goals, by framing her descriptions of development 
increasingly in the context of the clinical prospect of genetic diagnosis. This, then, 
represents a kind of moral pragmatism, much in line with the approach taken by Warnock, 
that was geared towards concrete solutions and applications at the same time that she kept 
in purview broadly held social attitudes, which remained intuitively attuned to a shared 
sense of where the limits should lie. For McLaren, making the case for PGD similarly 
continues to be both a rational case for a specific application, but also an iterative process 
of incorporating the sentiments of a wider constituency, as well as her own, into her 
biological model.  
Framing PGD for a wider constituency  
On the Warnock Committee, McLaren was faced with a very different task to the one she 
had on the MRC. On the MRC, the response to genetic screening had to be made to 
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determine a research agenda and policy within a professional community of scientists. On 
the Warnock Committee, the question of genetic screening had to be addressed in the 
context of advising the Government on how to treat the human embryo and would thus 
have to reflect the views not just of embryologists, geneticists and reproductive biologists, 
but of society as a whole. Nonetheless, as in 1978, we see here how McLaren takes on a 
more definitive moral stance in the discussions of a specific clinical application, providing 
her with a scientific issue through which to assert a moral imperative. It is also by tracing 
McLaren’s arguments in favour of PGD, that her ethical model comes to light.  
In an interview conducted in 2018 for this study, Warnock recalls that McLaren was 
indispensable to the inquiry on the issue of genetic engineering. Indeed, besides the 
introduction of a very particular scientific account, the issue that Warnock highlights, to 
which McLaren became instrumental, was the question of future applications of human 
embryo research. Warnock explains how McLaren, “really beyond her call of duty, was 
extremely helpful with the whole business of drafting and circulating potential drafts for 
discussion” (Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018). She explains how McLaren 
helped her clear what she describes as a ‘fog’ in her thinking about the issue: 
And I used to make a point to see her between meetings, so we could go in for 
drafting exercises. … Anne was amazingly helpful with helping to clear the fog. 
Clarity was her great gift really. And I remember, we’d been set up to look at 
infertility. But it become quite clear that we had to, or ought to really, incorporate a 
lot of stuff that really had nothing to do with infertility at all but that was to do with 
genetic engineering and looking to the future in that way. And I just couldn’t see 
how to fit into this format of the report, because it seemed to be quite outside of our 
terms of reference. 
Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018 
It was thus on the issue of future applications of embryo research for purposes other 
than infertility treatment that Warnock lacked the clarity she now seemed to have gained 
on infertility-related recommendations. The issue of genetic engineering had emerged from 
the so-called ‘evidence’ submitted to the Committee, which, as Warnock explains in her 
interview with me, was “of course not factual evidence but the evidence of … what people 
thought” (Warnock, 21 August 2018), which had been collected over the two years of the 
investigation from various interest groups. In these various responses to research, the issue 
of genetic engineering had proven to be a bigger concern than anticipated. The question of 
research, Warnock further recalls, had been pushed to the end of the Committee’s 
deliberations, and so there was suddenly time-pressure on the process of incorporating 
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these unanticipated matters into the Report. McLaren, ever forward-looking and attuned to 
the potential developments in her field, as her former scientific colleagues all emphasised, 
was well-suited to the task. Warnock goes on to explain the nature of the problem as she 
saw it at the time: 
I think it became clear that if you … I’m trying to think of the order in which this 
occurred … that if you had an embryo, or several embryos in the laboratory alive, 
you could, at the very least select which embryos you were going to choose to 
implant, but there was also the possibility of actually intervening in the 
development of the embryo.  
Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018 
The solution they found, Warnock explains, was to “find a way of devoting one 
chapter to the future, that I hadn’t seen how we could incorporate but that actually flowed 
quite easily in the end – to ways of possibly intervening to change the embryos”, that 
represented “future possibilities that really weren’t anything to do with infertility but would 
be the next set of advances that would happen” (Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 
2018). As the above quotation shows, the chapter came to centre around a distinction 
between techniques that depended on genetic manipulation, such as ‘cloning’ or the use of 
animal-human hybrids with trans-species fertilisation, and the therapeutic benefits of 
selection by assessing, for example, whether sperm is healthy in the hamster-fertilisation 
test, and selecting healthy embryos based on genetic analysis. Therapeutic benefits are 
repeatedly aligned with selection in the chapter, while genetic manipulation falls outside of 
this remit and is precluded by the Warnock recommendations.  
In the case of the prevention of genetic disease, the chapter again states that “public 
anxiety about these techniques centres, not so much on their possible therapeutic use, but 
on the idea of the deliberate creation of human beings with specific characteristics” 
(Warnock, 1985, p. 75), and the Committee goes on to advise that research in this area be 
regulated by the proposed authority and that guidance be reviewed from time to time to 
accommodate new advances in addition to reiterating that the recommendations in the 
Report generally preclude advances this this area. The chapter projects an image of the 
future of embryo research in which genetic diagnosis is geared towards the goal of 
producing healthy offspring by means of selection, a goal that is identified as one that the 
public can get behind, while the line is drawn at genetic manipulation, which is identified 
as the real source of public concern around genetic intervention.  
Warnock says that she was impressed by how McLaren was able to contribute a 
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way of thinking, as opposed to scientific expertise alone, to the discussion:  
But what impressed me so much was that this was not a technical, scientific 
problem; this was a sort of stylistic, sort of structural problem, to do with the shape 
of the report as a whole, which wasn’t her specialty, but which she was extremely 
good at seeing the point of and discussing. And I valued her help in that respect just 
as much as I valued her scientific input.  
Warnock, interview with author, 21 August 2018 
This structuring and framing demanded not only that McLaren introduced relevant 
scientific information, but that she was able to distil the crux of the social concerns into a 
scientific account, once again showing how her discussion of science is shaped by social 
values. Yet, even further than this, McLaren is able to deduce these concerns and values, 
through her perception of feelings and to express in scientific terms her understanding of 
people’s hopes. This is a process of persuasion based not on coercion, but on an 
understanding of the human values and how they are expressed. McLaren and Warnock 
worked together, drawing on various logics to inform the public by combining 
philosophical expertise, emotional appeal, and scientific reasoning. As in the case of the 
‘pre-embryo’, they are superimposing by translating the sentiments expressed in the public 
evidence into regulatory lines imposed on scientific practice and future research directions.  
Almost all of McLaren’s former colleagues whom I interviewed for this 
dissertation, both from her scientific and policy circles, have emphasised her clarity of mind 
as a key attribute. Warnock’s description of her contributions to developing a response to 
genetic engineering begins to show what this ‘clarity’ allowed her to see. The assistance 
McLaren was able to provide in addressing the question of genetic engineering seemed to 
rely on an understanding of the source of public anxiety which was then used to structure 
the scientific information in such a way as to address these concerns. The process then, 
required both empathy as well as the ability to develop a rationale that would come to 
reflect this. Winston refers to this relationship between affect and rational thinking in 
McLaren’s approach: 
I don’t think if you’d said to him [Enoch Powell], “what are the four ethical 
principles” … Anne would have said immediately, “Well, you respect the autonomy 
of the individual; secondly you have this idea of trying to good; thirdly, not to do 
harm; and lastly to have a just solution to what you’re doing”. Powell couldn’t have 
answered any of that stuff. For him it was a kind of gut feeling he had. And Anne 
ultimately, I think, was actually an academic, with an academic view, but with a 
wonderful humanity about her which was actually always there. And that for me 
was something I always remember, when she talked to my PhD students or 
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whatever she was doing, you felt this was somebody who was feeling her way 
through things.  
Winston, interview with author, 26 September 2018 
Winston, although perhaps lacking the clarity that Warnock has, attempts to convey 
the same sense in which McLaren’s approach was so distinctive because of the way in 
which she brought scientific rationale and sentiment together. He contrasts McLaren’s 
ethical approach to that of Enoch Powell, showing that, unlike Powell, she was able to 
justify her ethical position by referring to certain principles. Powell, on the other hand, 
merely had a ‘gut feeling’. Yet Winston concedes in the same passage that McLaren’s moral 
position was also emotionally driven. The real distinction Winston is trying to make, it 
seems, is that McLaren was able to explain her ‘gut feeling’ in her own professional 
language.  
As she did in Warnock’s example, McLaren performed this translation by drawing 
on scientific information and by making distinctions, structuring the information in such a 
way as to bring to light the ethical implications of the science in a particular context of use. 
Integral to this process was ‘feeling her way through things’. Winston’s passage also 
gestures to McLaren’s dialogical methodology: that she spoke to people in order to develop 
her views. This, too, as we have seen in Warnock’s account, allowed her to incorporate an 
intimate understanding of others’ views into a shared moral position expressed in scientific 
terms. Once again, we see how McLaren’s colleagues describe her as effective in the policy 
context precisely because she was able to bring the traditionally disparate domains of facts 
and values together; both are encompassed in her remit as a scientist in public debate.  
Winston goes on to describe a particular instance where McLaren’s scientific and 
moral clarity was important, as they collaborated on translating PGD into practice:  
Anne wasn’t really interested in the parliamentary frippery – she was never of that 
mind, she was really interested intellectually in what was going on much more. But 
she was astonishingly clear about what should happen and what was happening. 
And I suppose right through my relationship with her, right up to the point when it 
became clear that we were going to get PGD off the bench and into the patient, there 
was then talk of course about how about modifying the human embryo. And Anne 
of course said, that’s not necessary, you don’t need to modify it because pre-
implantation diagnosis makes that an unnecessary thing, and she was very clear 
about that actually.  
Winston, interview with author, 26 September 2018 [emphasis added] 
In describing McLaren’s response to the parliamentary debates and her interest in 
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them as ‘intellectual’, Winston points to the way in which she was able – in Parliament just 
as on the Warnock Committee – to integrate the views she encountered into an overarching 
framework expressed in a scientific account. This ‘intellectual’ perspective allowed her to 
see, when PGD was being debated, that it rendered genetic modification unnecessary, an 
argument that she knew, as we have seen from the Warnock anecdote, would alleviate 
anxiety amongst some of the public. Thus, it was an intellectual sense of clarity that allowed 
her to incorporate emotional concerns into a scientific world view. This affective 
translation, this integration of emotional feeling by showing its implications in scientific 
terms, encompasses both McLaren’s own feeling of what is right as well as sense of 
compassion, an understanding of the hopes and values underlying the sentiments expressed 
by others. This ability to integrate concerns in the form of distinctions and framings is 
reflected in McLaren’s treatment of PGD in the public debate and, I will now show, meant 
that the common moral ground she was constructing for a growing pro-research alliance 
also comes to be expressed in a new biological picture.  
PGD and the public role of the scientist 
As genetic disease became increasingly central to the parliamentary and public debates, it 
became urgent that scientists clarified the possibilities and limits to genetic intervention in 
the embryo (Mulkay, 1997). In a commentary piece published in Nature in 1985, McLaren, 
writing with H. John Evans (Director of the MRC Clinical and Population Cytogenetics 
Institute in Edinburgh at the time), attempts to do just this. The article is a reaction to the 
introduction of Enoch Powell’s Unborn Children (Protection) Bill into Parliament, a bill 
that many of the scientists involved in the pro-research lobby still refer to as an important 
galvanising incident, making clear the extent of the opposition to research that they would 
have to face. The central issue of debate had now clearly moved to human embryo research 
and this was being debated largely in terms of specific genetic therapies. The article is also 
representative of a shift in Nature’s policy noted by Melinda Baldwin (2015) in her history 
of the journal, in which she shows how it became increasingly a site for public debate in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Authors would use an article to say their piece, from a scientific 
perspective, but clearly in order to elicit support for a political agenda. This political case, 
made in the capacity of a scientist in a public debate, then, is made through the language 
of clinical applications.  
The article immediately frames the debate as one about intervention in the embryo 
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in order to alleviate genetic defects. The article opens, “Much to the dismay of most 
informed scientists, infertile couples and parents are at risk of producing children with 
severe inherited genetic defects” (McLaren and Evans, 1985, p. 127). It continues: 
Unfortunately, the bill will … prevent attempts to circumvent the production and 
transfer of severely genetically abnormal embryos, a possibility that is almost 
within the grasp of medical science, and which is ignored or rejected by proponents 
of the bill.  
McLaren and Evans, 1985, p. 127 
McLaren and Evans are responding particularly to the arguments made by the 
French geneticist Professor Jerome Lejeune, who addressed the pro-life group with his 
views on curing inherited genetic disease. His proposed alternatives to genetic intervention, 
in themselves flawed according to McLaren and Evans, are also all concerned with therapy. 
It is here that McLaren’s distinction between selection and manipulation of the genetics of 
the embryo is made again: 
Defining and understanding the nature of the defect can lead to rational attempts to 
alleviate the disease, by supplementation (à la Lejeune) or by circumvention ... these 
developments are somewhat removed from practicality and ... will be applicable 
only in a limited number of diseases. Moreover, they are concerned with attempted 
amelioration of the disease and not with its prevention. And they involve 
manipulation of the patient, not of the embryo. 
McLaren and Evans, 1985, p. 127 [emphasis added] 
They go on to cite examples, such as the case of Duchenne muscular dystrophy, in 
which only a small proportion of the embryos will be affected, making detection of “which 
is normal and which is abnormal” a viable therapeutic route, and dispensing with the need 
for “genetic manipulation of the embryo” (p. 128). At this point, PGD was still only on the 
horizon (Franklin and Roberts, 2006), but the technique, the authors claim, lies “just around 
the corner, and would require further studies which would become outlawed under Mr 
Powell’s bill” (ibid). McLaren’s earlier position in which clinical applications frame the 
need for research is again evident, but importantly, we here see how PGD provides a 
powerful example of such a clinical application that addresses a moral imperative that is 
shared throughout society to secure healthy children. In this way, PGD came to represent 
certainty: first in the form of a shared moral position based on a clearly defined clinical 
goal, and then, as a real clinical possibility providing certainty to couples having children, 
which in turn also validated an increasingly positivistic and deterministic account of 




Here we see how PGD again provides a context in which McLaren is able to 
confidently assert a scientific and moral case for research that now also incorporates the 
morals of a wider public. PGD, like the Warnock model, thus came to represent another 
amalgam – of regulative provision that responded to social attitudes, of McLaren’s morals, 
of clinical science and basic research, all brought together through an intuitive, affective 
understanding of people’s values, concerns and hopes. This history provides another 
example of the process of superimposition that I have described, showing how McLaren’s 
justification for research to better understand genetic defects in 1978 set in motion a 
research project in which abnormal embryos are used to better understand development, 
which is then referred to in the debates on human embryology to make the case that research 
can produce normal development. The increased conviction with which McLaren takes this 
public stance as a scientist is also reflected in a consolidated biological account, to which I 
will now turn.  
The biological picture  
As the debates progressed, PGD went quickly from being a theoretical future possibility, 
to an imminent, and then actual clinical procedure. The earlier model that posited a research 
agenda around the ‘pre-embryo’ aimed towards a projected clinical horizon, was thereby 
transformed into and confirmed as a working biological model. Increasingly, PGD showed 
that the early embryo could be screened and transferred without affecting the healthy 
development of the later embryo, thus confirming the existence of a researchable and 
conceptually separable early embryo. By legitimising the ‘pre-embryo’ as a scientifically 
separable entity, the clinical procedure thus also dispensed with the need for the rationale 
provided in Where to Draw the Line in the sociological language of landmarks. The 
“proof”, as James Gowans, secretary of the MRC at the time of the debates, put it, “was in 
the pudding” (Gowans, interview with author, 18 September 2018). The certainty that PGD 
purportedly offered couples was thus reflected in the increasingly widespread acceptance 
of a biological model that set up the early embryo as a research tool. The status of the 
human ‘pre-embryo’ was defined in relation to a specific application, which was now a 
clinical reality, giving substance and certainty to the pro-research lobby scientific answer 
to the Warnock question of how to govern the treatment of the human embryo.  
At the same time, though, the need for PGD was explained by a biological picture 
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that was distinctly uncertain. Embryo selection and transfer was only necessary due to the 
inefficiency inherent to development – the natural fallibility in a still poorly understood 
contingent biological cycle. This generates a tension between two developmental views: 
one that emphasises the certainty that genetic screening can provide through an account 
that suggests that mastering of the embryo’s genetics is sufficient for healthy development, 
and another that emphasises the contingency of development upon a suitable environment. 
The latter is both the necessary precondition to making this research acceptable, while it 
also undoes the logic on which the procedure’s viability is predicated.  
Nonetheless, these two embryos are able to coexist in the dual developmental 
narrative used by the pro-research lobby because the case was structured according to the 
same scientific-moral stance expressed by McLaren in 1978, namely that clinical 
application and basic research should be conceptualised as part of the same project. This 
model is thus able to incorporate two models of development expressing two very different 
agendas. The first, the genetic one, is geared towards the achievement of a healthy 
pregnancy by the means available. The second, frames a research agenda around a still 
poorly understood phase in development. The genetic trajectory reflecting clinical certainty 
is supported by a broader vision that points to the need for the study of development to 
achieve certainty in clinical application. The latter vision becomes less necessary as the 
genetic view is, to some extent, confirmed by the success of PGD. This certainty is reflected 
in the use of the ‘pre-embryo’ in pro-lobby case, as in the McLaren and Evans article, 
framed by the need for genetic diagnosis, and no longer in terms of progressive 
physiological distinction mapped onto individuality that we saw in the previous chapter.  
At the same time, the success of PGD also changed the clinical view of development 
that emphasised certainty through genetic selection. By translating the biological, 
contingent trajectory into something that can be secured and optimised through scientific 
intervention, the natural inefficiency of the cycle is implicitly confirmed, and so the 
biological model of the scientists is also validated. Heightened intervention in order to 
secure so-called ‘normal development’ thus paradoxically reflects an underlying biological 
view that is contingent. In terms of McLaren’s diagram in figure 1, the spiral is always 
implicated by the unidirectional appendage of embryo to child.  
This points to an interesting outcome of an approach that built a case by 
incorporating public sentiment by introducing new biological distinctions, of merging 
perspectives: namely that it alters the view on both sides, from both perspectives. By taking 
 
94 
the public need for reproductive certainty seriously, a biological model was validated in the 
public eye that acknowledged contingency. Similarly, by drawing the line at selection in 
response to public attitudes, a biological picture was instantiated in which artificial 
intervention secured a paradoxically more ‘normal’ developmental trajectory, a process 
Franklin (2014) has described as ‘analogic return’, drawing on Strathern, whereby 
analogies ‘travel back’ to remake both their object and its epistemology, changing even the 
context of the concept itself. The conceptual disruption of selection to the popular view of 
deterministic development is in this way arguably much greater with selection than it would 
have been if a case had been made for editing the genome.  
Rather than an imposition on ‘natural’ biology, scientific intervention becomes part 
and parcel with the natural cycle – biology becomes assisted. By incorporating a popular 
view into the scientific account, the public, over time, is rendered more amenable to the 
biologist’s vision; by taking seriously public concerns and providing a shared language in 
which to express them, the scientist’s case becomes much more convincing at the same 
time that there emerges a common ground. In this sense, the ‘pre-embryo’ became part of 
not only of a shared ‘approach’, as in the quote by Virginia Bolton in the previous chapter, 
but also a shared, and altered way of seeing biology. The explanation of how PGD was used 
in the debates that I have given, thus also offers a new sense, or at least shows in more 
detail, how the ‘pre-embryo’ functioned in the pro-lobby case. While previous accounts of 
the debates have cited both the introduction of the term ‘pre-embryo’ and the promise of 
PGD as key factors to the pro-lobby victory (e.g. Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 
2005; Mulkay, 1997) they have fallen short of showing fully how the two were mutually 
reinforcing: that is, how they were connected to form the pro-research argument. British 
sociologist Michael Mulkay (1997), for example, outlines several crucial factors to the pro-
lobby success. The first, he says, was “the transformation of participants’ understanding of 
the experimental subject of embryo research” (p. 132): 
The idea of the ‘pre-embryo’ helped to remove the moral barrier to the continuation 
of embryo research by convincing people and/or by helping them to express their 
conviction that this was not research involving real human beings, but experimental 
use of unformed biological material. … The great polemical advantage of the 
concept of the ‘pre-embryo’ for the pro-research lobby was that it placed the 
experimental subject of embryo research beyond the reach of its opponents’ moral 
discourse.  
Mulkay, 1997, pp. 132–133 
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This interpretation is in line with other analyses of the debates. STS scholar Sheila 
Jasanoff (2005), in her analysis of the ways into the constitutional framings that shape 
policies for the life sciences, also refers to ‘pre-embryo’ as a “vital ontological distinction”: 
By giving a name to the pre-14-day entity, research scientists and their political 
allies met and parried the nominalist tactics of the pro-life lobby. Thus, in a neat 
display of coproduction, the adoption of new rules for the ethical conduct of science 
resulted, at one and the same time, in the coming into being of a new natural entity.  
Jasanoff, 2005, p. 152 
While Jasanoff acknowledges how the ‘pre-embryo’ distinction was negotiated in 
relation to a set of ‘rules for ethical conduct’, this remains an ‘ontological’, not an 
epistemological one, and she does not describe this process of co-production she evokes, 
which, as we have seen, occurred very much through the part that the ‘pre-embryo’ played 
in PGD.  
Mulkay goes on to describe the possibility of PGD as a second, separate factor 
leading to the success of the pro-lobby: 
The second crucial element in the success of the pro-research campaign was its 
increasing emphasis on the possibility of controlling genetic disease without 
altering the genetic make-up of human individuals. The pro-research lobby 
convinced the majority of parliamentarians that many forms of genetic disorder 
could be more or less eradicated by means of genetic screening of IVF embryos. As 
a result, as the parliamentary debate entered its concluding stage, the defenceless 
unborn children of the early debates largely disappeared from view and were 
replaced by the miraculously healthy children to be produced in due course with the 
techniques forthcoming from embryo research. The replacement of the embryo by 
the pre-embryo made further research seem permissible. The acceptance of 
scientists’ claims concerning the wide range of potential benefits to be obtained by 
means of genetic screening made the continuation of embryo research appear 
obligatory to the majority of parliamentarians. 
Mulkay, 1997, p. 133 
We see that Mulkay posits PGD as a second, important factor that was distinct from 
the argument made for the ‘pre-embryo’ and that, in the debate, and served the distinct 
rhetorical function of making research ‘obligatory’ rather than merely ‘permissible’. Yet as 
my account of McLaren’s use of PGD in her pro-research lobbying shows, the view that 
research is obligatory is itself also expressed in idea of ‘pre-embryo’ as a usable tool: the 
distinction in development explains how McLaren in 1978 managed to reframe genetic 
malformation as a reason to fear research into a reason to support it. As the debates moved 
forward, the ‘pre-embryo’ was central to the argument for intervention, as it became 
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connected to a new set of values expressed in the idea of clinical application, of which the 
social benefit of healthy babies was one; but there were also others. The relationship 
between the arguments for the ‘pre-embryo’ and for PGD in the pro-research case 
represents more than a matter of nuance because, as we will see, it is precisely through this 
relationship that the public view of artificial intervention in biology changed permanently. 
A relativistic understanding of biology in which artificial intervention, especially in the 
genetic sense, provides a blueprint for a drastic and lasting shift in public attitudes towards 
reproductive technologies has lasted well beyond the conclusion of the 1980s debate.  
The description of the process by which the biological model and moral values 
came to be related thus has implications for the way that morality, too, is understood. 
Mulkay argues that the ‘pre-embryo’ “allowed the pro-lobby to apply the same moral 
principles that prioritised the rights of the individual to the question of embryo research, 
thereby reconciling the idea of human embryo research with “generally agreed moral 
principles” (Mulkay, 1994, p. 624). My account suggests that human embryo research was 
not merely aligned with pre-existing moral principles, but that this set of morals was 
negotiated iteratively through the process of superimposing visions. The outcome of this 
process is this linking of the ‘pre-embryo’ to PGD: an overdetermined common ground was 
established through a vision of assisted biology in which research and application were 
linked towards a shared moral goal.  
The case of PGD here given also offers an example of what Franklin (2013a), 
drawing on Marx, has called ‘substantialisation’, which expresses the relationship between 
human ‘embodiment, sociality, identity, material objects, and technology’ to show how 
humans co-evolve with their environment, so that a concept is substantialized through 
technique, not just inherited equipment. In this understanding, tools are more than 
equipment, but also expressive of and influencing ontologies and epistemologies,  
Tools, and the evolution of technology, must be understood as both inherited 
equipment and as the moulding conditions of human existence, constantly 
reshaping what the human is by what it can do, in a dialectical process that extends 
beyond historical time into the mists of human species emergence. More than this, 
tools are never merely instrumental: as Heidegger insisted, they belong to the 
history of thought, and as Marx also argued, tools are the offspring of imagined 
worlds as much as actual ones. Tools are substantialized concepts.  
Franklin, 2013a, p. 13 
In this sense the tool can also exceed what is currently known. Indeed, Franklin 
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describes “both science and reproduction as frontiers that are shaped by open-ended 
exploration largely based on the use of handmade and hand-held tools.” (p. 106). The 
reworking of the biological in dialectical relation to PGD as it was being developed, shows 
how this model in which social and scientific technology and concept are intimately related, 
can also be applied to the negotiation of moral values. Here the technology of PGD 
substantializes a commonly held biological model by incorporating not only new scientific 
information, but also new concerns, feelings, and values.  
This insight is also palpable in the literature on postgenomic biotechnologies in 
Science and Technology Studies (e.g. Mackenzie et al., 2013). Here, scholars have argued 
that new biotechnologies can be studied in terms of how they become part of a process of 
arriving at new standardised definitions of the ‘biological’ (ibid). In so doing, these 
technologies “amplify the regimes of engagement” and “explicitly or inadvertently invoke, 
for instance, publics who can add something that the scientists or engineers cannot” 
(Mackenzie et al., 2013, p. 704), as their biological standards are negotiated in direct 
relation to an imagined set of users. In this way, standardized technoscience is “co-imagined 
with standardized publics” (Ellis, Waterton, and Wynne, 2009) – these biological tools 
shape what is biologically possible at the same time that they become “vectors of tangled 
values, beliefs and desires concerning speed, control, and economy” (Mackenzie et al., 
2013, p. 716). It is crucial, these authors claim, that we recognise that “in finding a way of 
pledging material arrangements to a sought-after good, there are risks and responsibilities 
involved in creating standards” (ibid). McLaren’s case shows us how one scientist 
negotiated this responsibility.  




Figure 5. Moiré Patterns, Behind Appearances, 1969, C. H. Waddington, p. 124. In this diagram, Waddington 
demonstrates how by overlaying two patterns, he creates a model system to study these patterns in relation to 
one another, addressing the problem of organisation that he claims is of central interest to the new, ‘Third 
Science’.  
The embryologist and polymath C. H. Waddington wrote a book titled, Behind 
Appearances (1969). In it, he outlines a shift in scientific thinking in the 20th century, 
evident in the theories of evolution and relativity, that no longer conceives of the world as 
“consisting of solid lumps of matter which can be organised into straightforward machines” 
(p. 1). He outlines a movement from the science of the Ancient Greeks, where axioms 
would be proposed from which “theorems could be deduced by the application of logical 
systems of inference”, to a Second Science associated with the Renaissance based on the 
interrogation of nature through experimentation and whose questions are formulated in 
terms of entities such as atoms, forces, masses, to a Third Science, sparked by theories of 
relativity in physics, or evolution in biology, that acknowledge indeterminacy and chance 
as “fundamental characteristics of reality”, as well as the technical means, with the 
introduction of computers, to analyse systems of organisation (p. 2), causing a shift “away 
from atomistic, decontextualised science”, into the study of “such general properties as 
information or organisation. These objects of study are not entities in the usual sense but 
are characteristics of systems” (pp. 2–3).  
Waddington also tries to relate these shifts in science to shifts in the history of art, 
with a focus on painting. Here, too, he notes how artists no longer look for likeness of 
delineated entities, moving away from the ‘representational’. He brings his analysis of art 
and science together by drawing on Thomas Kuhn’s model of the paradigm shift in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In Kuhn’s theory, he explains, each era sees the 
world in terms of a particular ‘paradigm’, and this paradigm comprises both “an apparatus 
of perception (which brings into particular focus certain aspects of our existence) and a 
framework by which the many different facets of the universe can be related to each other” 
(Waddington, 1969, p. 1). Perception, then, reflects a certain way of knowing. He goes on, 
“our general notions about the world – the spectacles through which we see it and the 
framework into which we try to fit our observations are, of course, dependent in the main 
on what we know about it” (ibid). And so, by drawing on Kuhn to outline a shift in world 
view over the first half of the 20th century that is much broader than that within the 




Particularly the new concern with organisation, he asserts, has profound 
implications for attitudes to the structure of science more generally, or the ethos of doing 
science. One consequence is a recognition of the multiplicity of the sciences, the 
idiosyncrasy of their perspectives. The study of organisation means studying the ways in 
which units are related, often “the resulting complex may exhibit properties which cannot 
be expressed by the objects in isolation” which means that “a science which deals with 
properties of one type of organised entity may, and probably will, be very different in 
character from that which deals with different kind of organisation” (p. 127). It would be 
difficult, he goes on, “ever to comprehend exhaustively the entire content of any class of 
natural phenomena” and so “we cannot hope that the different sciences will, in general, 
merge with one another again” (ibid). Each science, in this way, has a “particular selection 
of methods, an intellectual pattern appropriate to the behaviour of its subject matter” (ibid.).  
Waddington, then, describes how each science represents a partial perspective 
characterised by a set of specific questions. This view resonates once again with Strathern’s 
(1992b) concept of ‘merographic thinking’, in which “partial connection from another 
angle” can displace one meaning for another – a process she describes as substitution in 
her critique of the metaphysics of nature and culture” (p. 304). The relational epistemology 
leads to an understanding of individual sciences as partial, relative to the question and the 
scientist performing the inquiry, and this also informs Waddington’s interpretation of the 
images produced within science. The Third Science, he claims, is accompanied by a new 
aesthetic that expresses this interest in questions about organisation by recording “the 
interaction of two or more intersecting patterns” (Waddington, 1969, p. 122). The simplest 
example of this new type of image is the moiré pattern (see figure 5), which “can be 
produced by superimposing two systems of concentric circles on each other” which 
Waddington offers as an example of the kinds of problems the Third Science is interested 
in: namely, “a system that is itself produced by the interaction of two subsystems” (p. 124). 
As in his description of science as a whole, questions are conceptualised as a set of relations 
that can only ever be appreciated in part, at particular nodes, and as part of a particular 
system.  
The pattern and scientific ethos underlying Waddington’s conceptualisation of the 
Third Science and its new aesthetic connects to the concept of ‘framing’ I have used to 
describe McLaren’s contributions to the HF&E debates and resonates in interested ways 
with the approach she took to finding common ground. As we have seen, her process of 
 
100 
incorporating public views into her Warnock case was a process of bringing two distinct 
views of development – one teleological and one contingent – expressing different 
priorities and agendas, together into a scientific picture that showed how they overlapped 
under a common aim of clinical translation. As we saw in the previous chapter, too, and 
here in the case of PGD, this process requires feeling as well as rational thought in order to 
distil the concerns represented by any position, to understand how the account is framed in 
relation to specific concerns. McLaren thus displays an awareness of the partial framing of 
any account in relation to its context and purpose and uses this insight to find meaningful 
common ground through translation or superimposition. The clinical or the research 
perspective are both equally true, but both offer only part of a bigger picture. In this way, 
McLaren’s case for research described a set of relations – between basic and clinical 
science, law and science, between scientist and potential patient, and their respective 
morals and feelings. The model therefore positions the scientist not as an arbiter of 
definitive facts, but as a figure bringing clarity to the discussion by making explicit the 
framing of respective positions and their limitations and intersections. In this sense, she 
practices the newfound self-reflexivity that Waddington attributes to scientists of the Third 
Science, witnessed in the breakdown of the old distinction between the observer and the 
observed: 
The scientist himself, or man in general in his activity as an observer, comes to be 
incorporated into science in a way which is completely outside the Second Science 
paradigm. And finally, he also becomes involved in science not only as a maker of 
it but as a subject for its study, not only as an individual with a psychology, but as 
a member of a set of societies which are themselves examples of organisation. Third 
Science, which is still nascent and has not yet arrived at a definite inclusive 
paradigm of its own, will certainly have the human and social science as very 
important factors in its make-up. 
Waddington, Behind Appearances, 1969, pp. 2–3 
The above quote shows how Waddington’s conception of the new science implies 
a new role for the scientist, as aware of the limitations of any particular discipline, and 
therefore more amenable to inter-disciplinary collaboration. This type of thinking is very 
much evident in McLaren’s policy work and, we will see in the next chapter, also in her 
approach to laboratory science. As with Waddington, there is a consistent understanding of 
the role of framing, of perception in the production of knowledge, and this awareness arms 
her with a strategic toolkit that allows her to solve problems, also within science, in a non-
traditional but highly effective way.  
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Waddington describes a general trend across the sciences, but he labours the point 
that biological thinking in particular was already adept to the new conceptualisation of life 
in terms of organisation. Biologists were starting to see just how “universal organisation 
is” – “in day to day physiological functioning, in developments from egg to adult, in long-
term processes of evolution” and science more generally was beginning to follow suit, 
although under “somewhat different names” such as “ ‘feedback control’, ‘end-product 
inhibition’, ‘error-correcting networks’, and the like – very similar ideas have been growing 
in importance in the physical as well as the biological sciences” (1969, p. 118).  
In the next chapter I will turn to a fuller explanation of the concern with process 
and organisation among the so-called ‘organicist’ biologists, and how McLaren can be 
placed in this lineage, but here I point to the way in which biological thinking already lends 
itself to thinking through problems in terms of relations, and of conceptualising and, 
therefore, visualising its object of study in these terms. Evelyn Fox-Keller has described 
this distinctive biological way of seeing as the ‘biological gaze’ (1996) and offers a range 
of examples in the history of the life sciences in which the tools used to make biological 
objects at the start of life visible also unavoidably change them, thereby complicating the 
notion of objective observation, so that “what we see as we gaze at the secret of life is life 
already, and necessarily, transformed by the very technology of our gaze. And conversely, 
and simultaneously, that gaze provides the means of further transformation” (p. 120). 
Especially at the microscopic level in modern biotechnology, in the fundamental 
processes of generation, it becomes clear how there is inherent to biology the process of 
preparation and modelling in order to bring to light the specific problem the biologist is 
interested in. IVF, as Sarah Franklin (2013a) has argued, goes even further by showing not 
only “how socialised (and socialising) scientific understandings always are, but now also, 
and ever more visibly, how social values, systems, and aspirations are being engineered 
and constructed in such a manner that they too become part of what ‘biological’ means” (p. 
70). As Keller’s quote above also illustrates, the process of intervention is both disruptive 
and enabling. Donna Haraway has conveyed a similar lesson in, among others, her 
monograph Crystals, Fabrics and Fields (1976), where she follows Thomas Kuhn and his 
notion of the paradigm as also discussed by Waddington, to show how ‘metaphor’, and in 
her later work, the ‘model’, “is the vital spirit of the paradigm (or perhaps its basic 
organising relation)” (p. 9). These metaphors “embody expectations and fundamental views 
of a structure of nature” making scientific theories testable while they also “lead to a 
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searching for limits of the metaphoric system and thus generates the anomalies important 
in paradigm change” (1976, p. 8). The biologist, in this way, is adept in the back and forth 
movement between metaphor and referent through “the application of the analogy” (p. 10). 
This biological gaze begins to suggest how McLaren was primed for the kind of thinking 
that distilled diverse perspectives into workable models – models that change as the 
technologies of science and of society in the form of the law and public attitudes transgress 
the boundaries of what is known.  
McLaren proved adept at superimposing these perspectives in order to build a 
common ground expressed in a biological model that, as we have seen, was very different 
from any of the individual perspectives incorporated. Similarly, in the accounts of 
Waddington, Keller and Haraway, the biologist is an expert at the work of framing the 
question into enabling models that foreground a set of relationships comprising a system. 
In the next chapter, I will offer some examples of how McLaren engaged this kind of 
thinking in her science, and how this resonates with her approach in policy-making. Here 
already, though, I want to note the resonances between the style of thought required to bring 
different perspectives together in developing the Warnock model, of describing the policy 
question through a process of framing, and the concern in biology with organisation studied 
through models that make visible the phenomenon at hand. 
Genetic thinking  
As we have just seen, PGD, which emerged as a result of this early framing by McLaren 
that posited the need for research based on prospective clinical translations, was also 
formed to reflect public concerns, so that a research agenda prioritised developing 
techniques that would select, rather than alter, the embryonic genome. In addition to 
changing public understandings of development implicitly, the emphasis on genetics as a 
means to clinical certainty also showed in concrete and scientific terms the limits of 
genetics in explaining development, a curious legacy considering the role that genetics have 
continued to play as a source of hope in the debates on therapeutic cloning and stem cells 
since the HF&E debates. The obstacles encountered on the path to achieving PGD revealed 
the limitations of genetic analysis in the securing of a healthy birth, thereby validating the 
embryologist’s vision of contingent development over the teleological one. In a 1989 
Ellison-Cliffe lecture, Research on the human conceptus and its regulation in Britain today, 




But this raises another problem, which would never have been uncovered without 
IVF research, and which again emphasises the risks of extrapolating from mouse to 
human … In the human … it is not until the 4–8 cell stage that the embryonic genes 
start to be expressed. This means that any attempt to do pre-implantation diagnosis 
at the eight-cell stage in the human by looking at gene products would be in danger 
of diagnosing the mother’s genes instead of those of the conceptus. 
McLaren, 1989, pp. 211–12, unarchived document 
This discovery of the late activation of the embryonic genome also explains, 
McLaren goes on to show, the need for the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) that can be 
used to amplify a particular stretch of DNA so that the DNA itself, rather than the gene 
product can be analysed. The case shows however, that on the path to developing means of 
genetic diagnosis in aid of embryo selection in order to maximise the possibilities of 
certainty in pregnancy, scientists gained a refined insight into the workings of the 
embryonic genome in early development that complicated the developmental picture and 
contradicted any simplified, deterministic view of development as the expression of one 
narrow conception of ‘potential’ usually represented as the expression of genes in popular 
debate. By responding to patient priorities and taking their developmental picture into 
account, in the form of a clinical aim, the biological model of development as contingent 
was further validated. This gives another sense in which the biological picture used in the 
Warnock debates became increasingly justifiable in ‘scientific’ terms, as PGD was realised. 
The sociological and legal rationale for a cut-off point in development became less 
necessary, as the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ in clinical science increasingly spoke for 
itself. The view of biology expressed in these arguments for research based on the 
possibility of PGD is changed. As Franklin writes,  
… greater proximity to genetic information may be experienced as increasing its 
uncertainty as well as its fixity or determinism (see in particular Strathern 1999). 
This tendency to dichotomise these possibilities (either DNA “tells you who you 
are” or it doesn’t) may thus be an analytic tendency at odds with a growing amount 
of empirical data (see esp. Lock 2005). 
Franklin, 2006, p. 223 
In McLaren’s biological model for development, and reflected in her case for 
embryo research overall, at least, we see that genes and the determinism that they might 
imply in popular accounts of development are only part of a layered account that contains 
other biological criteria (physiological coherence, sentience), as well as social, clinical, 
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legal and ethical considerations. The biological model thus comes to foreground the 
contingency of any relationship between embryo and person, thereby translating a new 
biological view, as well as scientific research, into applied therapies and into the debates.  
This new biological vision, then, is a crucial legacy of PGD still noticeable in the 
public debate today. Unlike the other analyses of the debates that we have seen that separate 
the biological case for the ‘pre-embryo’ from the role of PGD in explaining the outcome of 
the debate (Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 2005; Mulkay, 1997), I have shown that 
this legacy can only be explained by understanding the relationship between the arguments 
for clinical translation and the biological model used. Bioethicists Jennifer Gunning and 
Veronica English (1993) try to explain this legacy of a new biological vision and draw a 
connection to clinical applications centred around genetic screening to explain how the 
debates saw a widespread shift in understanding of the biological facts of development. In 
their comparison between the legislative processes in the UK and the US, they show how 
clinical application was distinctively central to the UK case from the beginning of the 
policy debate. By framing IVF, initially still an experimental procedure, as a therapy in the 
Warnock Report, the authors claim that the focus of deliberation was shifted from the 
controversial terrain of research towards the less divisive one of therapies. Moreover, they 
argue that an emphasis on genetic possibilities also changed what was considered 
therapeutic research in the first place. Now it was not just the alleviation of infertility but 
also the prevention of genetic disease that required interventions at the molecular level, 
bringing laboratory and clinic ever closer together in the public view. The arguments for 
research in aid of PGD in this way paved the way for the acceptability and desirability of 
basic research in embryology and inherited disease generally, of using “human embryos, 
animal models, but also inter and intraspecific IVF, to provide information on genetic 
defects” (Gunning and English, 1993, p. 24).  
Genetics, then, with its implications of linearity and determinism, has also served 
to recruit support for a wide range of research projects into the contingency of development. 
The rise of regenerative medicine and its dependency on models of development that are 
temporally malleable, are testament to this paradoxical legacy – and it is the consequence 
of superimposition, of a set of imperfect translations that never fully paper over the cracks. 
I hope, then, in this chapter to have demonstrated Gunning and English’s point with a 
description of how this legacy of the acceptability of genetic research was cultivated 
through a biological model that connected the certainty offered by genetic screening to 
 
105 
contingent and continuous development, substantiating a close relationship between 
laboratory research and clinical application that came to be broadly shared.  
Translational robustness  
I have described the legacy of ‘genetic thinking’ emerging from the model of 
superimpositions employed in the HF&E debates in order to develop and further schematise 
the model of translation that I am proposing. Through the account of McLaren’s 
contributions to the Warnock debate, I have suggested an alternative evaluation of the ‘pre-
embryo’, not as a ‘fudge’ nor as a rhetorical tool, but as part of a translational model aimed 
towards finding consensus through public deliberation. I have described the use of the ‘pre-
embryo’ and the biological vision that it reflects, as a layering of different perspectives that 
are representative of different groups and different epistemologies. What emerges, as we 
have seen, is a picture that always remains complex, that always reveals the cracks in its 
foundations in the form of confusion, discomfort and disagreement among the various 
parties involved. Interestingly, though, despite the non-literal translation of the scientific 
vision into a linear account reflecting the certainty that genetic screening could provide, the 
scientific vision of a totipotent, continuous biological cycle has been validated in the public 
eye and provided a widespread acceptance of, and even support for, intervention in the 
biological cycle. While both the teleological embryo that gives rise to a baby and the 
totipotent embryo that is used in the lab continue to coexist, the biologist’s and patient’s 
vision of development has moved closer together. As the ongoing support for the HF&E 
Act and its amendments to accommodate new clinical possibilities suggests, this model and 
this vision have been remarkably robust – despite the scientific community’s apparent 
disdain for the term ‘pre-embryo’ and despite the fact that the term is no longer used, the 
vision that it connotes remains intact.  
This brings us back to Strathern and her theorization of knowledge practices and 
how they stand alone or intersect according to their context. In her book Reproducing the 
Future (1992b), Strathern draws one of many analogies between language and the embryo: 
“like developing cells,” she says, “language has a constant potential for increasing 
differentiation” (p. 143). She explains this characteristic by placing emphasis on the 
environment, the context of ideas:  
In cultural life, in those habits of thought about which for most of the time we are 
very much unaware, the ideas that reproduce themselves in our communications 
never reproduce themselves exactly. They are always found in environments or 
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contexts that have their own properties or characteristics. These environments or 
contexts provide a range of domains. We can think of all the social differences that 
opportunity, class, gender, expertise and so forth make to how the world is 
perceived; interests such as these form several such environments, and profoundly 
shape the nature of communication. Moreover, insofar as each is a domain, each 
imposes its own logic of ‘natural’ association. Natural association means that ideas 
are always enunciated in an environment of other ideas, in contexts already 
occupied by other thoughts and images. Finding a place for new thoughts becomes 
an act of displacement.  
Strathern, 1992b, p. 6  
If then, a ‘new’ idea is only ever articulated in a context already representing a node 
in a web of pre-existing ideas, it can never be reproduced exactly because every context is 
different. Given this understanding, non-literal translation is the only way to preserve 
meaning, and non-exact reproduction is the only means to survival. Like the embryo, the 
robustness of meaning comes from an ability to adapt to an environment with its own set 
of ‘properties and characteristics’. This points to the aptness of the model of 
superimposition. Again, this is a geological idiom that does not mask the process of the 
compression of layers upon which it relies. Consensus is built on shifting ground and it is 
in these tectonic movements that the vitality of meaning resides. Disagreement does not 
preclude consensus, but instead describes the unavoidable context in which any, always 
temporary, legislative outcome is found. The legacy of the biological model used in the 
HF&E debates reveals how it was the imperfect reproduction of the biologist’s model that 
allowed its underlying meaning to survive, indeed, to thrive in the form of an expanding 
and proliferating research agenda, which in turn, in a recursive loop, came to confirm the 
biologist’s view. By adapting the model to the values, feelings, legal requirements, and 
ethical ideas that defined the context of the HF&E discussions, the scientific model of 
development was kept very much alive.  
Legacy of the biological model  
McLaren, as is clear in description of development in Where to Draw the Line, was invested 
in a model of development that was continuous and contingent. She also, however, believed 
that clinical applications should always be discussed in relation to research and vice versa. 
This latter conviction allowed her to present the scientist’s view in a public debate, 
moulding her biological picture to embody shared moral concerns. McLaren was thus 
anything but opposed to emphasising the possibilities of genetic diagnosis, and the certainty 
that this could bring couples, despite the fact that this offered only one perspective on a 
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more complex biological picture. As Professor Marcus Pembrey (Pembrey, interview with 
author, 17 October 2018), remembers, McLaren recognised from early on the role that 
genetics would come to play in the public debates over embryo research. She also 
encouraged him to join Progress and later to chair Progress Educational Trust. He recalls,  
And very interestingly, she said, “You’re exactly the right person to do that because 
the next big issues is not going to be embryo research, it’s going to be genetics. 
What genetics can do, and so on, and all the ethics of that”. And she also knew that 
I, in ‘88, I’d started working with Gene Goulding to set up the Avon Longitudinal 
Study of Parents and Children, where we would be doing DNA analysis on the 
general population for the first time. It would be the first cohort ever where we 
would be collecting DNA and start analysing it. So she basically encouraged me in 
all of this. 
Pembrey, interview with author, 17 October 2018 
McLaren actively encouraged research in this area while also encouraging the 
leaders of these research agendas to guide public discussion. It is perhaps also with an eye 
to the future, then, that she was cultivating a role for the scientist in public debate in relation 
to PGD that revolved around a new model for scientific intervention in development. This 
biological vision, this shared moral ground, has in many ways persisted through the debates 
on embryo research that have arisen since the passing of the HF&E Act. The response to 
the proposed changes to the HF&E Act in 2008, are one gage of how attitudes have 
permanently changed. The proposed HF&E Act II was to accommodate “the formation of 
admixed human embryos for research, using the eggs of cows combined with human nuclei 
to create new biological tools” (Franklin 2014a, p. 118). Sarah Franklin reflects on the 
protests and reactions to the proposed changes to the Act: 
However, the reduced size and fervour of the demonstrations for and against 
embryo research were not the only measure of the difference between 1990 and 
2008. Looking back, we can see that although some forms of reproductive 
technology – such as cloning, human-animal hybrids, and stem cells – still engender 
controversy, the logic of progress associated with assisted conception has been 
sedimented into a naturalized trajectory of intervention in the name of human 
betterment in which technological manipulation of human embryos is not only a 
viable alternative to ‘natural’ reproduction, but also a necessary path to the 
continued improvement of human health.  
Franklin, 2014a, p. 120  
Unlike the 1980s debates, there was now a strong majority in favour of the mixed 
animal-human embryos, reflecting the consolidation of a moral position based on a 
biological vision of assisted biology that impels us to intervene in the name of human 
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betterment. As Strathern (1992a) has described, the process of ‘literalisation’, or of making 
explicit values in relation to the facts-of-life in order to generate new ones, means “there is 
no going back”, that one “cannot recapture the point before explicitness” leading to a 
perpetual “relativizing of ‘our’ understanding of ‘ourselves’“ that produces the sense that 
there appears to be less and less to be taken for granted and thus less nature in the world” 
(p. 44). Franklin echoes this insight specifically in relation to the legacy of IVF in Britain: 
Over time, the connection between IVF and fertility – or even conception – has 
been superseded (as it was preceded) by a more general isomorphism between 
improvements to human life and the ability to culture human embryos in glass. This 
is the biological relation IVF substantializes as both a model system and an ethical 
consensus, and therefore not only as a translational path but as a public duty. This 
is the logic of remaking life that appears increasingly to have become a sign of a 
vital, caring, and creative Britain.  
Franklin, 2013a, p. 61 
PGD, as we have seen, built on this sense and consolidated this new British ethos 
based on ‘ethical consensus’. This increasing sense that biology was, and should be, 
assisted was, in turn, assisted by the carrying forward of the Warnock model, which 
expressed the sense that biology is relative not only to technological intervention, but also 
to clinical horizons, the state of science, regulatory provision, and public consensus. While 
the term, ‘pre-embryo’ may not have survived in public or medical debate beyond the 
1980s, its translational logic demonstrably has.  
In the Chapter 4, I will discuss how this translational logic might assist us in 
contemporary debates about the possible extension of the 14-day rule, in light of an 
arguably changed biological vision in which assistance has reached new heights in the form 
of synthetic biology – where the concept of natural development, when an embryo exists 
as a delineated object, is obsolete. How, in this case, might we think about drawing lines as 
a process of finding common ground instead by drawing on various disciplinary logics and 
the concerns of various affected groups?  
Conclusion: McLaren’s problem-solving ethos  
In the previous two chapters, we have seen how McLaren, in the context of the policy 
debates on human embryo research, actively orchestrated and consolidated a structure, a 
specific framing of the discussions taking place in scientific meetings, committees, in 
Parliament, and by special interest groups. This work of framing shows how, to McLaren, 
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her work as a scientist consisted of much more than bench science. PGD provides a case in 
point. In addition to the encouragement she gave to eminent scientists in the field of 
reproductive biology such as Marcus Pembrey and Robert Winston to join lobbying groups 
like Progress, and to Marylin Monk in developing the scientific techniques required, she 
also groomed the social and political ground by developing a scientific and ethical model 
that would facilitate research. As in the previous chapter, we saw how McLaren brought 
together disparate domains in her translational model, which defined her distinctive style 
of practice at the same time that it renders her legacy sometimes ambivalent as scientists 
grasp for the language to describe her approach. Indeed, I have shown the rise of a more 
relativistic biology over the course of the debates, and have tied this to McLaren’s expertise, 
showing how she combined authoritative scientific understanding with the idea of moral 
purpose and social good, necessitating a language that could reflect both. This description 
of the scientist’s role in public debate again models the translation I am proposing, one that 
begins with an understanding of the biological facts as relational, to move towards 
interpretations of the facts that are representative of the ideas and values of a broader social 
identity.  
It is nonetheless the persistent difficulty in describing this model that also explains 
McLaren’s own need for new terminology, including but not limited to the ‘pre-embryo’ 
and her model used in the HF&E debates and expressed in the various speeches and 
diagrams she used, as she tried to bring values, facts, feelings and hopes together to express 
her sense, as a scientist, of what was right. The legacy of this distinctive role, I have also 
suggested, is that we think increasingly in this way, even in the absence of terminology to 
describe the process.  
In the next chapter, I will place McLaren’s approach as I have described it thus far 
in a broader description of McLaren’s ethos in science, and her developing thinking about 
the relationships between science and society that emanate from this conceptualisation of 
her own role as a scientist. Her career comes to represent, I will show, a testament to the 
importance of framing to any debate. Her contribution in all cases is one of a distinctive 
style of reasoning, a style that falls into a legacy of biological reasoning characterised by 
socialist scientists in Britain in the 1930s, and one that is particularly relevant to 




McLaren’s style of practice 
Over the course of the debates on human embryo research in the 1980s, McLaren developed 
a distinctive role in which she combined an authoritative scientific understanding with the 
idea of moral purpose and social good. This unusual position necessitated a new language 
that could capture these disparate perspectives, a language that she found in the form of a 
set of superimposed logics. McLaren’s contributions show how the scientific facts were 
translated into the discussions not literally, but were adapted to the context in order to 
accommodate the broad range of concerns that were linked to the public debates on human 
embryo research. In this way, however, the biological vision from which she departed 
remained curiously intact, as is evident in the more relativistic model of biology that is 
assumed by a public generally supportive of a wide range of experimentation in the field 
of genetics and reproductive biology today (Franklin, 2014a).  
How did McLaren come to cultivate this approach? How can we describe her 
approach to public debate by referring more broadly to her formation as a scientist? What 
elements of her biography help to illuminate her distinctive style of practice? I will address 
these questions by describing in this chapter McLaren’s political and scientific background 
beyond her role in the debates on human embryo research in Britain. By looking at 
McLaren’s educational and personal biography, describing her academic and political 
lineage in relation to public engagement with science, in addition to her own writing on the 
relation between science and society, I attempt to describe broadly McLaren’s overarching 
social vision, which I describe as an ethos of problem solving.  
The language used by my interviewees to describe McLaren’s approach as a 
scientist resonated and can be categorised under three broad traits. The first emphasised by 
many scientists, including Peter Goodfellow, Richard Gardner and David Whittingham, 
was McLaren’s ability to connect researchers: she was, as Goodfellow (interview with 
author, 21 September 2018) puts it, ‘everybody’s aunt’. We have already witnessed this 
ability in the account of the human embryo debate, where she was able to unite researchers 
in order to move a translational agenda forward, for example. The second quality repeatedly 
emphasised, was McLaren’s clarity of vision, most notably in Warnock’s recollection of 
her role in structuring and framing the questions at hand on her Committee. Finally, former 
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collaborators repeatedly emphasise her breadth of vision; her ability to look across 
scientific disciplines, and to broader social, ethical and political questions in order to move 
scientific agendas forward (interviews with author, 2018). Her role in the debates on human 
embryo research again provide a case in point, as I have described by reference to the series 
of translations McLaren performed across domains in order to make a case for research. 
These three capabilities were, moreover, as we have already seen, all mutually instantiating. 
McLaren’s breadth of vision was, for example, what gave her clarity on the Warnock 
Inquiry, and allowed her to frame the question at hand as a shared research agenda that then 
allowed her to exercise her ability to connect individuals under a common goal. These traits 
reappear and converge in McLaren’s other pursuits, from her scientific to her policy work, 
generating a distinctive pattern of practice, as McLaren moves between social circles to 
recruit and connect new perspectives and people to her overarching scientific goal.  
By describing here again how McLaren’s approach manifested, we begin to see how 
her idiosyncratic style was defined by a particular social vision – she drew on her ability to 
translate in all the senses we have seen to work towards her understanding of a better, fairer, 
world. Describing McLaren’s social vision more broadly also helps distil the social 
implications of the model of public deliberation in the context of the debates in the 1980s. 
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Geological idioms: Waddington’s landscape  
 
Figure 6. Image of Waddington’s ‘epigenetic landscape’, a metaphor for development, as painted by John 
Piper, Epigenetic Landscapes, Squier, 2017, p. 23.  
As we have seen, McLaren’s distinctive approach to the policy discussions on 
human embryo research in the 1980s was characterised by her combining authoritative 
scientific rationale with the idea of moral purpose and social good. McLaren’s thinking in 
science, too, resonates with the most creative ways of modelling development that have 
emerged in the field. The cultural critic Susan Squier (2017), for example, has detailed how 
the embryologist C. H. Waddington (1905-1975) used his model of the so-called ‘epigenetic 
landscape’ to propose a very different way of conceptualising the problem faced by the 
embryologist in the 1960s as molecular biology and embryology began to unite.  
Waddington belonged to a group of so-called ‘organicists’. These were socialists 
and scientists who were committed to conceptualising a new model for the organism as it 
develops from genotype to phenotype. Waddington in particular expressed hopes that this 
model would incorporate a growing understanding of biological development as an 
“interactive and recursive set of systems” (Squier, 2017, p. 44), that could extend beyond 
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the organism to its – perhaps even, social, as Squier shows – environment. The epigenetic 
landscape was the “visual image developed by Waddington as the central figure for the 
[new] scientific field of epigenetics, the “causal analysis of development” initially intended 
to facilitate greater collaboration between molecular biology and embryologists by framing 
development in such a way as to represent a shared problem (Waddington, 1940, cited in 
Squier, 2017, p. 2). For Waddington, then, the challenge in producing the image was 
epistemological: he wanted to find a way to link embryological development to hereditary 
transmission through the representation of temporal process in visual form. Waddington’s 
landscape accordingly modelled a hypothetical relationship between two domains and 
invited practitioners from various disciplines to ‘fill it in’. The image was not intended as 
a realistic sequencing of embryonic development as was conventional in the field 
(Hopwood 1999; Squier, 2017), but served as a visual metaphor for the process of 
development, intended to build a bridge between embryology and genetics. The landscape, 
in this sense, expresses a largely unknown system; it is an open question. The scientist, in 
this model, intervenes in this system which they “believe has certain stability 
characteristics” but Waddington explains, “we have no idea where we are on the landscape 
when we first start trying to affect the system” (Waddington cited in Squier, 2017, p. 12). 
The landscape is too big to ever traverse in its entirety and Waddington therefore prescribes 
a rough method for exploring the landscape in which the scientist “alternates between (a) 
local exploration and (b) a jump in the dark to try to change some quite different aspect of 
the system” (Waddington 1977, cited in Squier, 2017, p. 12). This way of conceptualising 
the scientist’s relation to their object of study is quite different from the narrow expertise 
of the more conventional scientist. Here, the scientist attempts to understand a system, not 
an object, and this system is only ever a subset of a large network of interconnected systems 
that they can never fully perceive. The scientist is limited by their position in the ‘landscape’ 
which constitutes the particular part of the hypothetical model, the subset of related 
systems, that they choose to explore.  
Squier goes on to draw on the philosophy of Michel Serres, vis-à-vis STS scholar 
Bruno Latour, to characterise the epistemological approach Waddington posits in his 
instructions for ‘exploring a landscape’. Latour describes Serres’ proposed mode of 
learning, called ‘tiers-instruit’, to explain how this differs from “the standard Western 
epistemological model” of critique and subordination to a single epistemological category 
(Latour, 1987; Serres and Latour, 1995 in Squier, 2017, p. 13). Serres’ mode of learning 
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relies instead on a “wandering, translational commentary that ranges across disciplines and 
disciplinary languages” (Squier, 2017, p. 13).  
 
 
Figure 7. Diagram from Epigenetic Landscapes, Susan Squier, 2017, p. 14. Squier replicates a diagram 
created by Bruno Latour, in which he shows the difference between philosopher Michel Serres’ method of 
inquiry and that of the traditional ‘critique philosophers’.  
Serres’ approach, represented by the second diagram of layered languages is 
contrasted to the one summarised in the first image shown in figure 7. Here, a circle marked 
by arrows extending outward toward the periphery and inward to the centre “represents a 
powerful critique … that ties, like a bicycle wheel, every point of a periphery to one term 
of the centre through the intermediary proxy” (Latour, 1987, p. 90 cited in Squier, 2017, p. 
13). This mode represents, Latour explains, the “Critique philosophers,” who “firmly install 
their metalanguage in the centre and slowly substitute their arguments to every single object 
of the periphery” (ibid). Serres’ “pre-critical philosophy” is, in contrast, expressed as a 
series of “parallel lines stacked one on top of the other, with the tiered labels ‘Language 1, 
1.2, 1.3., and 1.4.’ and wavering and straight lines linking the tiers” (p.13). “Crossover from 
one repertoire to another,” the caption reads. Latour defines Serres’ method not as critique 
but as commentary, a “cross-over, in the genetic sense, whereby characters of one language 
are crossed with attributes of another origin” (Latour, 1987, p. 90–91, cited in Squier, p. 
13). For Squier, the implications of this crossing-over extend beyond disciplinary crossings 
within science.  
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Waddington’s epigenetic landscape, for Squier, has the potential to construct new 
epistemologies that draw on extra-scientific discourses and frame development across new 
levels of analysis. Squier reads the epigenetic landscape into contemporary examples of 
landscape architecture and bio art to show how the landscape’s alternative 
conceptualisation of the object of science as a problem allows it to serve as a 
methodological tool for remediating development. In particular, the landscape captures 
different layers of time that allow broader, ‘environmental’ factors to be factored into 
accounts of development, which can come to encompass a whole “ecology” of social 
factors beyond those in molecular or cellular biology alone (Squier, 2017, p. 183). 
Scientific inquiry is not only exploratory but also, importantly, a process of allowing 
oneself to be affected, and one’s languages to be inflected, by the languages of other 
domains. Rather than “dividing and subordinating fields, Serres multiplies them and 
disturbs their boundaries, preferring disorder and fertility to sterile order” (Squier, p. 13). 
Here we return to the imagery of superimpositions that Waddington also described in 
Behind Appearances (1969), using the moiré pattern – both the landscape and his 
exploration of the relations between science and art can be seen as part of a search for 
adequate visual representations of the problems in science and, in both cases, the answer 
seems to be layering logics: exposing relationships, understanding contextually, 
relationally, and translationally in the sense that I have described throughout this thesis. 
Serres’ conceptualisation helps to tease out McLaren and Waddington’s shared 
epistemological assumptions. Serres’ methodology also resonates with McLaren’s 
approach of superimposing in arriving at consensus, expressed in a model of layered logics 
in which she allowed her scientific language to be changed by the context of public debate. 
Like Waddington, McLaren was explicitly exploring ways of modelling the set of 
relationships in which she was interested: between the domains of science, ethics, law, and 
feeling, for example.  
The ‘pre-embryo’ came to demarcate first a research agenda geared towards clinical 
application, and then increasingly a biological picture that reflected the way that this 
clinical translation worked. The picture was shaped in a very real sense by the concerns of 
a general public around genetic defects and the desire to have healthy babies. McLaren, 
like Waddington, invoked a geological idiom with her concept of superimpositions to 
describe and develop her understanding of her role in relation to her object of study. This 
relationship, as we have seen, was relative to a particular agenda; partial in the sense that 
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it was framed by a specific goal towards clinical application. McLaren’s policy work thus 
already shows how the legacy of Waddington’s landscape, like Squier argues, is in the way 
its logic has been used to model relationships that extend far beyond embryology and 
genetics – it is, in the multiple sense that I have described in this thesis, translational.  
It is also possible, however, to trace the influence of Waddington’s thinking on 
McLaren’s way of approaching laboratory science specifically. Indeed, McLaren in an 
interview for the British Library Mammalian Developmental Biology archive in 2007, cites 
Waddington as one of the main scientific influences on her work (interview with Franklin 
and Johnson, 2007), and worked at his laboratory in the Institute of Animal Genetics in 
Edinburgh for fifteen years between 1959 and 1974. Moreover, both Waddington and 
McLaren were Marxists, and educated through the Communist Party.  
In her science, McLaren shared Waddington’s commitment to a view that might be 
described as ‘epigenetic’, and, like Waddington, she found herself wanting for a field that 
captured the scope of her research interests. There did emerge a field that came close to 
what we will see was McLaren’s integrated understanding of reproduction, genetics and 
developmental biology, in the late 1970s, under the bracket of ‘evo-devo’, whose followers 
aimed to link development to inheritance. Steven Rose, neuroscientist, social commentator, 
author, and a friend of McLaren’s, recalls McLaren’s response to this sudden interest, and 
how she saw this merely as a re-articulation of the seminal influence of Waddington’s 
epigenetics: 
I think in the hands particularly of Waddington … the attempt was to introduce 
epigenetics as a way of trying to integrate the two. And I think that that was a key 
influence in Anne’s thinking and would have been an influence as well when she 
went to Russia. But what came much later of course was the rediscovery of 
epigenetics and the attempt at a three-way integration between development, 
genetics, and evolution. And this became known as evo-devo. And Anne was sort 
of cheering about it … I think we were both there, we were standing in line, to get 
into a conference or something, and she said, ‘what is this evo-devo stuff?’, we’ve 
been doing it all along! It’s just got this fancy new name.  
Steven Rose, interview with author, 12 September 2018 
 
The quote gives a sense of how McLaren delineated her object or, more accurately, 
her system of study as an epigenetic question in Waddington’s sense – initially as a shared 
question for geneticists and embryologists alike. It also shows how she carried these ideas 
forward into an era that saw a temporary rejection of, and then a return to, these questions. 
Her science was, in a sense, always political, because she concerned herself with the 
 
117 
epigenetic questions that had been rejected in Western genetics and because these in turn 
belonged to a lineage of Marxist scientists all interested in challenging what they 
considered to be the individualistic models of Western science. Despite her Marxist politics, 
however, McLaren chose not to engage directly in political discussion or contestation of 
the issue, but, we will see, instead to the gradual filling-out of a continuous developmental 
model of gene–environment interactions that, over time, scientifically, built a body of 
research that was, undoubtedly, epigenetic.  
McLaren, then, was good-humoured in her approach. We will see in detail how her 
career trajectory is testament to the trust she placed with scientific research to validate an 
open-ended, theoretical model. This allowed her to bring the disparate domains of 
developmental biology, reproductive biology, genetics, and even politics together through 
a characteristic, pragmatic, scientific approach. McLaren’s research interest was in gene–
environment interactions over generations, and built on Waddington’s views – indeed, was 
consolidated when she joined Waddington’s Institute of Animal Genetics in 1959 to explore 
the role of maternal influence in the process of implantation. This also led McLaren to 
develop her own model that resonates with Waddington’s landscape in terms of not only its 
substance, but its translational ethos.  
The scientist-explorer 
McLaren’s conceptualisation of her field of study is evidenced in her own descriptions of 
her scientific practice that I discovered in her archives at the British Library. I spent a 
considerable amount of time studying these laboratory notes, reflections and speeches, 
which are unusually detailed for a scientist’s papers and thus provide valuable, textured 
descriptions of the scientific process. In the write-up of a talk given in March 1968 as part 
of an ‘Evening Discourse’ hosted by the Royal Institution in London, called Life before 
Birth: the first few days, for example, McLaren outlines the techniques used in her lab in 
order to explore gene–environment interactions in the first few days of development. After 
detailing the use of petri-dishes to observe mouse embryos in vitro, and chimeras to explore 
the mechanisms of differentiation, McLaren goes on to describe the methods used for 
studying implantation. She explains,  
If you spend, as I have spent recently, many hours looking at these successive slices 
of a pregnant mouse uterus, you acquire a most passionate sense of involvement 
with the mouse embryo and its problems. The slices can be stained with different 
dyes which show up different features of the landscape – and it really does seem 
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like a landscape, because your mind links the successive sections, like successive 
frames of a film, and you have the sensation of actually travelling through this long 
tube. As you move along you note, with rising excitement the swelling of the wall 
of the uterus which heralds the approach of an embryo. One arm of the uterus 
seldom contains more than 10 embryos, each occupying only 10 or 20 slices, out of 
a total of several thousand slices, so one looks forward to the embryos like oases in 
the Sahara, or stations on the Trans-Siberian railway. 
McLaren, Life before Birth, 1968, pp. 14–15 [emphasis added] 
Here, McLaren presents an analogy of the relations between the genes and 
environment, here at the level of the embryo as it implants in the uterus. The experiment is 
set up to bring to light the process of implantation by following the embryo in this process, 
describing the relationship between the embryo and uterine environment. McLaren is so 
immersed in her model that she describes herself as traveling through the uterus, awaiting 
the appearance of the embryo. McLaren, moreover, in describing her research object in 
terms that are very reminiscent of Waddington, as a landscape, also explains how this is 
constructed from a succession of images – a series of superimposed slides. It is through the 
relationship between these slides that a picture of the process of implantation begins to 
emerge. In order to move forward in time, the scientist performs a process of calibration to 
‘link the successive sections, like successive frames of a film’. The view that emerges is 
thus the product of a subjective relationship to an environment, and this relationship is 
enacted through a process of conceptually relating: each frame represents a set of 
relationships to the viewer and between elements in the environment. The question is how 
you get from one frame to the next to construct a temporal image of a process. The quotation 
shows evocatively how McLaren sees the work of science as the linking of layers, 
connecting these in order to build an image of a process, a model that, as Wadding vis-à-
vis Serres, emphasises the subjectivity of the scientist as they move through the landscape 
and foregrounds the specific environmental context, the limited, partial picture that any 
single frame expresses. Any single frame, as an expression of a set of relations, contains all 
of the other frames, but each frame also only gains meaning in relation to every other frame. 
It is through that same movement between local observation and recurring jabs into the 
unknown that the scientist builds a picture. This process of relating by sequencing is 
performed from the limited perspective of the embryologist, and in response to a specific 
set of questions. We see how McLaren is thinking in terms of translations between 
contextual utterances, exercising her characteristic approach to link them in order to build 
a bigger picture that is both enabling and provisional, limited and receding, like the horizon 
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of a landscape.  
I will now turn to a description of McLaren’s career, which reflects this systemic 
way of thinking based on a conceptual and linguistic linking of layers by analogy. We will 
also see that, like Waddington, her model for doing science reflects a broader social vision 
enacted through a commitment to communication in and of science.  
Pattern formation in developmental biologists 
 
Figure 8. Diagram from “Pattern Formation in Developmental Biologists”, 1997, Taniguchi Symposium, p. 
58. In this figure, taken from a paper discovered in Anne McLaren’s uncatalogued papers at her daughter, 
Susan Michie’s house, McLaren summarises her own career as a pragmatic shifting between problems, 
thereby conceptualising her object of study as the entire course of the mammalian life cycle, from one 
generation to the next. Reproduced with kind permission of Susan Michie. 
In an article presented at the Taniguchi Symposium in Japan in 1997, titled Pattern 
Formation in the Developmental Biologist, McLaren (1997) summarises her career by 
drawing an analogy to the development of the mammalian embryo. “In the developing 
embryo”, she explains, “pattern formation occurs as the result of interactions between the 
cells’ own genes and the surrounding tissue environment” (p. 57). She goes on, “similar 
interactions could play a part in fashioning the pattern of a biologist’s career” (ibid.). She 
goes on to explore what she describes as her own “opportunistic” approach to biological 
research, which she contrasts to the approach of biologists who either pursue a single 
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research question throughout their careers, or those who invent new techniques. Those of 
the opportunistic school instead choose to focus on a “system” (p. 57). This means that they 
increasingly invest “intellectual capital” in this system and that, should it cease to 
“illuminate one particular problem, they shift to a different problem” (p. 57). McLaren’s 
research career as she describes it is thus defined by “unashamed” opportunism and a 
particular pattern that reflects her interaction with her scientific environment (ibid.). This 
pattern, she goes on to show, is both “curiously cyclical” and characterised by a consistent 
interest in the interaction between gene and environment at different levels of organisation. 
She explains how she began her career in genetics, with an interest in how genes worked 
and how they interacted with their environment, which she explored in collaboration with 
her partner, Donald Michie, through their research in maternal effects on the number of 
lumbar vertebrae in mice at University College London (1952–1959). They showed that 
these were determined by environmental (uterine) factors and were not X-chromosome 
linked. This work led them to further develop the embryo transfer techniques devised in 
the Jackson Laboratory in the USA, including the techniques of superovulation, which later 
became instrumental to possibility of IVF.  
Rather than fully exploring the effects of the uterine environment on gene 
expression, the embryo transfer experiments showed McLaren that there was a narrow 
window of opportunity for implantation, which led her to look into the conditions required 
for implantation. This, in turn, led to a foray into immunology, drawing on the view at the 
time that implantation might be an immunological reaction and that the male-specific 
histocompatibility antigen H-Y might be involved, introduced by sperm or male embryos. 
McLaren disproved this view and also showed that female mice could be rendered infertile 
by immunising them against sperm antigens (not H-Y antigens), foreshadowing approaches 
to immuno-contraception in humans. At this time, McLaren began not only transferring, 
but also culturing embryos in vitro. She showed, with John Biggers, that mouse embryos 
could be cultured for several days using the technique developed by Whitten (1956), and 
could then develop into normal, live fertile mice after transfer (McLaren and Biggers, 
1958), a discovery that had obvious relevance to the development of IVF in the human.  
The work on embryo culture then led to investigations into aggregation chimeras, 
using the techniques described by Tarkowski (1961) and Mintz (1962). This work was of 
interest from the point of view of gene–environment interaction because it meant that for 
the first time in mice, cells of one genotype could differentiate in the cellular genotype of 
 
121 
another. This work led to a focus on the development of gonads and germ cells in sex-
reversed mice, and then a return to the question of the male-specific histocompatibility 
antigen H-Y, which was believed to be the male-determining factor. McLaren worked with 
Elizabeth Simpson (1984) to refute this hypothesis, showing that H-Y was not necessary 
for male development. She continued to pursue this interest in germ cells and looked at 
how they develop into gametes, as well as the origin of the primordial germ cells.  
Finally, McLaren became interested in immortalised embryonic germ (EG) cells 
that are derived from germ cells, which resemble embryonic stem cells, in that they can 
proliferate indefinitely in culture and can contribute to all cell lineages if introduced into a 
blastocyst. This turn to EG cells finally brought her back to the interest in parental effects 
and gene expression that had started her career. These parental effects by this time were 
known to be mediated by genomic imprinting. EG cells could be used to investigate when, 
in the germ cell lineage, the parental imprint is removed, and the new imprint is imposed. 
This completed the cycle of McLaren’s interests, and the cycle of the mammalian life. 
 McLaren accordingly saw the path of her career as an expression of the correct 
object of study for the embryologist, that is, “the entire life-cycle of the mammal, from one 
generation round to the next” (p. 61). This holistic approach to development necessitates 
drawing on the approaches and foci of “not just developmental biology, but also 
reproductive biology and of course genetics” (p. 61). “To me”, McLaren writes, “that is all 
one subject, but it has no name” (p. 61). McLaren, then, studied the interactions between 
gene and environment, the expression of genes, and the reproduction of a species. 
McLaren’s scientific approach encompasses all of these perspectives into a cyclical study 
of mammalian development from generation to generation. Germ cells are key to this 
model, they form what you might call the ‘baseline’, as they are the cells that carry 
developmental information between generations, rather than the gametes that fuse to form 
the finite individual. Rather than the development of the individual, it is the interaction 
between gene and environment that is central to McLaren’s research orbit.  
Waddington’s echo is very much heard in McLaren’s model of her career. In 
conceptualising her object of study as the entire course of the mammalian life-cycle, 
McLaren does not commit herself to a single disciplinary approach; what interests her is 
the entire system, which she explores through a series of analogies that biologically model 
the same set of relationships of gene and environment. This modelling of her system in 
terms of a set of analogies operating at different levels of organisation means that there is 
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no privileged level of analysis, and it is only by their metonymic relation to the abstracted 
theoretical model of gene–environment that each of these layers is interesting. It is only 
once McLaren has performed the work of integrating the models into her broad vision that 
they become meaningful.  
McLaren’s overview of her career also suggests how she was as committed to 
producing what was the aim of Waddington’s epigenetics – a causal analysis of 
development. This required transgression. Serres describes in reference to his third science, 
he “multiplies” and “disturbs” the “boundaries” between fields, “preferring disorder and 
fertility to sterile order” (Squier, p. 13). Waddington similarly writes in Strategy of the 
Genes (1957) about the sense in which embryologists cannot rely on a single level of 
analysis, or linear account, explaining the need for a multidimensional visualisation. The 
study of development should concern itself not just with “the final state to which the system 
arrives, but also in the course by which it gets there” and the “best image of the epigenetic 
landscape ... would have been in a “phase space”, or “a system containing many 
components [that] can be represented by a point in multidimensional space” (p. 125). The 
embryo in development becomes part of a layered account that incorporated several scales: 
“the time of embryonic development, the time of an organism’s life span, and evolutionary 
time” (Squier, 2017, p. 85). Such an approach is concerned “less with individuals than with 
the relationships and processes that continuously constitute being, in its multiple changing 
forms, in time” (ibid.). The embryo is linked to a population (of embryos) that precede and 
follow it: 
The epigenetic landscape depicted both the specificity of embryological 
development (at the scale of the fertilised embryo) and what he called “the full 
biological picture” made visible by the mediation of the microscope as well as 
statistics. The ongoing metabolic and physiological processes of development over 
the lifespan connect the embryo both to the “broken-down nag it will eventually 
become” and to the population from which they both have emerged and that they 
constitute in turn.  
Squier, 2017, p. 84  
McLaren’s research concerns itself with this same broad biological picture that links 
the development of the embryo to inheritance. McLaren’s scientific approach, then, relies 
as much on the superimposition in her science as she does in her policy work. Here, too, 
layers of organisation are superimposed in order to build a working model of a problem 
that always exceeds what can be known. In both cases, McLaren draws on her abilities as 
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a connector, a clarifier to build to a broader vision and, in doing so, reveals the 
interconnectedness and the complexity, the infinite regress that defines a scientist’s 
‘understanding’ of anything. It is only through this process of translating between 
analogies, of transplanting her model into different contexts and allowing them to be 
changed by their specific environment, that McLaren is able to develop her biological 
picture.  
Scientific analogies as translation 
 
Figure 9. Diagram from Mammalian Chimaeras, 1976, p. 8. Here, McLaren schematises her research interests 
as analogies of the same nature-nurture problem, which she sees as the relationship between the gene and its 
environment.  
McLaren’s description of her own career also makes explicit the extent to which 
her view emerged from, and was expressed through, the drawing of analogies. In the same 
Taniguchi speech, McLaren goes on to describe how she advanced her scientific career 
through her ability to draw analogies between fields, specifically between levels of 
organisation. Take for example her interest in tracing cell lineages through the development 
of chimaeras. In her Mammalian Chimaeras (1976), she explains how this is really a more 
sophisticated articulation of the nature-nurture problem that had dominated biology,  
The old nature-nurture problem ... was concerned with how an organ of a particular 
genetic make-up interacts with its environment to achieve its final adult phenotype, 
and how much of this phenotype is determined by the genotype and how much by 
the environment. In mammals, the environment includes not only the external 
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conditions to which the individual is subjected after birth, but also the maternal 
environment that it experiences before birth. The technique of embryo transfer can 
be used to investigate the importance of maternal environment ...When we consider 
the development of individual cells, we are faced with a more sophisticated 
extension of the nature-nurture problem, since the environment in which a cell 
develops is made up of the population of other cells surrounding it.  
McLaren, 1976, p. 6  
This passage, like the outline of her career trajectory, shows how McLaren links 
different systems metonymically through an interest in the individual–environment 
relationship. Like Waddington, she constructs her scientific object as a broad, abstract set 
of hypothetical relations, which she then explored by modelling a node in this system at 
various levels of organisation, intervening in biology in order to orientate herself in a 
landscape and to describe what she sees. The biological model, in this way, does not 
represent an object to be fully explained, but a set of relations that are never fully 
understood, most likely inexhaustible for a scientist in their lifetime. As Waddington 
describes in Behind Appearances (1969), a piece of existent stuff contains everything you 
can find in it – you’ll never exhaust what it contains: “you may find a fossil, and that is an 
item in which the whole pageant of organic life on earth is focused” (p. 113). McLaren had 
her own fossil in the form of the spiral, as we saw in figure 1, which expresses the unfolding 
of development as a series of events that comprise the interaction between layers of 
organisation over generations, a process that is cumulative, interactive and generative. This 
spiral is in turn expressed in a series of biological analogies, each of which represents a 
particular biological layer, as we have seen here, which is in turn interpreted and calibrated 
in reference to the infinite spiral – McLaren’s own version of the epigenetic landscape.  
Here, then, we are given a clue as to how to characterise McLaren’s thinking in 
terms of superimpositions as a broader ethos – experiments express individual metonymic 
expressions of a broader biological vision; her models are forays into an infinite landscape 
that takes us from ‘one generation to the next’. The same sense-to-sense, Derridean 
translation, the same ‘merographic thinking’ in Strathern’s (1992b) terms, used in her 
policy model, is very much at work in McLaren’s approach to science, as she moves 
between metaphoric reinterpretations of the central problem. At the time that McLaren was 
doing her science, however, this subject had no name. ‘Epigenetics’, the term that 
Waddington had introduced, had fallen out of favour following the rise of molecular 
biology in the 1960s and the accompanying centrality of genes to models of development. 
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Here, as in the debates on human embryology, McLaren was forced to invent models and 
languages to express the work she was doing across that would connect resources across 
domains. The speech she gave at the Taniguchi Symposium in 1997 was one such attempt 
at a broader conceptualisation.  
Making science heard  
This model for doing science, this way of seeing the research object, resonates not only 
with Waddington’s translational model of the landscape but also with the similarly 
relational epistemological model described by feminist critics of science. Evelyn Fox-
Keller, in her biography of the geneticist Barbara McClintock (1983), for example, shows 
how McClintock’s particular style of practice as part of an attempt to explain why her 
theory of gene transposition failed to be ‘heard’ by the scientific community in the age of 
molecular biology. Here I return to McClintock’s style of practice introduced in the 
methodology section of this thesis vis-à-vis Keller, and compare this to the descriptions of 
McLaren’s science I have given, in order to foreground the importance of communication 
to McLaren’s practice.  
Science as persuasion  
McClintock’s method, as we saw in the introduction, revolved around acquiring a holistic 
understanding of the organism as a whole, a ‘feeling for the organism’, that then allowed 
her to make sense of her observations. McClintock’s description of the internal process of 
integrating her data to become part of the system she was studying resonates with the 
topographical language of landscapes McLaren uses to convey a similar sense of a process 
of theorising and integrating to make sense of her laboratory data. McClintock’s former 
colleagues in this way recall how it “was easy for McClintock herself to lose sight of the 
difference between what could be seen by the relatively uneducated eye and what could be 
seen only with the help of a long chain of logical inference that, to her, had become second 
nature” (Keller, 1983, p.126). Her investigations into transposition required “a prodigious 
amount of cognitive processing” that “intervened between the spots of pigment she could 
actually see on the corn plant and the controlling elements she ultimately came to write 
about” (ibid.).  
McClintock uses the analogy of a computer to describe the cognitive processing of 
the data she saw. This computer was “mediating between the spots, the patterns they 
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formed, and her internal vision” (ibid). It was this internal vision that provided a constant 
“point of reference” – an “organising scheme” (ibid). It was a process of moving between 
the model in her head, which expressed a holistic understanding of the organism, the data 
in each frame, and then in succession. It was a temporal reconstruction of a process in 
constant reference to an internal model. Like McLaren looking at the slides, the modelling 
process performed by her internal ‘computer’ mapped the relationships between slides over 
time. Each slide only becomes meaningful in relation to the others through calibration by 
reference to an internal model.  
Yet the comparison between McClintock and McLaren also reveals a distinctive 
difference. It is evident, on the one hand, that the two scientists shared a commitment to an 
understanding in terms of the entire organism. McClintock was opposed to the reductionist 
tendency in genetics and her commitment to understanding the whole organism meant that 
she maintained an interest in embryology besides the precise mechanisms of cytogenetic 
processes. Her method, then, like McLaren’s, centres around understanding the relations 
between systems and this requires calibration vis-à-vis a model that she describes as 
‘intuitive’, that is internal, but that comes to resemble the ‘neutral epistemic object’ of 
Waddington’s landscape, or McLaren’s conceptual spiral. Yet despite the similarities 
between the ways in which McClintock and McLaren describe their way of integrating and 
calibrating their biological data, for McLaren, this model has implications for her role as a 
scientist beyond science and provides a framework for collaboration and communication 
across fields and even entire domains of knowledge.  
This differs greatly from McClintock’s isolationist approach. Keller describes how 
McClintock’s way of working through experimental questions emerged “in her own highly 
individualistic way, dictated more by internal than external forces” (p. 268), and shows that 
McClintock made little effort to make her science more broadly understandable, even to 
colleagues. Her deeply isolationist mode of working, Keller argues, explains in part the 
delay in response to McClintock’s theories, which was not only a result of their 
“revolutionary implications” in the historical context of genetics, nor even just her 
“particular nature of her knowledge and understanding” (p. 268). Indeed, the brief 
comparison to McLaren’s description shows how comparable their views are. But this was 
in part attributable to the fact that McClintock had no interest in communicating her 
findings in the conventional language of science.  
This task of what Keller calls ‘persuasion’ shapes the interpretation of evidence, 
 
127 
relates it to existing knowledge in a particular way, and determines the success or failure 
of a discovery. McClintock did not always play by these rules – in fact, in Keller’s account 
she seems to actively cultivate a myth of her science as impenetrable, her methods almost 
too distinctive to describe. She is adamant that her approach is unique, that her mind was 
“processing and integrating data far more complex than we can possibly be conscious of” 
(Keller, 1983, p. 103). Her understanding, she says, relied on a “computer … working very 
rapidly and very perfectly” and, she says, she “couldn’t train anyone to do that” (ibid). 
McClintock, then, did not seem to be amenable to the persuasive work required to make 
new ideas in science ‘heard’, to appeal to the common assumptions of what is logical and 
rational, refusing to adhere to a convention in which certain discourses are privileged over 
others.  
McLaren presents a very different case. As we have seen, her biological vision is 
expressed in a career path in which she moved between disciplines as a result of her ability 
to collaborate by translating and mobilising people across fields to work on various 
iterations of her core interest. Connecting people and resources through the cultivation of 
a shared language was thus integral to her practice. McLaren applied her biological 
methodology of integrating information across fields, to a much broader conceptualisation 
of scientific work that included forging social bonds over shared understandings of a 
scientific problem and, thus, could not have been further from McClintock in her 
commitment to clear communication. McLaren was, however, as we have seen, marginal 
to the scientific community in a different sense, largely and paradoxically as a result of her 
commitment to this ‘social’ aspect of science, in that she was actively working in science 
policy as well.  
As we have seen, her increasing involvement in policy discussions from the 
Warnock Inquiry onwards led several of her former colleagues whom I interviewed to assert 
that, from the 1980s, McLaren was “scientifically past her prime” (Goodfellow, interview 
with author, 21 September 2018). Interviewees also repeatedly drew a comparison between 
McLaren and Mary Lyon. The latter was a real ‘Nobel’ scientist, whereas McLaren was a 
great ‘absorber’ and a ‘connector’ (Gardner, interview with author, 27 September 2018). A 
distinction is repeatedly drawn by those interpreting McLaren’s legacy today between the 
social work of collaborating and doing policy work, and the work of basic science. Again, 
as we saw in the previous chapters, the scientists I interviewed distanced themselves from 
the ‘non-scientific’ realm of policy-making and public debate, by deeming terminology 
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such as the ‘pre-embryo’ arbitrary or, in this case, by casting McLaren’s role itself as 
unscientific.  
It is unthinkable, it seems, that the social work of absorbing and connecting might 
aid scientific practice, or that scientific thinking might instruct the scientist in their 
contributions to policy; yet McLaren, we have seen, was committed to both these activities. 
In the case of her science, I have described how her approach was ‘social’ in several 
regards: in the sense that it relied on a relational epistemological model for her relationship 
to her research object, and also in the sense that she mobilised a range of resources and 
research trajectories through collaboration and communication across three fields. In her 
policy work, similarly, we have seen how McLaren also applied this relational biological 
thinking, and equally communicated and absorbed logics and views that fell outside of the 
boundaries of science into her biological case. In both contexts, the distinction between 
‘social’ and ‘scientific’ work is much less clear-cut than the statements by scientists 
regarding her role imply. For McLaren, at least, these represented two necessary aspects of 
solving a problem. The processing required to integrate evidence into her internal model, 
for McLaren, also meant doing the social work of communicating, connecting and 
translating, because society is very much a part of this machine.  
Indeed, a minority of former scientific colleagues, such as the biologist Elizabeth 
Simpson, credit McLaren’s ability to connect in order to facilitate the development of ideas 
as the strength of her science. In her 2001 article, The Case of the Midwife Scientist, she 
reveals by implication, how the disregard for her style of practice is also gendered. Simpson 
writes,  
She has managed to juggle manifold demands of students, colleagues, friends and 
family, as well as wider demands in the scientific community. The fact that she is a 
woman does not make that a more remarkable feat – as she once said to me, women 
used to coping with small children have the knack of doing several things 
simultaneously.  
Simpson, 2001, p. 517 
The work of connecting and collaborating, associated with the ‘female’ practice of 
socialising, in order to move a broad agenda forward, is considered by many members of 
the scientific community as secondary to, and less remarkable than, the serious, and by 
opposition, ‘male’ activity of the conception of big ideas. McLaren’s scientific approach is 
based on a very different premise, in that evidence is constituted in a very different way, 
through the interpretation of analogies that are developed through collaboration across 
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fields, rather than the construction of singular breakthrough experiments. Simpson, in an 
interview with me, revealed how this approach was nonetheless deeply scientific: 
… She thought about whole animals and what made them and she couldn’t separate 
out –she mercifully didn’t separate out – her thinking about the cells and the DNA 
from the whole animals and the phenotype. She was somebody who had the ability 
to think through the whole process and devise experiments for getting at things and 
if she thought it would be good to look at things a certain way and have the means 
for doing it, she’d ask someone to help her to do it.  
Simpson, interview with author, 21 June 2018 
McLaren constituted her scientific evidence through collaboration. The work of 
getting ideas taken up, I have shown, is highly conceptual, and requires an intimate 
understanding of the scientific problem, as well as the capacity to model this across 
domains, in addition to the capacity to communicate and collaborate. Midwifery was 
integral to McLaren’s science. 
Technological pragmatism  
There is also another component of the scientific style of practice that McLaren shared with 
McClintock, but that McLaren once again also enacts in the form of a social, collaborative 
approach to communicating science across fields; namely, an embryological, tool-driven 
experimental ethos. Franklin (2013a) has drawn attention to the role that tools have played 
in embryology. She writes a history of IVF in which she shows how this technology came 
about as the result of a legacy of embryo pioneers ‘taking biology in hand’, a lineage of 
techniques that always extended beyond what was ‘known’ about the biological system and 
that increasingly blurred the line between biology and technology, collapsing them into a 
biological model where the “layering of tool, organism and experimental system to model 
the fusion of internal organising forces and externally imposed mechanical technique – 
what it represents becomes confused – technology and the concept totally entwined” (p. 
125). In each case, the technique facilitated another, putting biology to work to build a 
biological picture over time. This culminates in the modern-day ethos of synthetic biology, 
where biology is taken in hand in order to make it ‘work’. And just as biology thereby 
becomes relativized, as we have seen, technology too is biologised in the form of new living 
tools: 
From the point of view of the evolution of technique, it is irrelevant that much of 
this work was experimentally inconclusive, misleading, or failed – because much 
of it was not result but technique driven to begin with. Its larger object was not only 
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modelling biological mechanisms, or for that matter reworking them, but building 
a new biology in which tool and substance work together biologically. 
Franklin, 2013a, p. 135  
It is exactly this circulation of tools, this technological probing, that McLaren’s 
career exemplifies; an engineering ethos that makes biology ‘work’ and substantiates a 
biological model over time, filling out a hypothetical picture through the movement 
between models and techniques. As we have seen, McLaren extends this approach to her 
policy approach, encouraging the development of clinical applications such as PGD, 
building research agendas accordingly, but also referring to clinical translation as a 
projected horizon representing shared values. The movement towards this moral horizon is 
executed through the development of techniques, which are entwined with biology, so that 
the biological model comes to embody this shared, projected, moral vision and showing 
how “experimental embryology”, in the context of policy negotiations, too, represents “an 
accumulation of techniques that evolve through circulation, as they are passaged through a 
range of contexts, becoming interwoven with a diverse set of fundamental and practical 
problems in the process” (Franklin, 2013a, p. 111).  
McLaren’s career and role in the Warnock debates shows how this technological 
kinship is established through communication and relies on shared epistemic objects; how 
her techno-biological models become analogies for a broader system, and how her great 
asset as a scientist was therefore not only ‘absorbing’, but once again, constructing a 
biological model by translating across domains to build an area of overdetermined 
convergence. Using the technology at her disposal across various fields, she drew on 
physical analogies across fields that brought research together over a shared problem, 
connecting this research to her overarching model of gene–environment interactions. This 
description of her career also reveals once again, how McLaren provides a case in point of 
how science involves a broader range of activities and ways of thinking than scientists 
themselves are prone to acknowledge. The distinctions between facts and values, social and 
scientific, feeling and rationale blur when science is framed as a process of making model 
systems ‘work’ in order to inform – by analogy – a growing understanding of a theoretical 
system. This pragmatism, in turn, as we have seen, also guided McLaren’s thinking in the 
policy realm – making clinical applications work in order to recruit a wider constituency to 
her biological model, providing, as it were, ‘proof of concept’, but also shaping people’s 
relationships to biology through an iterative process of incorporating ethical, emotional and 
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legal perspectives into the biological account. Indeed, the ‘social’ aspects of her work and 
the mode in which McLaren approached science also reflects a specific conceptualisation 
of the relations between science and society more broadly. For McLaren, we will see, 
methods and approaches travel between science and society because these domains are 
intimately entwined. Doing laboratory work, even in the collaborative and more broadly 
encompassing sense described, to McLaren, was not enough. Indeed, she claims,  
A philosopher once said: “The aim of philosophy is not just to understand the world, 
but also to change it.” The same is true of biomedical science: it’s not good enough 
just make do with palliative measures for all the most intractable medical conditions 
like arthritis and Parkinson’s and multiple sclerosis and diabetes – we must try to 
cure them. The use of stem cells would seem to offer the brightest hope at the 
present time. Whether it’s adult stem cells, foetal stem cells, donated embryonic 
stem cells or nuclear transfer cloned stem cells – which will work best, only 
research will tell. To me, this is a much more important potential consequence of 
the experiments of Loeb and Spemann, Briggs and King, Gurdon or Ian Wilmut, 
than the possibility that somewhere in the world, one or two cloned babies may be 
born. 
McLaren, Thanks-MSU, British Library, Add MS 89202/2/13, undated. 
Science, for McLaren, always meant looking to what science could do for the health 
of society – not just in the field of reproduction, but broadly. Her participation in the human 
fertilisation and embryology debates is a very clear manifestation of this conviction and, as 
we have seen, was expressed through the language of clinical translation which reflected 
the shared values that connected science and society. While this commitment to ‘extra-
scientific’ activities as part ‘doing science’ are not unique to McLaren and, indeed, other 
scientists have spoken about their commitment to this way of thinking, it was this 
awareness of the function of these activities, her ability to describe them, and a sense of 
social responsibility expressed in an active public role as a result, that makes McLaren’s 
style of practice so distinctive. I will now draw on McLaren’s own description of her 
conception of the science-society relationship to show how her approach to both science 
and policy-making are part of a problem-solving ethos that relies centrally on translation – 
of connecting domains through the ongoing cultivation of a shared language.  
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Scientific social responsibility: A problem-solving ethos  
 
Figure 10. Diagram from World Health Organisation speech, 1989, British Library, Add MS 83980. In this 
diagram, McLaren schematizes the conflicts that may arise as the opinions and interests of various levels of 
social organization are incorporated into the process of decision-making about family planning. Because these 
conflicts are unavoidable, she argues, it is necessary that they are represented in public debate as the only 
socially responsible basis of inclusive, representative policy on reproductive technologies. All Anne McLaren 
Papers images reproduced with kind permission of Susan Michie. 
Besides her work in the HF&E debates and the numerous other professional and 
political positions she held, McLaren was also committed to the cause of family planning, 
particularly in developing countries. Given that these meetings often addressed a broad 
range of issues related to reproduction, demanding explicit attention to both social, 
systemic issues of provision, access, and the reproduction of society as well as the 
reproductive technologies themselves, these meetings provided a context in which 
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McLaren was able to articulate her vision of the science-society relationship more broadly. 
In one keynote address given at the World Health Organisation in Geneva in 1989, of which 
I found a handwritten copy in the McLaren papers in the archives at the British Library 
(McLaren, 1989, Geneva WHO Keynote, British Library, Add MS 83980), McLaren 
describes her social model for the role of reproduction in society. The speech reveals how 
McLaren saw the communication of science as integral to the work of the scientist, and as 
the only means of ensuring that science fulfils its potential to better society. She begins,  
As a biologist, I have worked all my life in reproductive and developmental biology, 
always on animals, but always with human problems in mind. I have worked on, 
for example, induced ovulation, the regulation of fertility by immunisation against 
sperm, and in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and embryo transfer. When it became clear in 
the early 1970s that it was only a question of time before IVF and embryo transfer 
became a clinical reality in our own species, I became concerned with the ethical 
and social and legal implications that would ensue. It seemed important that the 
benefits that this new technology could bring to childless couples should not be 
threatened by public ignorance and fear of the unknown. 
McLaren, Geneva WHO Keynote, 1989, p. 7, Add MS 83980 [emphasis added] 
McLaren details her personal awakening to the so-called ‘ethical’ implications of 
her basic scientific work, which emerged, as she says, in response to a growing awareness 
of the relevance of her work to human health, thereby echoing Warnock’s insight that basic 
and applied research became increasingly entwined for McLaren over the course of the 
debates in a model that represented the good that science could do for society (Warnock, 
with author, 21 August 2018). As we have seen in the previous chapters, clinical 
applications thereby came to represent a particular relationship between basic science and 
society, in which science served the public good. Clinical translation gained its meaning, 
then, through its relationship to a set of other domains, all of which came to converge 
through a series of translations. In this particular talk McLaren emphasises the broader, 
social context of clinical applications, showing that social benefit is not intrinsic to 
technological advance, and emphasising the ‘extra-scientific’ work that needs to be done to 
secure the benefits of clinical translation. What particularly concerns her here is that people 
are adequately informed. McLaren here spells out how finding a common language is key 
to a fair science that serves the social good.  
In her speech, McLaren outlines her involvement with the WHO Special 
Programme of Research. The programme set up in 1972, that went under the full title of 
the WHO “Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human 
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Reproduction”, upheld, as the name suggests, a trinity of responsibilities (Geneva WHO 
Keynote, p. 7). First, it concerned itself with “funding and coordinating research on human 
reproduction on a global scale”, secondly with “improving the potential for such research 
in developing countries” and, finally, it recognized, “from the start…the importance of 
ethics in family planning and research”, having played a significant role in establishing 
ethical guidelines in the field, not only ensuring that its own programmes adhere, but also 
encouraging the setting up of local ethics committees (pp. 7-8). 
 McLaren casts the development of the programme and its aims against a backdrop 
of scientists’ gradual awakening in the 1960s to the world population problem and, at the 
same time, to the high levels of maternal mortality. She details how over the course of the 
Special Programme, there has been a movement from mainly basic research to developing 
applications, combined with research into the “social factors that affect birth rate”, such as 
“the acceptability of different contraceptive methods, as well as health-services research in 
family planning and studies on the social and behavioural determinants of fertility 
regulation” (p. 8). This vision of the relationship between research and application is still 
rather conventional; closer to the ‘bench to bedside’ model that we know today (Cambrosio 
et al., 2006), in which basic scientific research is channelled directly into clinical 
applications that are then disseminated to ‘society’, a distinct domain. Research into so-
called ‘social factors’ appears as an afterthought, providing suggestions for small 
adjustments to the implementation of clinical techniques after the fact of their development; 
society does not appear to be seen as co-constitutive with the development of the clinical 
techniques.  
Importantly, however, McLaren goes on to show how the Programme also began to 
expand its remit beyond this early emphasis on contraception – building on the insight 
McLaren described as emerging in the 1960s, that the problems of maternal mortality and 
population growth might both need to be addressed under the same paradigm. Over the 
years, she explains, the “Programme has broadened its whole interpretation of family 
planning to include projects concerned with, for example, the causes and alleviation of 
infertility, in addition to its original emphasis on development of contraceptives”, which 
leads McLaren to state her own view on family planning, or “family decision-making as it 
is sometimes termed”, claiming it “is a very broad one” and “includes all those areas of 
reproduction where couples today – or maybe tomorrow – can exercise responsible choice, 
rather than leaving the outcome to chance” (p. 9). The examples she gives include: 
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“Whether to have children? How many? When? Which sex? If infertile – whether to seek 
treatment? Assisted reproduction? … Whether to request prenatal diagnosis for genetic 
disease? Whether to terminate an affected pregnancy?” (p. 9).  
As in her science, McLaren takes a broad view of family-planning that is guided by 
a central, pragmatic, question much like the question posed by the Warnock Inquiry and, 
as we have seen, the one that provided the impetus behind her movement between scientific 
analogies. In this case, too, McLaren asks, ‘What can we do using the tools that we have?’ 
This new question, relying on a broader conception of family planning, which actually 
reflects a view of the role of reproduction in society, leads to a different mandate for the 
WHO Special Programme and, indeed, for the individual scientist. McLaren stresses that, 
while “a good deal of basic mission-oriented reproductive research still goes on, and this 
is also important because it strengthens our understanding of human reproduction, and the 
knowledge gained can be applied to either the downward or the upward regulation of 
fertility” (p. 8), it is now equally important that scientists not only provide options, but also 
the information required to make decisions when choosing between them. 
The new options that are available allow couples more choice, but the other side of 
that coin is that they require couples to take more decisions – and if they are to take 
responsible decisions they need information. 
McLaren, WHO, 1989, p. 8  
Here we hear echoes of the comment made by Bolton in the previous chapter, that 
when faced with the vote on human embryo research, it was important that people were 
well-informed, or they would be likely to vote out of “gut reaction and motivated my 
prejudice and misinformation” (Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018). Bolton 
goes on to draw an analogy to Brexit to emphasise what is at stake in the failure to inform, 
namely that a vote is no longer a deliberate choice for a defined outcome, but a stab in the 
dark, and so, not really a choice at all. Here McLaren similarly shows that the pragmatic 
aim of clinical translation only serves its social function when scientists and the public at 
large are able to negotiate these options in a shared language. Informing the public is not a 
matter of imparting a literal scientific account, but of negotiating choices. A negotiation 
relies on an iterative exchange of perspectives, values and information that will come to be 
expressed in a shared ‘language’. Providing options is in itself insufficient and, in fact, 
unethical if it is not supplemented with the language required to choose. Problem-solving 
for the scientist, in this instantiation, is more about empowering potential patients in their 
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decision-making than solving the problem for them. The scientist must take up this 
supportive role as the necessary complement to the technological assistance to 
reproduction. Clinical translation, then, as in the Warnock discussions, represents to 
McLaren a nexus between science and society, which points to both the potential good that 
science can do in its social context, as well as an imperative for the scientist to do the 
communicative work required to facilitate this good.  
The work of superimposing clinical, scientific and social visions and calibrating 
them into a shared model, hereby becomes more than an idiosyncratic problem-solving 
approach, but a problem-solving ethos, a style of practice representing a pragmatic moral 
stance that is characteristic of McLaren’s approach across all the contexts in which she 
worked. McLaren’s broad vision that encompasses everything required to get ‘from one 
generation to the next’, when carried forward into policy work, thus fulfils the potential of 
Waddington’s epigenetic landscape as articulated by Susan Squier once it is transported 
beyond its original context, to facilitating an expansion of what are classed as the 
‘environmental’ factors in accounts of development, which can come to encompass a whole 
“ecology” of social factors beyond those in molecular or cellular biology (2017, p. 183). 
McLaren goes on to articulate how the role of the scientist changes under this new ethos of 
‘family planning’ as supported decision-making: 
Scientists exist by courtesy of society – society pays them, and in return they have 
the responsibility of providing its members with information. In the present context 
they have the responsibility of telling people the facts about human reproduction. 
We know that every society has its ethical vision of human reproduction … but we 
also need a scientifically based vision of human reproduction that can be 
superimposed upon the ethical vision, in the same way that one can superimpose 
two images upon one another by converging one’s eyes. To superimpose these two 
visions is a necessary basis for responsible decision-making. 
McLaren, WHO, 1989, p. 10 [emphasis added] 
Here, McLaren summarises the problem-solving ethos that I have described over 
the course of the previous two chapters. This ethos that she, in her characteristically 
understated manner calls simply ‘responsible decision-making’, is enacted as the process 
of superimposing a scientific narrative onto a social vision so that both remain visible, 
never perfectly or definitively aligned, but also mutually altered on route to a shared clinical 
goal. McLaren then, presents this superimposition, which I have shown is translational, as 
an ethical imperative when science is positioned as a source of social potential. This is the 
true process by which the potential of clinical translation is harnessed. By superimposing 
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social and scientific visions in order to find a suitable language that encompasses the 
fractured but overlapping concerns and values of both domains, scientists fulfil an ethical 
responsibility to provide not only possibilities, but to empower potential users to make a 
choice in how society moves from one generation to the next.  
Interestingly, McLaren goes on to propose a model for decision-making in family 
planning that resonates with the one I have described for the Warnock discussions. Pointing 
again to the possibility of choice in reproduction, she asks who is to make that choice. She 
schematises the various layers that need to be considered (see figure 10) – individual 
interests; then family interests; then social interests – and shows how these are often in 
conflict with one another. McLaren writes that it is essential in moving towards a solution 
that they “recognise their common goal”, which she describes as “the group’s survival” in 
light of the “threats of famine, pestilence and war … the environment. … our fragile 
ecosystem” (p. 14). This shared aim, a horizon of hope, provides the context for an 
imperfect, common ground. Like clinical translation, it is within this explicit framing of a 
common goal, that discussions can effectively take place: 
… we must work together, and to this end we must, above all, talk together and 
discuss how best family planning can take account of ethics and human values – for 
without, these values, in the long run family planning will fail, and that we cannot 
afford. 
WHO, 1989, p. 14  
The ethical and human values are negotiated through the very process of articulating 
and arriving at a ‘common goal’. Again, we seen replicated the Warnock process of 
superimposition, of incorporating various concerns in order to move towards a common 
ground representing shared values. Again, we see that, for McLaren, the clinical application 
does not in itself fulfil this criterion, but that it can come to represent, as it did in Warnock, 
a shared moral goal that facilitates convergence. As the scheme of the various interest 
groups in figure 10 shows, McLaren saw any solution as temporary, imperfect and built on 
fractured ground, but an acknowledgement of these irreconcilable tensions is a prerequisite 
for an inclusive negotiation of directions in science, for reproduction as informed decision 
making. The speech, written in 1989 and thus towards the end of the Warnock discussion, 
shows McLaren’s growing sense of her moral position as a scientist, one in which she does 
not provide an answer but lays out a framework for thinking through the problem, bringing 
clarity and distinctions by layering various logics: a rational, scientific process that relies 
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on social collaboration, affective understanding, and iterative deliberation, all of which is 
required to harness the power of scientific exploration for the social good.  
McLaren and socialist science  
I have described McLaren’s vision of the relationship between science and society, one that 
pivots around clinical translation and its ethical imperative to support public engagement 
around science. I have also shown the palpable influence that Waddington, a notable 
socialist and embryologist, had on the problems and the approach McLaren took. This style 
of thought, as we have seen, later led McLaren to a conviction that the scientist has a 
responsibility to communicate, to work towards a shared language by offering relevant 
scientific information to the public in order for science to deliver its positive social 
potential. Here, I turn to McLaren’s education and politics more broadly, to further show 
how her views on the role of science in society were enacted through her imperative to 
move between disciplines and domains to expand her theoretical model.  
Moving between genres 
It is perhaps unsurprising that McLaren initially intended to pursue English at Oxford, 
given that she was surrounded by writers, commonly of science fiction, from an early age. 
McLaren grew up between London’s West End near Hyde Park and Bodnant, her family’s 
80-acre estate in North Wales. Her mother, Christabel Mary Melville MacNaghten, from 
London, was the daughter of Sir Melville MacNaghten, the head of Central Intelligence 
(CID). Christabel was one of London’s most celebrated hostesses and entertained a social 
circle of literary figures, including the Sitwells, Virginia Woolf and H. G. Wells. Growing 
up, McLaren would go for long walks with Wells in North Wales, discussing, her daughter 
Susan Michie claims, mainly science and socialism (personal correspondence, 11 August, 
2019). These figures were also scientists and socialists, and their careers exemplified the 
outcomes of a close nexus between science and literary writing. McLaren stayed with 
Wells’ progressive Quaker cousins in Oxford while studying for her entrance exams and 
carried forward a sense in which crossing genres and platforms was important to spreading 
and developing scientific ideas.  
Later in life, McLaren came into contact with Naomi Mitchison, a scientist, novelist 
in a range of genres from science fiction to historical fiction, poet, socialist, feminist, and 
sister and scientific colleague of the embryologist and socialist, J. B. S. Haldane. She and 
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McLaren remained good friends, corresponding into Mitchison’s old age on issues such as 
world politics, women’s history and plants. The letter in figure 11, for example, taken from 
the Anne McLaren papers at the British Library (Mitchison, 10 July, undated), reveals how 
they exchanged ideas about the intersections of socialism and science, the framing of 
socialist issues, and their own political activities.  
 
 
 Figure 11. Letter from Naomi Mitchison to Anne McLaren, 10th July, year missing, British Library, Add MS 
89202/4/38. The letter discusses the socialist politics of her father, J. B. S. Haldane, and describes the lectures 
of socialist issues Mitchison herself was giving. The letters offer insight into the kinds of conversations and 
ideas McLaren encountered through her lifelong relationships with socialist writers and scientists. Open 
Government Licence (OGL). 
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Mitchison also interestingly dedicated her science fiction novel, Memoirs of a 
Spacewoman (1962), to McLaren. This series of episodes from the expeditions of its 
narrator, Mary, sketches a world in which knowledge of the world is gained through 
exploration, which in turn relies predominantly on the faculty of ‘communication’. 
Communication in the novel is about establishing a working relationship with the object of 
study. As opposed to the models of scientific inquiry that aim to explain objective reality 
using the source language of the scientist, in this model, language is itself the enabling 
negotiation of knowledge, emphasising the limits of the explorer’s own subjectivity as they 
attempt to express the unknown. Mary describes the difficulties of this process:  
You’ve got to think yourself behind that mouth. This was quite a difficult exercise, 
but of course necessary before communication could be properly established ... 
Thinking oneself into the shape of one’s contact was elementary when considering 
communication techniques, but sometimes one had to be very careful to think 
oneself back. 
Mitchison, 1962, p. 27 
In Mary’s world, language cannot be transplanted literally between individuals and 
domains because it is defined by its context, and this positionality is non-trivial as it is co-
constitutive with our understanding of the world. Communication, the means by which we 
understand anything at all, is therefore inherently imperfect – it represents a stab in the dark 
using the means that we have as we work towards a space in which me might be able to 
allow our working model of reality to be changed by other languages representing other 
perspectives, ways of knowing, and ways of being. Mitchison seems to have recognised as 
early as 1962 how this model might pertain to McLaren’s developing scientific approach. 
McLaren’s interactions with Mitchison, then, offer an insight into how McLaren’s personal 
relationships throughout her life shaped a context in which discussions about the ideologies 
of science were expressed creatively across genres. Mitchison’s account also offers another 
sense in which McLaren resisted scientific convention – moving not only between 
disciplines but also between genres – as she developed her understanding of her science.  
Circles, models and progress  
McLaren, as we have seen in her 1989 WHO speech, and as was inferred by a reading of 
Mitchison’s text, saw communication as central to negotiating the relationship between 
science and society. Language, for McLaren, served as a vehicle for deliberation in order 
to empower the public to make choices between clinical applications, and thereby shape 
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research agendas. McLaren reiterates her understanding of the role of public engagement 
in science in a 2007 article, one of the last she wrote before she passed away, and a pertinent 
summary of the approach she had taken throughout her career, which was published in the 
commentary section of the journal Cell Stem Cell. Under the heading, ‘The Scientist’s 
Role’, she writes,  
Scientists are not ethicists: in my view, they have as little or as much right to their 
opinions on the ethics of human ES cell research as any other citizen. However, 
they do have more knowledge. They therefore have an ethical duty to explain to 
people what research they are doing and what the possible implications are for 
society. ... It is a mistake, however, to assume that the more people understand about 
a scientific project and its aims, the less likely they must be to reject it. There is 
some evidence to the contrary. If an informed public rejects some line of scientific 
research, we should take heed: there may be matters of social concern more cogent 
than just the ‘‘yuck’’ factor. Education of the public is not enough. Of course, the 
public understanding of science is often woefully inadequate, but the scientists’ 
understanding of the public is often not much better. Let us aim for an informed 
dialog and let us hope that the media will do their best to make sure that nothing is 
‘‘lost in translation.’’  
McLaren, Cell Stem Cell, 2007, p. 26 
We see a direct statement here of McLaren’s commitment to a dialogue based on an 
exchange of information expressed in resolutions that incorporate scientists’ and the 
broader public’s concerns. Science, in her view, is a tool that connects scientists to a broader 
constituency, not only to professionals and the elite. Communication for McLaren was 
about more than filling a deficit in knowledge among a scientific or governing elite, but 
about drawing new perspectives into her orbit.  
Here we might turn to some notes that McLaren wrote in her diary following her 
attendance at a meeting of the Science Group of Oxford Student Branch Communist Party 
on 25 November 1948. Despite her liberal and socialist family background, and the 
expansive network of socialist writers and scientists that she was exposed to from a young 
age, it was not until her undergraduate degree at Oxford University that McLaren can be 
seen to become politically active. At Oxford, McLaren, moved in circles of mostly men, 
who had seen the desperate period of the 1930s and the terrible poverty of the working 
classes. Many of them had joined the Communist Party, and considered themselves 
socialists, particularly the group around Cambridge, including figures such as the organic 
chemist J. D. Bernal, who supervised Nobel prize winner Dorothy Hodgkin, and J. B. S. 
Haldane, a biologist and McLaren’s supervisor on a research project on mite infestation of 
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Drosophila. These were men from privileged backgrounds, many of whom had been 
spokespeople for socialist science within and beyond the professional scientific 
community. McLaren, born in 1927, and having been at Oxford for the period between 
1944 and 1952, entered this scene later, but also at a very distinctive time in history as the 
post-war influx of ex-servicemen, who had been demobilised, breathed fresh life into old-
fashioned institutions like Oxford. In her recollections of this era, McLaren described 
everyone as having been “ a bit shaken up in their ideas” with the consequent emergence of 
a “vibrant, open atmosphere of social and intellectual exchange” (Franklin, 2007, p. 855), 
and ripe for her early explorations into the intersections between socialism and science. 
In one entry of the 1948 diary that I found among material not yet deposited at the 
British Library and held at the time of writing at McLaren’s daughter Susan Michie’s house, 
McLaren had drafted a speech, in which she aimed to clarify her thinking about “the 
position that science holds in the present conflict between Capitalism and Socialism” 
(McLaren, 1948, unarchived document, p. 1). McLaren outlines what she categorises as the 
“philosophical, ethical, social and ‘economic” attacks that Capitalism inflicts on science, 
stemming from the threat that is felt by Capitalism, recognising that science is always on 
side of “progressive social forces” (ibid, p. 9). The attack, she goes on, is not just on “this 
or that isolated aspect of science, Darwinism, or Psychology, or Sociology, or anything 
else, but an assault against the whole rationale, the whole methodology, the very basis of 
Science” (p. 8).  
Marxism, in her view, is also a science; it is, therefore, only understandable, she 
claims, that “the chief brunt of this attack is directed against Marxism – naturally enough, 
that is, because Marxism is the science of sciences, the scientific study of that most complex 
of all organised systems, human society, the science, in fact, of working class power” (ibid). 
She goes on: 
Marxism links together all the sciences, showing them all in their interrelation, as 
having a common scientific method and tending towards a single, unified, world 
view, materialist, dialectical; a means not only of understanding the world around 
us but also – and this is what the Capitalists object to – of changing the world around 
us … it is the task of Marxism to fight for the freedom of science, freedom in theory 
and freedom in practice, freedom to discover and by so doing to change the world. 
McLaren diaries, 1948, unarchived document, p. 9. Reproduced with kind permission of 
Susan Michie 
The passage shows how science, for McLaren, at this early stage in her career, is 
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already coextensive with her Marxism. In this sense, McLaren posits science not only as a 
means of understanding, but as a tool for social change. This latter function emerges from 
a Marxist imperative to show the interrelatedness of all science. This translates into an 
imperative to theorise freely, linking discovery to the project of demonstrating the 
interrelatedness of the sciences, which McLaren does by finding analogies that model the 
relationships between domains. This practical approach to demonstrating through working 
models is, then, very much connected to McLaren’s Marxist views, and again, shows how 
the work of finding languages, the textual analogue for her work of making scientific 
models, is part of a project to show the interconnectedness of scientific problems as part of 
a social system, a point that only comes to light when demonstrated through analogies, 
which themselves are interpretations of an ongoing problematic. We see here how McLaren 
upholds a systems way of thinking, in line with Waddington’s and the organicists, but also, 
importantly, how this suggests a role for the scientist as actively advocating the freedom of 
not only scientific practice, but also theory. This call for open theorising emerges from a 
duality in the way that McLaren casts science as not only a means of ‘understanding’, an 
epistemological tool for explaining, but also as a tool for ‘social change’. Science can be 
used to spur on social change by working on scientific problems across domains. It is in 
this sense that we can see how scientific communication reflects McLaren’s Marxist 
politics; it is part of the work of actively drawing on science as an approach to problem-
solving based on drawing connections through analogies in a textual, interpretive mode – 
of using science on the path to social change.  
Science, then, for McLaren, should be actively used by exposing its logic which is 
based on an understanding of the world as a set of organised systems. Scientific activity is 
interpretation centred around finding the most suitable analogy. In this speech, McLaren 
goes on to elaborate how this theoretical point is implemented as a pragmatic agenda:  
Marxism, indeed the whole of Science, does not claim recognition because it is 
based on abstract moral principles, but because it is true and because it works; and 
because it is true, science can be and should be used to rid humanity for ever of the 
evils and misery which afflict so many in the world today, and to help men and 
women forward to a fuller and freer way of life.  





Figure 12. McLaren’s diary, 1948. In this diary entry that I discovered at Susan Michie’s house we see how 
McLaren’s pragmatic problem-solving ethos is summarised in a pencilled-in afterthought. 
McLaren here explains how science provides a source of ethics, not in the sense of 
‘abstract moral principles’ but as a result of its truth, by which she really seems to mean its 
efficacy – the fact that science ‘works’. This pragmatic justification, pencilled into her 
speech as an afterthought, as shown in figure 12, pre-empts McLaren’s problem-solving 
ethos as described in her 1989 WHO speech, and throughout the Warnock debates. By 
1989, it became evident to McLaren that making science work for the social good, drawing 
on its potential as a tool for social change, also necessitates that there is a shared language 
through which people are able to influence, assess and choose in the ongoing process of 
developing scientific applications.  
This prescribes a more specific role for the scientist in public debate, as one of 
superimposing and integrating, facilitating and orchestrating in order to make science work. 
This approach now appears as a manifestation of McLaren’s imperative expressed as early 
as 1948, to implement science by finding analogies that bring to light its interconnectedness 
in the Marxist social machine. Science is not about discovery, but about interpretation and 
explication through language. To McLaren, scientific theorising, public engagement, and 
laboratory science are all part of the work of doing science. This is an approach that is 
pervasively pragmatic, making do with the political, social and scientific possibilities to 
establish a tenable common ground to facilitate social progress. This process relies on 
expansion by connecting to new people and ideas. It is about moving freely across domains, 
drawing them into a model that expresses the truth of their interrelatedness.  
McLaren’ commitment to both science and socialism continued throughout her life. 
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As Andrew Murray (2007), McLaren’s son-in-law, writes in his obituary for McLaren and 
her former husband, Donald Michie,  
They integrated scientific inquiry with the struggle for social justice – one without 
the other would have made no sense to them. As they sought to enlarge scientific 
knowledge, so also they worked to change society to allow that science to flower 
for the universal good. 
Murray, The Guardian, 2007 
McLaren’s political affiliation continued to be reflected in multiple ways in which 
she practiced her science throughout her life. Indeed, it is this commitment beyond the 
academic vestiges of Oxford that makes McLaren’s communism so noteworthy. 
Communism fit relatively well with the political climate at Oxford, and, as the British 
sociologist and Marxist Hilary Rose, also a friend of McLaren’s, put it in an interview 
conducted in 2018 for this study, the Communist Party was, “in a sense, the ‘right place to 
be’ in that moment in history” (Hilary Rose, interview with author, 12 September 2018). It 
is later in life, after McLaren left this academic atmosphere and entered into labs and 
policy-circles, that this commitment becomes more maverick. She is remembered for 
wearing plain, casual clothes to important meetings, for carrying her notes around in plastic 
carrier bags, and for leaving her house bare despite her wealth. Moreover, her daughter, 
Susan Michie, recalls how she had a practical approach to campaigning in which she drew 
in as many supporters as possible, across social classes. She sold papers on street corners, 
distributing leaflets around council estates, and every general election spent the day, along 
with Susan, supporting the Labour Party by driving people from the very poorest parts of 
Edinburgh to the London polling station (personal correspondence, 2019). McLaren’s 
Oxford background, then, goes some way towards outlining some of her intellectual 
influences, but she is more remarkable for her departure from this background. It was her 
commitment to breaking generatively with norms – of disciplines, of social class, political 
affiliation and of genres – towards practical goals that was so characteristic of McLaren’s 
practice, and reveals again her commitment to communication across domains to move her 
agenda forward.  
A brief look at McLaren’s engagement with Soviet science helps to show how much 
Marxism and science were entwined for McLaren, and how science provided for her a 
theoretical language that was to be used to communicate in order to expand the borders of 
the discipline – advancing her science by building alliances around theoretical models, 
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doing the social-scientific work of deepening her knowledge of a system.  
McLaren and Soviet science  
 
Figure 13. Meeting with Trofim Lysenko, 1957. McLaren and Donald Michie (right), Lysenko (third from 
left). Reproduced with kind permission of the Gurdon Institute. 
In 1957, McLaren and her then-husband Donald Michie, travelled to Eastern 
Europe to attend the 6th World Festival of Youth & Students in Moscow, between 28 July 
and 11 August. Here, they met with Trofim Lysenko (1898–1976). The story of Lysenko 
has been rehearsed many times in the context of the history of socialism and science in the 
West (see for example: Peterson, 2016; Rose and Rose, 1976; Werksey, 1978). Lysenkoism 
was the doctrine associated with the Soviet agronomist and biologist whose interest in 
agriculture led him to propose that crop yields could be improved through the effects of the 
temperature of the seed. He has thereby become associated with the theory of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, the hypothesis that an organism can pass on 
characteristics that is has acquired during its lifetime to its offspring. This theory became 
increasingly opposed to genetics in the West on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Lysenko 
rose to power under Stalin and prosecuted those who adhered to Mendelian-Morganist-
Weismannist genetics that posited that there could be no reciprocal influence of the soma 
on the heritable substance of the germ line. As Lysenko’s corruption under the Stalinist 
regime came increasingly to light, he became symbolic of the terrors of Soviet science in 
the West, and the great controversy that numerous historians have credited with the 
dissolution of a credible scientific socialism in the West (Peterson 2016; Rose and Rose 
1976; Werskey, 1978). 
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Lysenkoism, however, as Lewontin and Levins (1976) have pointed out, 
represented more than an “affair” or the “rise and fall” associated with “a single individual’s 
influence” (p. 32). It was an ideological struggle that played out as a philosophical spat 
between the Weisman-Morgan-Mendel school of genetics in the West, and the supposed 
Darwinism in the East, which came to be expressed in two contrasting models of 
development. Geneticists posed a direct causal relationship between gene and phenotype, 
while, to Lysenkoists, the Weismann scheme did not explain the process of development, 
of how change occurs, and was therefore anti-materialist, in the sense that it “postulated 
effects without causes” (Lewontin and Levins, in Rose and Rose, 1976, p. 39). The 
Weismannist scheme also left an important paradox unanswered: the “one-way relation 
between gene and environment also emphasised the contradiction in genetics that all cells 
are supposed to have the same genes, yet produce different tissues” (Lewontin and Levins, 
1976, p. 38). Mutations in development, according to Weismann’s scheme, could only be 
surface changes, while the genetic material remained constant. Geneticists in the 1930s 
claimed that the unpredictability in genetic theory was epistemological only, that it was 
only the fact that the causal events were at a microscopic or molecular level and so  
inaccessible in practice to observation, and not interesting to the geneticist anyway, that 
meant that these could not be explained, but that there was nonetheless an “unbroken causal 
chain between parent and offspring and between mutagen and mutation” and that “for all 
practical purposes, mutations and segregations are chance events” (ibid., p. 39). 
Lysenko won the official support of the party and ministries in 1948, as the world 
became increasingly divided into two camps: “Churchill announced the Cold War in his 
1946 Fulton, Missouri speech. In 1947 the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) 
was organised to replace the defunct Comintern, and Andrei Zhdanov put forward his thesis 
of the world divided into two camps.” (Lewontin and Levins, 1976, p. 54). All of this 
ensured that intellectual contact between Lysenkoists and geneticists all but ceased. 
Lysenkoist work was ignored and ridiculed in the capitalist countries, while Lysenkoist 
scientists did not publish in journals or attend conferences outside the Soviet Union. It 
became untenable as a ‘Western’ scientist to take an interest in Lysenkoist science. “In the 
context of the Cold War”, in the US, Lewontin and Levins write, “even the suggestion that 
Lysenko’s work ought to be examined cost Ralph Spitzer his position as a professor of 
chemistry at Oregon State University” (p. 55). Exceptions included the work of 
Waddington, which showed “the basis of the apparent inheritance of acquired characters 
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through the discovery of genetic assimilation, the process whereby latent genetic 
differences within populations are revealed but not created by environmental treatment, 
and therefore become available for selection” (p. 55). In the Cold War context, Lysenkoism 
became more strident, politically opportunist and more reckless in its claims, moving from 
an early Lysenkoism, which still emphasised that modifying the heredity of organisms was 
not easy, to brash claims of being able to “transform wheat into rye in a single step” (ibid). 
Western genetic literature was consulted mainly to search for “ ‘admissions’ – admissions 
of the incompleteness of genetic theory” (ibid). Lewontin and Levins thus give an 
indication of how two philosophical paradigms in science became increasingly politicised 
and polarised, to each of their detriment.  
The height of Lysenkoism had detrimental effects on the efforts by the scientists in 
Britain who had hoped to develop a socialist science. Lysenkoism escalated “at a crucial 
time in the development” of the “attempts by Marxist scientists in the West to grapple with 
the problem of the relationship between science and social structures”, and “seemed to 
provide the acid test of the possibilities of a socialist science” (Rose and Rose, 1976, p. 
xxii) This, then, was disastrous for the idea of Soviet science. The period following 1948, 
the highpoint of Lysenkoism, marked a retreat in the Soviet Union to a “neutral ideology 
of science, and, in the West, a turning away of many scientists from the orthodox 
communist parties and even Marxism itself; “they were forced to choose between their 
science and their political convictions” (ibid., p. xxii). 
By 1957 the worst of the Lysenkoist scandal had passed, yet McLaren’s interest and 
openness to Lysenko’s ideas reveals her scientific affiliation with organicist scientists, such 
as Waddington, who continued to take an interest in gene–environment interactions, despite 
the predominance of molecular biology at the time. This interest is expressed, as we shall 
see, not only in the content of the science that she actually discussed with Lysenko, but also 
in her push to improve the communication between Soviet scientists and the West in 
general. This shows her commitment to science as communication, moving between circles 
and across political borders in order to demonstrate the set of relations she was interested 
in. 
McLaren, at the time of her visit, was working as a postdoc at UCL, alongside 
Donald Michie and John Biggers, extending her interest on the interaction between genes 
and environment through a series of experiments largely utilising the technology of embryo 
transfer and chimeric mice. This interest was very much at the centre of discussion in her 
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meeting with Lysenko on this visit (see figure 13). In one of her diary entries, again among 
the papers I reviewed at Susan Michie’s house, she writes that she attended a meeting at 
“the Institute of Genetics”; “greeted by Nuzhdin Kosikov (yeasts),” she writes, “and the 
great Lysenko himself. 5-hour interview ... Nuzhdin a sad disappointment. Lysenko a great 
man” (McLaren diaries, 1957, unarchived papers). In her rushed notes of the meeting 
contained in one of her notebooks held at the British Library (figure 15), she summarises 
some of her discussions with Lysenko. One of these was the question of the role of genes 
in development. Lysenko, she writes, “does not accept an exact correlation between a 
particular point on a chromosome and a character and he thinks that Modern Western 
geneticists don’t either” (ibid.). McLaren has schematised the question for Lysenko in a 
diagram (figure 14) that later appears to depict the Weismannist theory of development in 
her Germ Cell and Soma (1981), besides the updated schemes that posit a reciprocal 
influence of the soma on the germ line. The theorising in this monograph thus summarised 
her ongoing thinking regarding a scientific issue shrouded in political controversy. Rather 
than confronting this on political grounds, McLaren conducts a scientific investigation, 
expressed in the body of her work, that evolves not only through collaborations in the 
laboratory, but also with Soviet scientists. This is how McLaren fulfils her commitment to 
theorise ‘freely’ and equips herself with the insights and framework to make her scientific 




Figure 14. Page from McLaren’s diaries of the trip to 6th World Festival of Youth & Students, Moscow, 28 
July to 11 Aug, 1957, British Library, Add MS 89072/5/1. These notes from McLaren’s notebooks reveal her 
developing the Weismannist scheme that later appears in Germ Cell and Soma (1981). McLaren is doing the 




Figure 15. McLaren’s notes on Lysenko meeting, 1957, British Library, Add MS 89072/5/1. These notes show 
the work McLaren was doing, even at this early stage in her career, of attempting to improve relations between 
Soviet scientists and the West.  
McLaren goes on to ask Lysenko whether he would consider “publication in 
English-language journals”, offering to “translate Soviet articles sent in Russian” and she 
also personally “urged publication of unabridged accounts in Nature” (figure 15), although 
McLaren writes that the response is “unenthusiastic” and that to the publication question, 
Lysenko replies that “PBA and ABA are sufficient”. At the bottom of the page she writes a 
note: “Appeal for peaceful co-existence in genetics”.  
McLaren, then, sees the work of improving diplomatic relations, sharing scientific 
resources and theories, as necessary for the advancement of science. While her political 
affiliations may explain her initial interest in Soviet science, or ideas that had come to be 
associated with Soviet science, it is an overarching commitment to free scientific enquiry 
that is more broadly Marxist than the narrow politicisation of scientific research agendas. 
This is not the scientific determinism of the 1930s socialist scientists that posited science 
as the answer to social progress but, as we have seen, a commitment to scientific methods, 
in which she includes theorising, collaborating and connecting in order to promote the 




Figure 16. Letter from Anne McLaren to Robert Shields, 2000, British Library, Add MS 89202/4/38. In this 
letter to the Trends in Genetics editor at Elsevier Science, McLaren appeals to the value of open enquiry in 
science to defend her article proposal on the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  
Another piece of correspondence taken from the McLaren papers at the British 
Library, from years after McLaren’s visit to Russia or the publication of Soma and Germ 
Cell, in 2000 (figure 16), provides another example of McLaren’s approach to advancing 
research on gene–environment interactions. In this case, she makes her statement in 
response to a letter from Robert Shields, the Trends in Genetics editor at Elsevier Science, 
in which he rejects an article McLaren had proposed in which she cites studies reporting 
the ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’ that is cast as an extension of the work done by 
Ivan Vladimirovich Michurin (1855–1935), who worked on plant hybridisation under 
Lenin, investigating the effects of the environment on the genotype. Among the several 
issues the Elsevier board had with the article, the last two are summative. Shields reports,  
Whether Michurin was right or wrong, his work does not appear to have led to 
anything beyond Lysenkoism. Whereas the rediscovery of Mendel fuelled the 
genetic revolution, the popularization of Michurin in the Soviet Union did not lead 
to any of the work that she describes as indicating inheritance of acquired traits. It 
strikes me as a distortion to promote Michurin’s work as a prelude to later studies 
that indicate non-Mendelian inheritance. … Fig. 9 shows pictures of Mendel, 
Lysenko and Michurin. It’s hard to know why, except to make some socio-political 
point, as opposed to a scientific one.  
 
153 
Shields, 3 March 2005, British Library, Add MS 89202/4/38 
To this letter, McLaren responds,  
When I hear terms like “Mendel-Morganist”, but equally “Lysenkoist”, I suspect 
that politics is getting in the way of scientific enquiry … if you or I were sceptical 
of someone’s results, we might feel impelled to repeat them “just in case”, but we 
would not feel that “we had to demonstrate that his ‘results’ were wrong.” 
McLaren, 16 March 2005, British Library, Add MS 89202/4/38 
McLaren casts the rejection as a politically motivated one but defends the ‘Soviet’ 
point of view scientifically – arguing for the scientific principle of open enquiry, and then 
also pointing to evidence of the underrepresented view in the form of recent studies, 
“mainly in Japan” (ibid). She ends the letter on a light-hearted note: “PS. Please don’t worry 
if your editorial board decides against my piece. I know you have much more stuff than 
you can publish, and I won’t hold it against you!” (ibid). McLaren, once again in a non-
divisive, non-vitriolic manner, recasts the debate around the inheritance of acquired 
characterises as a scientific one, revealing her ongoing commitment to inclusiveness that 
makes the advancement of science a tool for political progress – cutting across political 
divides in the shared scientific project. As in the embryology debates, we see here and in 
the account of McLaren’s meeting with Lysenko how science, for her, provides a language 
that can be used to incorporate conflicting views to work towards a resolution. Science 
provides a solution, not in a deterministic sense, but in the form of an authoritative language 
that facilitates exchange across divide, and not by reconciling difference, but by 
incorporating the insights from all sides into a working model.  
This commitment to bringing together theory and praxis for the enhancement of 
both, a commitment that, as McLaren’s daughter Susan Michie pointed out, might also be 
described as Marxist (personal correspondence, 11 August, 2019), becomes especially clear 
in the following example in which McLaren proposes a scientific model, building on these 
debates about non-Mendelian inheritance, in her monograph Soma and Germ Cell (1981). 
Here, she outlines a working model that, in time, comes to be consolidated by research that, 
within the framing she has architected, presents evidence for her system of relations. 
Scientific theorising, over the course of time, is a tool for scientific progress.  
Germ Cell and Soma  
Here it is relevant to turn briefly to a monograph that exemplifies McLaren’s commitment 
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to theorising in order to harness scientific progress. McLaren’s Germ Cell and Soma (1981) 
can be seen as an intervention in the philosophical, politicised dispute between Lysenkoists 
and Weismannist-Mendelist-Morganists. Her contribution is here to provide a framework 
that reduces the debate to its bare epistemological scheme, detailing the research that has 
and could support or refute each model. The book, which is unusually “philosophical” for 
a scientific text (Simpson, interview with author, 21 June 2018), is an expression of a 
political project that, rather than championing Lysenkoism or Western genetics, seeks to 
facilitate exchange between them. Once again, McLaren performs her role as an 
orchestrator and connector, drawing disparate views together in order to explore how they 
overlap, and can come to overlap, in a shared research agenda. I will briefly summarise her 
argument below.  
In Germ Cell and Soma: A New Look at an Old Problem (1981), McLaren tackles 
the longstanding question of the relationship between the somatic cells and the germ cells 
in the developing embryo. This had been a contentious issue in the history of embryology. 
Dogma in the field, especially over the 1960s, had come to dictate that there could be no 
reciprocal influence of the soma on the germ line. This moreover, had become a politicised 
issue given that the reciprocal influence of the germ line on the soma had come to be 
associated with Lysenko’s science under Stalin’s regime, as we have seen. McLaren, 
however, approaches the issue as a scientific one. To her, the issue is of particular interest 
because she sees it as another articulation of the ‘nature-nurture’ problem, the relationship 
between gene and environment, which she is interested in. As she explains writing five 
years earlier, in her Mammalian Chimeras (McLaren, 1976),  
When we consider the development of individual cells, we are faced with a more 
sophisticated extension of the nature-nurture problem, since the environment in 
which a cell develops is made up of the population of other cells surrounding it.  
McLaren, 1976, p. 6  
In Soma and Germ Cell, McLaren deploys her characteristic style to frame the 
discussion by offering a generalizable set of models, then proceeds to detail research that 
exemplifies the interactions between soma and germ cell – analogies for the relationship 
that she is interested in, which she finally assimilates in reference to the opening diagrams, 





Figures 17 and 18. Diagrams from Germ Cell and Soma, 1981. Here, McLaren schematises the two 
contrasting views of the relationship between germ cells and soma in the history of embryology, building on 
the theorising she and Donald Michie had done as early as 1957 in conversation with Trofim Lysenko in 
Russia.  
McLaren opens the book with the diagrams in figures 17 and 18. The first, she 
explains, is the one “associated with August Weismann” and “shows his hypothesis of a 
continuous stream of immortal germ plasm, concentrated at intervals in actual germ cells, 
that buds off to form mortal soma in each generation. Influences on the germ plasm can 
affect soma, but there is not – and in principle there cannot be – any reciprocal influence 
of the soma on the germ plasm” (McLaren, 1981, p. 3). In the second diagram, in contrast, 
“influences on the germ cells can still affect the soma, but now the soma can exert 
reciprocal influence on the germ cells”, which she says, “ was the scheme that Charles 
Darwin believed in”, and in the final figure, “which corresponds more closely to 
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developmental reality, it is the epiblast that is the business part of the embryo, after it has 
formed its extraembryonic membranes but before it has started to form any organs” (ibid). 
The dotted arrows in this diagram represent the “hypothetical influence of the soma on the 
developing germ cells” and in “its philosophical implications it is closer to Darwin’s 
scheme.” (ibid). Having established these broad schemas, she goes on summaries the 
research being done on each part of the developmental cycle that might be used to reflect 
on the soma-germ cell relationship, all of which, we have seen, she believes should be 
considered in order to understand the relations between gene and environment. McLaren is 
especially interested in the development of the germ cells.  
To McLaren, the embryonic development of germ cells and the question of whether 
or not they embark on meiosis constitutes one of the most crucial points of interaction of 
the germ cell with its somatic environment and illustrates well the interplay between the 
“environmental stimulus and the autonomous chromosomal factors that determine the germ 
cell’s response” (p. 88). This node also embodied a central paradox, namely how germ cells 
can be both totipotent and differentiate into specialised forms, and it was a paradox that 
could not be explained using Weismann’s model. In other words, the germ cell question 
presented a particularly apt analogy of her model system of gene–environment, here in the 
form of germ cell and soma interactions. McLaren goes on to point to two gaps in 
understanding. The first is the influence of the environment on germ cells, which she shows 
exists, and is the weaker version of her argument. The second part of her argument regards 
the origin of the germ cells. Here, she makes three conjectures: (a) the potential for 
totipotency rests in all cells; (b) the realisation of this totipotency rests on the cell’s 
exposure to an adequate environment; and (c) the selection of certain germ cells to form 
the germ line while others form the somatic tissues depends on their position within the 
epiblast. If proven right, even in part, her modelled hypothesis will be deemed correct, 
because an “absolute distinction between germ cells and soma could no longer be made” 
(McLaren, 1981, p. 95). McLaren’s case, then, departs by proposing a hypothetical model 
for development, and ends by stipulating the exact conditions under which this model must 
be true. She concludes,  
… if they [the conjectures] were demolished by future research, then some 
compromise between figure 1a [Weismann’s model] and figure 2 [her model] might 
constitute an acceptable model. But if they were upheld, even in part, then figure 2 
[McLaren’s model] could be regarded as a valid updating of figure 1b [the Darwin 
model of pangenesis], since an absolute distinction between germ cells and soma 
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could no longer be made. 
McLaren, 1981, p. 95 
Evidence was gathered around each of these conjectures as research progressed in 
the field. Conjecture three, which McLaren considers “the most readily testable of the three 
conjectures and hence the most interesting” (p. 95), was indeed proven by one of her 
students, Professor Patrick Tam, who, as part of his PhD work in Anne’s MRC Mammalian 
Development Unit on the population expansion of the primordial germ cells (PGCs) in the 
mouse embryo, had established the cell engraftment and tracking technique and embryo 
culture protocol to test the developmental fate of graft-derived cells in a host embryo ex 
vivo. Tam (Tam, interview with author, 28 August 2018) recalls that McLaren approached 
him about using his techniques to perform a cell transplantation experiment to test if cells 
in different regions of the epiblast are fixated or ‘plastic’ for the PGC fate. The results of 
his experiments (Tam and Zhou, 1996) were consistent with McLaren’s third conjecture, 
the hypothesis that the germ line is not pre-determined but could be specified by ‘position-
delimited inductive activity’.  
What is significant about McLaren’s argument here is how it reveals, once again, 
her aptitude for delineating a research agenda around a specific biological model, 
stimulating the application of techniques towards a shared, broadly defined theoretical goal 
across various levels and fields of biology, in order to advance a research agenda despite 
its political stigma. McLaren, once again, shows a translational aptitude, the ability to 
perform the social and scientific work of connecting in order to move her scientific research 
agenda forward. As her collaborator on her work into sex-determination in immunology in 
the 1970s and 80s, Elizabeth Simpson, put it in an interview with me, 
… Anne is putting together a framework for asking questions. And she was very 
good at having a comprehension of what that framework needs to take into account. 
So, a lot of the arguments that she’s using in here are almost philosophical, rather 
than scientific, which makes it sort of … you need to take a step back for a second. 
Simpson, interview with author, 21 June 2018 
Simpson’s comment reveals how the work of framing and modelling that McLaren 
was doing was often cast as beyond the purview of science, deeming it ‘philosophical’. 
Even the broad theoretical framing of problems, reminiscent of the work that both 
Waddington and McClintock did, is ‘extra-scientific’ for Simpson, but is once again 
integral to McLaren’s practice. This commitment to theorising freely, however, is an 
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expression of McLaren’s dedication to science as a political tool. She tackles a central 
dogma in the field, one that had come to become politicised and divisive, simply by putting 
her biological model to work ‘scientifically’. In applying this method, then, McLaren was 
not interested in distinctions between domains of knowledge. Her approach was, once 
again, highly pragmatic. This pragmatism relies on an ability to translate between 
problems, to recruit actors and technologies to a research agenda. Her commitment to 
Marxism consolidates and helps explain her ‘social’ approach to science: her 
‘opportunistic’ shifting between analogous models that requires both the social work of 
collaborating, the theoretical work of superimposing, as well as the scientific work of 
experimenting and analysing to build a theoretical, scientific model that, she trusts, will 
advance the state of science given that enough research is done, and that this continues to 
be incorporated into the working model. This example, then, adds to the sense of McLaren’s 
commitment to science itself as a set of tools forceful enough to connect scientists across 
political regimes. We also see once again how her method of superimposition was also a 
scientific one, in the sense that science provides a language and a method that can be 
mobilised to incorporate new perspectives, rendering distinctions between fact and value 
secondary, if not irrelevant. This was an approach that derived, in part, from her 
understanding of science as a tool for political progress, and of the politics of establishing 
and maintaining relations across borders as a tool for scientific progress.  
The relationship I have sketched above for McLaren between science and the social 
good also foregrounds two key characteristics of McLaren’s style of practice of key 
importance to her science, policy, and political work, namely that of ‘communication’ and 
‘comparison’. These two activities are repeatedly linked in McLaren’s approach as she 
draws new connections between problems across fields, domains and political divides. 
Communication, in these cases, is essential in order to recruit the relevant actors to her 
project, and this in turn requires comparisons in the forms of non-literal translations, 
analogies that make concepts speak to the concerns and methodologies of a particular field. 
Communication of scientific concepts in all of these cases, means considering the language 
of the target group in a formative sense. McLaren’s dedication to communication and 
comparison defines her life’s work and is an aspect of doing scientific work not often 
acknowledged within science by scientists – but McLaren enacted a commitment to both.  
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Reading McLaren’s legacy 
In the above, the idiom of ‘moving in circles’ has been key to my description of McLaren’s 
style of practice. McLaren is credited by many of her former acquaintances and colleagues 
for her ability to move easily in any circle. The same can be said of her ability to move 
between scientific problems, scientific disciplines, and even political regimes. The work of 
communication and comparison allowed McLaren to move in and between various 
‘circles’. In her science, this ability is not given the same validation by her former 
colleagues, leading many to discredit her science, especially from the 1980s onwards. My 
interviewees contended, for example, that her involvement in Warnock in 1980s marked a 
shift of interest that meant she was “past her prime scientifically” (Goodfellow, interview 
with author, 21 September 2018). In my interview with Richard Gardner (27 September 
2018), evoking comparisons with the English geneticist Mary Lyon, best known for her 
discovery of x-inactivation which was also of major importance to McLaren’s work, 
Gardner claims that Lyon was in a “very different league” as a “source of original ideas” 
to McLaren (ibid). McLaren, in contrast, he contends, was “a tremendous absorber of 
information,” and “picked up ideas at a very early stage and developed them very 
competently”, but this lack of originality, he implies through the comparison, makes her 
less of a scientist in her own right, not of “Nobel standing” (ibid). McLaren’s opportunistic, 
broad approach to science, then, seems to have diverged too far from the conventional 
career trajectory for her to be considered a scientific ‘great’. 
I have shown, however, how communication was key to McLaren’s development 
of her gene–environment model. Her movement between fields and problems led her to 
constitute a unique field of study encompassing the entire life-course of the embryo from 
one generation to the next. This circularity is more than a superficial point because it 
manifests the outcome of the ethos of problem solving that I describe in this dissertation, 
that relies on analogies and connection. The outcome of an approach that draws on a variety 
of fields to solve the social problem of investigating a scientific problem, it appears, is not 
an incoherent sprawl, but a coherent, meticulous model based on multi-faceted evidence. 
The body of McLaren’s work represents an argument for epigenetic effects at various levels 
of biological organisation and has laid the foundation for much of the revival of epigenetics 
today, as active scientists in the field still confirmed to me in our interviews (e.g. Surani, 
interview with author, 22 August 2018). The idiom of moving in circles foregrounds just 
how distinctive McLaren’s approach to science was and, in doing so, helps elucidate her 
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ambivalent legacy, which is tainted by a sense of misunderstanding and which, much like 
the legacy of the ‘pre-embryo’, needs to be explained as a failure to adhere to dominant 
scientific literalist paradigms.  
The meaning of McLaren’s scientific work, as her life, only emerges from a broad, 
encompassing description of the way in which she translated problems across fields 
throughout her life and thereby falls outside of a scientific convention in which key 
discoveries are explained in the language of a single field. Her contributions to uncovering 
the mechanism of epigenetic effects and developing the method to deduce these, is 
discredited, while her science was repeatedly cast as primarily ‘reproductive’ biology, or, 
as we have seen, not of ‘Nobel standard’ by my interviewees. In these accounts, something 
in her distinctive and pragmatic approach of crossing between fields, between problems 
and applying herself so fully to policy-work serves to discredit her professionally. I hope 
to have shown how McLaren’s science depended through and through on a broad, 
integrative view, in which data was gathered from across disciplinary fields, national 
borders and iron curtains. Her commitment to policy and internationalism also reveals also 
how deep her commitment to science as a social project ran, how she saw the work of 
developing a social infrastructure to support her scientific aims as an essential part of 
facilitating science for the social good. McLaren was interested in everything that gets the 
individual from ‘one generation to the next’, and with this comes a commitment to finding 
appropriate analogies for the dynamic that is the red-thread in all of her work, ‘gene–
environment interactions’. It is perhaps this analogous, non-literalist language and method 
that has failed to register within the conventions of academic science even today, that has 
failed, to evoke Evelyn-Fox Keller’s, to ‘persuade’.  
Thatcher, McLaren, and ‘choice’ 
I now return briefly to the human embryology debates of the 1980s. The account I have 
given of McLaren’s vision for science and society, of her socialism, and of her commitment 
to moving between circles, provides a useful background to further situate her and her 
approach in these public debates on science. In particular, it builds on my critique of 
Duncan Wilson’s (2014; Chadwick and Wilson, 2018) assertion that Warnock and Thatcher 
shared a common anti-expert sentiment, showing how their supposed shared emphasis on 
individual choice held by Warnock and Thatcher were actually radically different. 
McLaren’s style of practice helps illuminate how the language of science allowed these 
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figures to see eye-to-eye during the debates, but how this relied on – far from a common 
neoliberal sentiment – an approach that Susan Michie has pointed out, might be described 
as Marxist, namely a “commitment to working with the broadest possible alliance of people 
whose interests can bring together in support of a cause” (personal correspondence, 2019). 
Wilson (2014), in his attempt to construct a distinctly British history of Bioethics, 
describes a shift in Britain towards external regulation of biotechnologies in which there 
were no moral experts, only ‘different opinions’ that would be factored into a process of 
‘corporate decision-making’ (p. 141). He claims that this shift was facilitated by a 
conducive political environment, in that it “dovetailed with the neo-liberal emphasis on 
individual autonomy and echoed Margaret Thatcher’s belief that ‘choice is the essence of 
ethics’ ” (p. 156). As we saw in Chapter 1, Wilson argues that the Warnock Committee 
could thereby contribute to a Conservative effort to break the welfare-state form of 
government in which professional expertise was vital to the development of public policy. 
The Conservatives instead argued that policy should be shaped by ‘outsiders’ who 
functioned as proxies for different stakeholders and consumer interests. Warnock echoed 
this belief by arguing that declining trust in professional expertise transformed what were 
once “ ‘matters of professional behaviour’ into ‘questions of public policy’, which merit 
public discussion and therefore, because we are a democratic society, ultimate discussion 
in Parliament” (Warnock cited in Wilson, p. 156).  
This argument becomes difficult to accept or, at least, is somewhat subsidiary, given 
the role that the Warnock model actually came to play in the debates, as we have seen in 
my account of how McLaren carried it forward. This was an iterative process of building 
common ground, by superimposing a social vision on the biological, legal and the ethical. 
Both McLaren and Warnock, and the pro-research lobby that surrounded them, as 
we have seen, were very much oriented towards what Warnock herself described as the idea 
of the good: 
In recommending legislation, then, we are recommending a kind of society that we 
can, all of us, praise and admire, even if, in detail, we may individually wish that it 
were different. The task, one philosopher noted, was to articulate “a steady and 
general point of view”. 
Warnock, 1985, p. 1 
The 14-day limit that they recommended, then, stood for an idea of social morality 
itself. This view diverges considerably from the typical Thatcherite position in which there 
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was no such thing as society; Thatcher was, indeed, adamant that there was “no such thing 
as society” (Margaret Thatcher, interviewed by Douglas Keay, Woman’s Own, 1987). In 
Thatcher’s view, there were only individual men and women and their families, and the 
concepts of ‘social order’, ‘social consensus’, or a ‘social contract’ would have been of 
little relevance to her. Morality, to Thatcher, was a deeply individualistic affair, a legacy of 
Thatcherism that Warnock has lamented. She writes in her 2000 memoir,  
The legacy of Margaret Thatcher, then, is still pervasive and harmful to society as 
a whole. The idea of the common good, which genuinely lay behind the welfarism 
of the 1940s and 1950s, has simply got lost.  
Warnock, 2000, p. 196 
Warnock makes clear, that she and Thatcher had fundamentally opposing visions of 
social morality. In a 1979 conference speech, Wilson points out that Thatcher had argued 
that “morality is personal” and denied there “was such a thing as a collective conscience” 
(Thatcher, cited in Wilson, 2014, p. 170).  
If, then, we accept that Warnock and Thatcher could align over an understanding of 
Warnock’s practical role as a philosopher in the debates; as one of exposing logic of 
arguments, making suggestions, but not as an expert, this becomes a rather superficial point 
of convergence, considering just how much their social models diverged. The account I 
have given of McLaren’s vision for science and society, particularly her conception of 
choice in the context of family – ‘decision-making’ – adds to the sense in which the 
supposed shared emphasis on individual choice held by Warnock and Thatcher were 
actually radically different. McLaren, too, emphasises the importance of choice to the 
future of the governance of reproduction. In various speeches given on family planning in 
different contexts, she repeatedly cites George Elliot in her discussions of choice. In the 
1989 WHO keynote, for example, she says, 
I pointed out earlier that reproduction offers the possibility of choice, responsible 
choice, not just necessity. George Eliot wrote: “The strongest principle of growth 
lies in human choice”. Every animal can reproduce itself; only human kind can 
choose when and how and whether to reproduce. But who is to make these choices? 
Sometimes they may be individual choices; but often there will be conflicting 
interests within the family, and the decisions will have to be family decisions, taking 
conflicting interests into account … Then again, families do not exist in isolation, 
but in social groupings … so social forces, ethical pressures, social incentives and 
disincentives may all influence the decisions.  
McLaren, in WHO Keynote, Geneva, 1989, p. 14 
 
163 
Her ‘principle of growth’, as we have seen, is only effective when people are 
provided with the necessary information to choose, and influence, the options presented to 
them. Clinical applications, as we have also seen in the contact of PGD, in this way come 
to represent a shifting horizon based on social consensus, expressed in a biological model 
that comprises a shared language. This is not a consumer’s demand for a product taken at 
face value, but a process of negotiation in relation to a stack of domains that places immense 
responsibility with the scientist to ensure that the discussion represents and incorporates 
the views of experts and non-experts alike, in order to find common ground. If this model 
is ‘anti-expert’, in that it overcomes the sole power of the medical profession in people’s 
decisions about how they want to have children, it is in the sense of it being democratic, 
establishing a shared space for discussion, instead of opposition. 
Science as a political tool  
Yet, despite their diverging social views, the Warnock model did win the support of 
Thatcher’s cabinet, although never openly, thus still begging the question of why the PM 
and her Cabinet were amenable to the unprecedented government intervention in the 
science of reproduction presented by the Warnock Inquiry. Moreover, in talking about 
McLaren’s role, particularly in pushing the pro-lobby case forward and having outlined her 
politics as it pertained to her science, it is relevant to ask how McLaren, too, related to a 
Prime Minister seemingly as far from her own politics as could be. In an interview I 
conducted with Chris Graham in 2018 for this study, he recalls one particular visit he made 
to brief Thatcher with McLaren and Richard Gardner that made clear to him McLaren’s 
disregard for Thatcher politically: 
Anne McLaren had come in with a skirt made out of jean-material, and not dolled 
up at all. Richard was in a suit. I’d borrowed my brother-in-law’s suit which was 
pin-striped, who was a surgeon … So we went down, and Anne sat in what she 
thought was Margaret Thatcher’s chair and in fact she was right. So the first thing 
Margaret Thatcher said was, “would you mind moving?” Anne and Thatcher hated 
each other. They hated each other. And just apart from politics, they were 
completely different ends of the spectrum. I once asked Anne, you know, what 
really was the basis of this dislike – I shouldn’t say hatred – and she said, “Margaret 
Thatcher talks at breakfast”, and she knew her from being an undergraduate, 
although they were at different colleges. So Anne did not get on with her at all. 
Graham, interview with author, 27 September 2018 
Graham’s quote not only makes clear McLaren’s disregard for Thatcher herself but, 
once again, to the ways in which McLaren resisted social conventions. McLaren’s daughter, 
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Susan Michie, recalls,  
Anne hated ‘society’ events and refused to follow the social expectations mapped 
out for her by her parents – she was by nature introverted and although she liked a 
good party and dancing, she did not like smart, stuffy occasions. She was also much 
more at ease with people in her local pub or café than people from her kind of 
background. 
Susan Michie, personal correspondence, 2019 
That McLaren directly corresponded with and won the Prime Minister’s support, 
despite their political and personal differences, is testament to her commitment to moving 
between circles, her commitment to working with the broadest possible alliance to advance 
her scientific agenda and, as we shall see, her commitment to scientific advancement, which 
coextended with the project of social advancement that came to provide the real common 
ground between the Warnock approach and Thatcher’s. A closer look at this 
correspondence, and some additional contextualisation of Thatcher’s overall attitude 
towards science policy, suggests, as opposed to Wilson’s analysis, that Thatcher converged 
with the pro-lobby not so much over a shared understanding of individual choice or of the 
role of the expert, but predominantly over a shared understanding of the value of science 
to society.  
British science and technology studies scholar, Jon Agar (2011), in his article 
exploring the role of science in Thatcher’s policy, draws on an understanding of her pre-
political, scientific career, to posit that, given this experience as a “research scientist”, 
Thatcher had a “different view of science from that of any other minister responsible for 
science” (Agar, 2011, p. 215). Thatcher’s training as a chemist at Oxford (where she crossed 
paths with McLaren), her four-year dissertation in X-ray crystallography of gramicidin 
after World War II and, importantly, her four years’ experience as a working industrial 
chemist at British Xylonite Plastics and at Lyons, meant, Agar argues, that science came to 
hold a “peculiarly significant strategic position for Thatcher” in two regards (p. 226). First, 
“science represented the best of the public economy, and the research councils … as places 
where the public economy worked”. This belief emanated from a “genuine and unforced 
… esteem for elite scientists” (Agar, 2011, p. 226). He goes on: 
She viewed science as a source of wealth, and therefore a justified expenditure from 
the public purse. Yet this elevation made science even more of a test case for the 
developing views on economic liberalism. If markets could work for science policy, 
they could work anywhere.  
Agar, 2011, p. 226  
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This belief in the – marketable – value of science, then, explains how Thatcher may 
have been supportive of the continuation of embryo research, especially in aid of clinical 
applications for which there was demonstrable public support and demand. The second 
consequence of Thatcher’s research experience to which Agar points also suggests why 
Thatcher may have been amenable to the setting up of a government inquiry into human 
fertilisation and embryology made of non-experts: 
It was precisely because Thatcher knew what scientific research was like that made 
her impervious to claims that science was a special case, with special features and 
incapable of being understood by outsiders, and therefore that science policy should 
be left in the hands of scientists. … Thatcher, who lived both worlds, saw no 
separation, in principle and in practice.  
Agar, 2011, p. 227  
It is this background that explains both Thatcher’s esteem for science, but also how 
it was under her that the science of reproductive technologies came under public scrutiny, 
as an area that should be marketed and governed like any other. It is perhaps also for this 
reason, that McLaren was able to appeal to Thatcher in the lead up to the 1987 White Paper 
vote that would decide between continued research under regulation and a ban, to discuss 
the pro-lobby position from a scientific perspective. McLaren can be seen here to be 




Figure 19. Letter from McLaren to George Porter, 1987, British Library, Add MS 89202/8/3. McLaren writes 
to George Porter, president of the Royal Society, to call for a meeting to discuss human embryo research with 
Margaret Thatcher. McLaren appeals to a common understanding of the importance of science to Britain.  
In figure 19, McLaren writes to George Porter, president of the Royal Society, to 
organise a lunch meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss research, which, she stresses 
in the letter, is a “field in which Britain at present leads the world”. This is McLaren’s 
attempt, therefore, to establish an alliance between the community of scientists at the Royal 
Society and Thatcher, over a shared interest in the role that science could play in Britain’s 
global status – an allusion to the economic interests at stake in scientific research. The 
appeal seems to have worked, as Thatcher agreed to a meeting and McLaren, along with 
Richard Gardner and Chris Graham, were invited to visit Thatcher to brief her that year. 
Richard Gardner recalled the experience to me in an interview conducted in 2018: 
… I can’t remember which day of the week it was but it was in the Green Room. 
And we were told in advance that she found it really hard to keep quiet. But she 
gave us each fifteen minutes without hardly any interruption at all. The only thing 
she couldn’t get her mind around was embryo banks … apart from this hang up over 
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embryo banks she understood everything we said, she took it all in. 
Richard Gardner, interview with author, 27 September 2018 
Yet despite her apparent interest in and aptitude for the science, Thatcher’s support 
was restrained. The developmental biologist Chris Graham also present at the meeting as a 
representative of the Royal Society, for example, recalls,  
… what we wanted her [Thatcher] to do was to photograph her visiting a clinic, 
because that would have turned the public – shown them that were was overt 
support from the PM, she wouldn’t have had to say anything. But she refused to do 
that and she said “I wouldn’t oppose the Committee’s report going through 
parliament”, which I guess was a step in the right direction. 
Chris Graham, interview with author, 27 September 2018 
This sense of implicit, but reluctantly expressed, support is evident in all of the 
correspondence I found between McLaren and Thatcher. McLaren, maintaining her clear 
and broad vision of the debates, for example, in several instances appealed to Thatcher to 







Figures 20 and 21. Letter from McLaren to George Porter, 30 March 1989, British Library, Add MS 
89202/9/29. In this letter, McLaren appeals to George Porter, president of the Royal Society, asking him to 
urge Thatcher to keep the question of abortion separate from the debates on human embryo research. The 
letter again reveals the extent to which McLaren relied on Thatcher’s understanding of the nature of scientific 
research to gain her Cabinet’s support.  
The letter in figures 20 and 21, taken from the McLaren archives at the British 
Library, shows McLaren writing to George Porter again, this time to urge Thatcher to ‘keep 
the two issues’ of abortion and the Warnock legislation ‘strictly separate’ on ‘scientific 
grounds’. Again, McLaren here appeals to Thatcher in her capacity as a scientist, and, 
therefore, in the hope that Thatcher will recognise the case for separating the issues 
‘scientifically’. Of course, there was a huge political interest in doing so, given the ways in 
which pro-life groups had attempted throughout the debates to leverage the case against 
human embryo research to challenge the abortion law (Mulkay, 1997). Yet McLaren 
chooses to appeal to Thatcher through the avenue provided by the Royal Society. Once 
again, Thatcher seems sympathetic to this scientific case, understanding that research is, in 
fact, an issue to be separated from the political issue of abortion, and responds with the 




Figure 22. Letter from Thatcher to George Porter, 17 May 1989, British Library, Add MS 89202/9/29. In this 
letter she agrees to separate the issue of research from the political issue of abortion, revealing her sympathies 
towards the scientists’ case for human embryo research. Open Government Licence (OGL). 
These glimpses of the communication that occurred between McLaren and 
Thatcher, however limited and often indirect, reveal that the basis of the exchanges between 
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them during the debates were always scientific. It is always within her capacity as a scientist 
and in providing information about the state of research that McLaren is able to appeal to 
Thatcher and influence her. This suggests that it was not so much a shared interest in 
empowering the consumer to choose, but a shared understanding of a specific vision of the 
scientific facts and the need for scientific research in aid of clinical applications – the 
‘value’, whether economic or for the social good, that science brought to society, that 
allowed McLaren as a Marxist scientist and Thatcher as a Conservative Prime Minister, to 
find common ground.  
As in Chapters 1 and 2, we see here even more clearly, how McLaren was able to 
exercise her scientific authority as a result of its intersection with her social class, as a 
member of the Royal Society, adding again, to previous descriptions of how scientific 
authority functioned in the debate (e.g. Mulkay, 1997). Science only reinforces her public 
authority, and this worked within a British political culture systemically reliant on expert 
trustworthiness and credibility. STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff (2005) emphasises this 
dimension in her cross-cultural comparison on the debates on biotechnology in democratic 
nations. She writes,  
Science in Britain enjoys a no less preeminent intellectual status than in the United 
States, but as a guarantor of political legitimacy science lacks power unless it speaks 
through socially accredited expert bodies, both individual and collective. Much 
energy is devoted in Britain to producing experts whose right to speak on behalf of 
the public will be virtually unquestioned. Their authority is not a matter of skills 
and knowledge alone, but of those attributes coupled to significant demonstrations 
of social responsibility. British experts generally earn the right to represent the 
public through successive episodes of personal testing that elevate them to the ranks 
of the “great and the good” and endow them, in effect, with common vision: the 
power to see for the people, with an encompassing gaze that goes beyond the 
ordinary person’s capacity for foresight.  
Jasanoff, 2005, p. 289 
Wilson overlooks this important cultural and political context in his analysis, one 
that is brought to light by McLaren’s interactions with Thatcher, which is distinctive of the 
British context where legislation was negotiated, and shows the extent to which expertise 
was key to the negotiations that led to the HF&E Act. While it may be true that Warnock 
or McLaren pandered to Thatcher’s notion that there should be no public experts, they 
nonetheless also, importantly, appealed to her belief in the value of science, as one that 
could and should be open to the influence of non-scientists, but that was still held in esteem, 
and whose representatives drew on its authority to exercise their social responsibility. 
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McLaren’s commitment to moving across circles to draw people into her scientific orbit, 
through a shared and evolving biological model, exposed the interrelatedness of science 
and other social domains, and thereby advanced a scientific agenda geared towards social 
progress. This allowed her to appeal to Thatcher’s understanding of science, made her 
credible as an authority to Thatcher, and begins to explain how the Warnock model came 
to be enacted in law under Thatcher’s government. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described McLaren’s approach to science, drawing on her own 
descriptions of her career trajectory and interviews with her former colleagues. I drew on 
the work of C. H. Waddington, whom McLaren has referred to as a significant influence on 
her thinking, to further define the epistemological approach she developed over the course 
of her science and policy work. I also referred to her social context, her Marxism and the 
legacy of 1930s socialist science in order to develop the role that public engagement played 
in McLaren’s conception of the relationship between science and society. All this 
contributes to a characterisation of McLaren’s style of practice, which, I have shown, might 
be described as a problem-solving ethos.  
This pragmatic moral stance is characteristic of McLaren across all the contexts in 
which she was active and, indeed, is reflected in her commitment to exercising this 
approach in various circles, drawing them into her scientific orbit by modelling shared 
problems. The scientist, in this model, bears a responsibility to engage in broad 
deliberation, by applying concepts across domains by finding appropriate analogies in order 
to arrive, temporarily, at consensus. This consensus is often expressed as an agreement on 
a prospective clinical application – in fact, consensus is part of putting this application, 
pragmatically, to work. This agreement, however, is disingenuous unless the participants 
in debate depart from the premise that this will always be built on fractured, shifting ground. 
In order for consensus to be that and not imposition, we must take seriously the ongoing 
process of translation on which it depends – the biological, professional, affective 
translations that describe how perspectives are superimposed to build common ground. 
Scientific practice, in this model, is centrally about communication, about 
modelling common ground in the form of a shared language. This style, and an 
understanding of the scientific, social and political commitments that underlie it, is 
exemplified by McLaren in the Warnock debates, as in her science. Here she exercises her 
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pragmatic, ‘opportunistic’ approach of leaping between groups and analogies of the same 
overarching model: connecting, orchestrating, mobilising and theorising, and building a 
translational model for getting from one generation to the next – all with an eye to the social 
good. The role that science plays in McLaren’s social vision, moreover, leads to a 
reinterpretation of Thatcher’s stance in the debates, and her relationship to Warnock and 
McLaren, as I argue that it was a shared commitment to the advancement of science, rather 
than a superficial common disdain for expertise, that allowed these key actors to unite over 
a common, scientific, agenda. This, in turn, consolidates my argument that science and 
scientific facts provide a useful, translational language through which to discuss and 
advance social questions and, when used reflexively, present the possibility of cutting 
across the stalemate of ethical and political division, towards pragmatic consensus based 




Lessons in public deliberation of science 
In this chapter I offer a more normative contribution to the discussions around policy 
approaches in reproductive medicine in Britain today, as well as more specifically on the 
14-day rule. I make this contribution as a response to the reluctance of some scientists, as 
I have documented through my interviews, to associate themselves with this era of public 
deliberation. This amnesia, I argue, inhibits the important contributions that scientists might 
make to public deliberations around science policy in Britain today. I appeal here, once 
again, to a broad understanding of the process of clinical translation, in order to further 
define the role of the scientist in public debate. I have used a plurality of translations 
throughout this thesis to draw attention to the legal, ethical, affective, and political work 
associated with finding a common biological language in the social process of arriving at a 
clinical translation. In this translational model, all of these aspects characterise the work of 
the scientist and for McLaren, too, as we have seen, these activities were intimately 
entwined. I hope that McLaren’s model as I have described it will serve as a reminder of 
the work that was done by the 1980s pro-research lobby in order to arrive at legislation, 
and that it will incite scientists to engage openly in the process of deliberation, 
acknowledging that ‘non-scientific’ language can nonetheless be part of the process of 
arriving at scientific applications; that the work of fostering an environment that is 
conducive to research can and should involve the work of finding mechanisms to take on 
board the views of a wider constituency and to implement these practically.  
In light of this attempt to revive some of the lessons ‘not learned’ from the debates 
in the 1980s, I turn to a conference that was geared towards finding new models to describe 
the relationship between science and society to guide science policy in Britain. After 
exploring some of the lessons that this conference teaches about the role of scientists in 
public debate, I will comment on the relevance of these models to the question of the 14-
day rule today.  
Science policy in Britain: Talking about ‘translation’ 
In December 2017, the Wellcome Trust sponsored a 10th anniversary Anne McLaren 
Memorial Trust Fund Conference, Anne McLaren and Translation. This event brought 
together science, art, and the humanities in order to address the increasing role of 
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interdisciplinarity and dialogue in the future of biomedical translation. The conference 
agenda thus drew together two key parallel shifts – one was the move towards translation 
as the dominant model guiding science policy and funding strategies since the 1990s, aimed 
at accelerating innovation by removing barriers to the smooth flow of ideas in a 
translational ‘pipeline’ from ‘bench to bedside’, as outlined in the introduction to this 
dissertation. The other, similarly a shift in the funding of scientific research in professional 
science, was the greater attention being paid to the need for public engagement described 
as ‘the turn to dialogue’. The centrality of dialogue to UK science policy has been traced 
back, in a report by Burchell, Franklin and Holden (2009), to a 2000 report Science and 
Society by the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, which called for 
a model of science communication based on mutual exchange between scientists and the 
public, as opposed to a unilateral model in which scientists impart information to improve 
public understanding of science. The goal of the conference, as the introductory pamphlet 
states, was to bring these agendas together in order to “set the stage for a repurposed set of 
translational models that would incorporate a wider range of knowledge practices, 
disciplines and methodologies”, thereby developing a new language of translation that is 
“both responsive to the need to increase the effectiveness of the innovation process, and 
cautious about the limits of end-directed research” (conference pamphlet, 2017).  
The conference was thus framed very much in the spirit of Anne McLaren’s 
problem-solving ethos that I have described in this thesis – the need for communication 
and deliberation is here used to offset and challenge the output-focused ‘pipeline’ model, 
in order to develop a more complex understanding of the process of arriving at any clinical 
application, but also actively searching for the ways in which this process can be 
understood and harnessed explicitly through active deliberation. It was interesting to see at 
the conference how what might be called ‘conventional’ fears about protecting science from 
the non-scientific influence of realms such as ethics and politics were side-lined through a 
shift in focus to the process of arriving at a clinical translation. The call for increased 
dialogue with the public, as well as the pressures of clinical translation, led some research 
scientists to make a plea to guard scientific objectivity, to ensure that scientific research 
remains rigorous and that information circulating in and beyond the laboratory remains 
accurate. As the discussions ensued, the territory to be fortified was remapped. By re-
evaluating the entire pipeline process, by showing how the scientist can be cast as one 
stakeholder in a process of arriving at clinical translation through dialogue, the central 
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question became one of how to facilitate this process.  
Central to the discussions was a return to the history of the HF&E debates in the 
1980s as an example of the process involved in developing scientific policy around clinical 
translation. Anne McLaren’s daughter, Susan Michie, reminded the attendees that the 14-
day rule was the outcome of a long ‘campaign’. Peter Braude helped elucidate what this 
campaign entailed. Looking back, he said, it is important to ask, ‘What needed regulating 
in the first place?’. He referred to the work that the Warnock Committee did, outlined in 
this dissertation in Chapter 1, of reframing the question at hand. As we have seen, the 
Report did not take the question of the status of the embryo, which had defined the 
discussions about the permissibility of human embryo research to that point, as its point of 
departure, but instead asked what useful research could be done using the human embryo. 
It asked, in Braude’s words, what needed regulating and, in this effort, looked at the 
research being done, the research that could be done in the future, and the purposes of this 
research. Increasingly, as I have shown in Chapter 2, drawing on the prospect of PGD in 
the debates, this became part of an effort to renegotiate what was considered experimental 
by positing clinical goals and showing what research was needed to ensure their efficacy 
and safety. The goal of a clinical translation in this model, provided a means of negotiating 
what I, following various scholars on the debates, refer to as a ‘social contract’ (Franklin 
and Roberts, 2006; Jasanoff and Metzler, 2018), in which scientists were afforded space for 
basic research in exchange for strict regulations by limiting research up to 14 days, and by 
ensuring its regulation under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). 
This understanding was reached through a discussion of goals that represented a 
shared belief in what science could do for society. Braude similarly pointed to the clinical 
translation of IVF, by which a formerly experimental technique became a clinical reality, a 
technique that was still in its infancy and to this day, as especially the senior scientists at 
the conference were keen to point out, remains relatively marginal with success rates much 
lower that popular media and advertising attests. IVF was turned from something 
experimental to something practical, he says, and was another form of translation. As I have 
done in this dissertation vis-à-vis PGD, by casting the negotiation of experimental–clinical 
as a translation in itself, clinical translation becomes part of a public negotiation of the 
techniques that they would like to see implemented and delineates an imperative for 
scientists to show what this will entail. It is in this sense that, as Martin Johnson said at the 
conference of the work done by the pro-research lobby in the 1980s, that the work of 
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scientists was not one of ‘persuading, but of informing’. 
Lessons in dialogue  
We might return here to the turn to ‘turn to dialogue’ described above, so distinctive to 
recent policy in British research community. As much as the turn to dialogue represented a 
move towards a model of public engagement that would be more participatory, and that 
facilitated interaction between diverse groups of science and society, this guiding 
programme, like translation, has raised a set of potential problems to professional science. 
Discussions at the conference, as well as my dissertation as whole, show how bringing 
translation and dialogue together as two dimensions of arriving at a clinical application, 
improves and directs the relationship between science and society. Both become part of 
doing what Charis Thompson calls, ‘good science’, a term to which I will turn after I briefly 
summarise the tensions expressed by scientists in response to the turn to dialogue.  
The findings of Burchell et al. (2009) revealed a widespread dedication to and 
recognition of the validity of dialogue among the scientific community but that was coupled 
with a set of concerns that stemmed from a failure to formally institutionalise this activity 
as part of scientific professionalism. The qualitative data presented in the study reaffirmed 
the extent to which the two-way, reciprocal model of engagement activities as exchanges 
has become a dominant paradigm, or ‘ideal type’, of engagement activity in British science. 
Public engagement and dialogue activities were seen by the study’s interviewees to be 
desirable and necessary because science and the public are increasingly understood as 
interdependent and mutually beneficial” in that “science presents social challenges and is 
dependent on public funding and consent; in turn, science benefits patients and the public, 
while the public can benefit science” (Burchell et al., p. 75). This series of interactions was 
“most optimistically conceived as a ‘virtuous circle’ or ‘win-win’ situation” (ibid).  
Nonetheless, the results showed, the activities of public engagement were largely 
regarded as extraneous to science itself, it was a “profession worthy of time and 
commitment; at the same time, it is an activity that is under-rewarded and potentially 
professionally distracting and stigmatising” (p. 75) This also leads to concerns about 
impact, a perceived need to measure outputs in an institution that does not value this work. 
This ambivalent attitude is summarised in the report: 
It is thus, confusingly for some scientists, seen to represent both the best and the 
worst features of scientific professionalism – at best an expression of the chief ideal 
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of science as a vocation (to further scientific progress), and at worse a symptom of 
professional failure. The strong finding that public engagement work can be 
stigmatising and, in this and other ways, potentially detrimental to a professional 
scientific career is a reminder that the ‘sea change’ has also produced an undertow 
of tension. 
Burchell at al., 2009, p. 75  
The study, then, reveals how the ‘virtuous circle’ of public engagement is utopian 
unless it is rooted in the institutional structure of science itself. The conference discussions 
as well as my findings in this dissertation, show how dialogue can be legitimised as a 
scientific activity by linking it to actual research programmes, through the broad aim of 
clinical translation. By bringing these together, we reposition the work of facilitating 
dialogue within the scope of scientific professionalism, in order to support a shift in the 
funding of research in professional science to prioritising the relationship between science 
and society through science policy. This framing of the relationship between translation 
and dialogue, as was exemplified by McLaren’s approach described in this dissertation, 
leads me here to propose a model for public engagement centred on dialogue around 
clinical translation.  
I propose this model by drawing on several key lessons learned from my study of 
McLaren’s role in the HF&E debates as well as the discussions at the conference: 
Lesson 1. Clinical translation can serve as an orientation point in discussions about 
policy, as part of a process of arriving at scientific research agendas that are 
rigorous, while also recruiting public support for basic science. The work done by 
the pro-research lobby in the 1980s and the resulting legislation, shows how 
extensive public deliberation does not endanger basic science but, in fact, has led 
to a social contract that has allowed basic research in Britain to thrive. IVF, and then 
PGD, I have shown in this dissertation, served as a basis for delineating the research 
that would be required to improve the efficacy and safety of these techniques as part 
of the process of engendering support for these goals of clinical translations. PGD, 
a technique for which McLaren noticed there was widespread support and 
enthusiasm, based on the benefits it presented to human health, became the point of 
departure for a model that was iteratively developed over the course of the debates 
to include new perspectives and concerns. McLaren made distinctions that were 
incorporated into the biological model she used in public information material, such 
as that between selection and editing in genetic engineering, and these were based 
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on public consultation – on the evidence she gathered serving on committees that 
were meant to be representative of a lay community, but also through various public 
engagement events with special interest groups and mothers themselves. The 
clinical aim in her model of public deliberation was not definitive but was a means 
of exploring the values, feelings, science and legal provision that would be required 
to make the technique work. In discussing this, the scientific and social 
infrastructure required to support the clinical translation was developed. Scientific 
engagement in this way engenders and does not endanger the advancement of 
science, nor the space for scientifically rigorous and objective research. 
Lesson 2. Scientists have feelings too. This leads to another point, and one that I 
have shown was very much relevant to the way in which the Warnock model was 
developed by Anne McLaren in the debates, namely that scientists can draw on a 
feeling of what is right, not only their objective scientific attitude, to appeal to the 
public. Honest exchange in this sense does not tarnish their scientific objectivity or 
credibility in the public eye but is a necessary precondition. This point is supported 
by the general acknowledgement in various studies on the public deliberation of 
biotechnology, that public fear surrounding scientific advances stems 
predominantly from a concern that unforeseen consequences, and social impact will 
not be considered in the advancement of science, potentially evident in the 
disinterestedness of scientists themselves (Taylor, 2007). This can be ameliorated 
by scientists’ engagement with the public over palpable goals in which human 
health is central.  
This is another advantage of the model I propose. The emphasis on clinical 
application as a broadly shared research agenda is that scientists are posited as 
feeling, interested parties, and this, once again, engenders public support for 
scientific research programmes. If scientists, as the public, are both stakeholders in 
the sense that they are working towards a set of aims, the public can be reassured 
that scientists are not disinterested: not only in the economic sense that they 
acknowledge how they are invested in a translational pipeline that has become 
marketized, but also in the feeling sense that they have at the heart of their practice 
a shared concern with human applications. Scientific objectivity does not need to 
spell a generalized neutrality, and this stance becomes easier to uphold when 
scientific information introduced into public discussion is explicitly geared towards 
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informing decisions on specific questions, allowing scientists to reveal their 
multifaceted reasoning as they think through the problem along with the general 
public.  
Lesson 3. Feelings can be explained ‘scientifically’. This positioning of clinical 
translation as the focus of public engagement carves out a more focused remit for 
scientists in public deliberation, in the form of an imperative to explain the 
possibilities and limitations, alternatives and required basic research surrounding a 
given clinical translation. When providing this information in the context of a 
discussion that explores clinical possibilities that the public value, and with an 
understanding of the broader values that these clinical translations represent to the 
public, scientists can engage more effectively in the debates, providing the public 
with the information that is most relevant to them, that speaks to these concerns. 
This affective understanding of what lies at the heart of a discussion can guide the 
scientist in expressing this understanding ‘scientifically’, in the form of the most 
relevant information to the question at hand. Relevance, in this case, is not 
determined only by the state in the field of science concerned, but by the dominant 
concerns and interests implicit in the public’s views on clinical translations. This 
imperative gives real meaning to the call by Jim Smith, Director of Science at the 
Wellcome Trust, to “use science to influence policy” (email correspondence, 20 
July 2019). 
Lesson 4. Scientific information is a prerequisite for democratic decision-making 
in human fertilisation and embryology. Although it may seem redundant to claim 
that, to talk about science, we require scientific information, the discussions around 
specific clinical application reveal what is at stake in ensuring that adequate 
information is available to form an opinion. Without the necessary information 
required to discern between translational choices, the public cannot really be 
considered to have a ‘say’ in the direction of research in Britain. As Virginia Bolton 
put it in my interview with her, “If you’re going to have a massively important vote 
that is going to change the course of history then you want voters to be informed” 
(Bolton, interview with author, 16 October 2018). A vote cannot be considered 
democratic unless voters have the information needed to assess the relative merits 
of their options. Information, then, is key to the deliberative model and scientists 
are indispensable to this process of engaging in an intimate sense with the 
 
181 
identification of clinical possibilities and their evaluation in order to adequately 
inform discussions with the most relevant information possible. The key issues 
underlying public attitudes towards specific applications will only be ascertained 
through explorative discussion. The specificity of single-issue votes and the focus 
on developing aims in the form of clinical translation allow scientists to cater their 
information carefully to the vote at hand, thereby empowering the public in a real 
sense.  
Anne McLaren writes, 
Education of the public is not enough. Of course, the public understanding of 
science is often woefully inadequate, but the scientists’ understanding of the public 
is often not much better. Let us aim for an informed dialog, and let us hope that the 
media will do their best to make sure that nothing is ‘lost in translation’. 
McLaren, 2007, p. 26  
Dialogue will be lost in translation in more ways than one, unless it is explicitly 
coupled with clinical aims, and unless it is premised on a shared understanding of the 
information that is relevant to the question at hand.  
Ethical models: Reframing the debate through clinical translation  
The above call for a rhetorical emphasis on clinical translation in order to facilitate debate 
has the potential, if not properly facilitated, to reaffirm the current emphasis on clinical 
outputs in the postmillennial pipeline model in biomedicine. I here refer briefly to the work 
of the sociologist Charis Thompson (2013) and of several critics in feminist science studies, 
notably Susan Squier, in order to clarify some potential objections to this positioning of 
translation as central to public engagement and, vice versa, of translation as a broader 
model for public deliberation and ethical debate. I hereby build on the sense in which the 
model for translation as superimposition that I have developed throughout this dissertation 
presents an alternative ethical model for public deliberation on biotechnology.  
Charis Thompson offers a detailed analysis of the role that potential ‘cures’ have 
played in the history of garnering support for stem-cell research in the United States. She 
warns that a rhetoric promising cures is misleading when the concerns included in the 
framing of the public debate are, what she calls, ‘pro-curial’,5 where the translation of basic 
 
5 I use the idiom of superimposition throughout this thesis, in part to extend the range of geological imagery 
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science into clinical applications is closely linked with a search for new marketable 
innovations. She offers the example of the ‘pro-cures’ rhetoric used in California’s 
‘Proposition 71’, the California Research and Cures Act. In the report, supporters of stem 
cell research were cast as “fighting to cure pervasive and devastating diseases and medical 
conditions” (Thompson, 2013, p. 37). By “equating the fundamental ethical imperative to 
save and improve lives with the provision of state funding for embryonic stem cell 
research”, she writes, “the pro-cures rhetoric counter-balances pro-life objections to 
research” (ibid.).  
Thompson goes on to show how this emphasis on cures played out in the 
translational climate of the early 2000s: 
To make plausible this ethical claim that the point of the research was cures, the 
research had to be shown to be concerned with the entire innovation trajectory, all 
the way from as-yet-undone basic research science to clinically valid treatments. 
The common use of the expression “bench to bedside” in connection with stem cell 
research, and the emphasis on “translational” research, did just this. The bench-to-
bedside commitment also lent itself to being read as a commitment to funding a 
new field of innovation, putting California out ahead of the rest of the U.S., and 
even the world ... Innovation and cures were bundled together as promise and 
potential, and potential was what these pluripotent cells had in abundance … 
Thompson, 2013, pp. 37–38 
This leads Thompson to argue that cures-talk not only reinforces unrealistic ideas 
about the speed with which science can deliver cures and save lives, but also regenerates 
“the economic life of the State through getting ahead in this sector”, and re-commits “to 
 
used in scholarship on the debates to evoke a broader, social and political conception of the issues deemed 
relevant to discussions about biotechnology, beyond individual health. Charis Thompson’s ‘pro-curial’ 
landscape is one of several ‘bioscapes’ that each describe the “constitutive technical, political, and ethical 
trajectories of ideas, bureaucracy, and equipment” included in the framing of a debate, to emphasise how 
agency is already an “entrenched, capitalised, and material “interest” bundle of humans and non-humans in 
a given domain” (p. 56). The pro-curial in particular is a “frame or landscape characterised by principled, if 
contested, procurement parameters, curatorial practices for accounting for acceptably derived research 
materials and cell lines, and a pro-cures rhetoric of innovation” (p. 44). STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff uses the 
notion of ‘regulatory settlements’ to describe how the policy on biotechnology was made in democratic 
nations between 1975 and 1995 and how these frameworks provided context for future framings of the issues 
concerned. In both senses, the deeply embedded, social nature of the debate is foreground, a sense that I echo 
in my model of superimposing ‘domains’ of knowledge on the way to building legislation. 
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the epistemology and fruits of science” (p. 45). The problem for Thompson is not only the 
unrealistic promises of this cures-rhetoric, but also that this framing of the discussion as 
centred around individual ‘health’, itself an elusive concept in an economy where this 
concept seems defined by the ‘possibilities’ afforded by available commodified remedies, 
masks other possible framings of the discussion that would hold the potential to challenge 
the distribution and accessibility of medical provisions that would, in doing so, have the 
‘social’ questions of systemic injustices, rather than individual wellbeing, at its core.  
The medical framing in this way contributes to the “biomedicalization of society”, 
in which social problems are posited as curable medical problems, themselves implying a 
naturalised norm (p. 49). Thompson now introduces her concept of ‘good science’:  
Good science connotes the conduct of the sciences that have ethics in ways that 
iteratively develop the science and ethics of their fields together to the mutually 
entwined and multiple ends of both robust science and technology, and the greater 
articulation and mitigation of problems of distributive or other injustice.  
Thompson, 2013, p.28 
This is a call for a re-framing the question at hand, of soliciting new interest, of 
doing what she calls the ‘ethical choreography’ of integration, taking seriously criticisms 
to open new paths of research, and to deliberate carefully on the issues that are broader than 
just the question of the status of the embryo.  
The case study I have presented in this dissertation describes a very different role 
for clinical applications in the context of the HF&E debates and, in fact, is characterised by 
some aspects of the ‘good science’ that Thompson prescribes. In describing the relationship 
between the biological model and clinical translation, with a focus on McLaren’s role, I 
show that the case developed by the pro-lobby represented more than an alternative ‘moral 
argument’ to the anti-research emphasis on the sanctity of life, as has also been argued in 
much of the literature on the HF&E debates (e.g. Jasanoff, 2004; Mulkay, 1997), but 
represented a shift towards a biology that formed one component of a layered case based 
on overlapping concerns, one in which biology became relative to the domains of social 
concerns, affect, legal provision, ethical arguments, and clinical translation. This model 
was developed in response to a question that framed the discussion as a pragmatic one of 
how the embryo could and should be used, and this question was relayed to various 
stakeholders, post-Warnock Committee, as a question of the possible clinical application 
of genetic therapy. This broad clinical aim became PGD by incorporating not only new 
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techniques, actors and fields, but also distinctions based on what was deemed permissible 
by a broader constituency, such as McLaren’s sense that it was genetic manipulation, not 
selection, that was considered unacceptable by many. In this sense, clinical translation was 
part of the iterative evolution, stemming from a reframing of the debate as a social question. 
The model, then, represented more than a ‘counter-balance’ to a pro-life argument, but an 
alternative ethical model entirely.  
Susan Squier, in Epigenetic Landscapes (2017), uncovers, from a feminist science 
studies perspective, how the ‘epigenetic landscape’, an image that, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, offers a visual metaphor for embryonic development, has been 
repurposed in various contexts to think through new questions that extend beyond gene–
environment interactions of the early embryo. Squier thereby aims to provide a more 
productive model for “the intersecting complex systems that are now understood to link 
scientific and cultural practices – or, more precisely, to reveal them as never having been 
separate or distinct” (p. 7), and so, posits that a broader understanding of the functionality 
of landscape as a metaphor has implications for the way that science can be done. One 
particular image, which reveals the “interactions underlying the epigenetic landscape” (p. 
185), incorporates multiple scales “of magnitude and time” in a “systemic view” of 
development (ibid). This model, similarly evident in developmental systems theory (DST), 
gives us a “better sense of the relations between scales”, as we shift “from interactions of 
molecules inside cells to those between persons … from the short-term dynamics of a 
population of organisms in a habitat to the slow procession of generations through 
evolutionary time” (Oyama 2000, cited in Squier, p. 185). Yet this model, Squier argues, 
raises an ethical problem: “Who, why, and how decides how many variables/elements to 
include into this new system of ‘multiple scales’?” (Irana Aristarkhova, cited in Squier, 
2017, p. 186).  
One answer, she suggests, is “to say that the choice should reflect (and is responsive 
to) the requirements of the context within which the choice is being made”, but equally 
important as reflexive inclusion, is the realisation that “these variables and elements are 
actually always already included” (Squier, 2017, p. 186) and that ethics is therefore “not 
about right responses to a radically exteriorised other, but about responsibility and 
accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming, of which we are a part” (Karen 
Barad, 2012, cited in Squier, 2017, p. 186). The model I am proposing foregrounds both 
and works from the realisation that connections between domains are drawn on the path to 
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temporary, imperfect solutions to a specific question.  
This analysis challenges the notion, then, expressed by Thompson, that democratic 
deliberative models that rest “on an implicit ideal of consensus through reason” can provide 
“no tools for taking persistent dissent into account or for dealing with challenges to the 
limits of reason in bioethics” (2013, p. 26). By relating various perspectives on the debates, 
McLaren shows, an understanding of the limits of a particular domain of knowledge is 
incorporated into a growing model premised on the relations between these partial 
perspectives. In this debate that took place with the clinical application ‘in-the-making’, 
we have a model of a ‘good science’ that pre-emptively broadens the framing of the relevant 
issues, while also addressing the problem of communication by providing a specific 
question, accompanied by the ‘relevant’ information for a broader constituency to decide 
on its desirability.  
McLaren’s problem-solving ethos, as I have described it, resonates with 
Thompson’s ethical model, not as ethics in Aristotelean or Kantian sense, in which there is 
an “individual action” or “deontological principle at work”, and which has dominated 
American bioethics, but, in reference to entire social systems, prioritises those dimensions 
of the ethical “that require reference to behaviour, virtue, training, the acceptability of a 
means or an end, or a greater good or good unto itself” (2013, p. 63). By opening up the 
process by which this was implemented by a single individual, I hope to have shown how 
translation can come to define an approach to policy-making in biomedicine that explicitly 
centralises the negotiation of clinical aims in relation to other domains, in order to expand 
the frame of the ethical questions at hand. In this model, the translational imperative is an 
opportunity to re-evaluate what it means to be ‘cured’ as a society, while alerting the public 
to the fact that translation takes time, that cures are unpredictable and that they necessitate 
basic research.  
I now move on to a discussion of how this ethical model pertains to the discussions 
around the possible extension of the 14-day rule in Britain. 
Extending the 14-day rule: The meaning of translation  
The question has recently been raised among scientists in the field, after over twenty-five 
years, of whether it is time to extend the 14-day rule. For scientists, there had been no need 
to contest the rule since no experiment had come close to culturing an embryo anywhere 
near to the 14-day limit. In 2016, however, two groups in the UK and the US reported 
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experiments on human embryos that were sustained in culture for 12–13 days after 
fertilisation (see, Deglincerti et al., 2016; Shabhazi, 2016). The research group in the UK 
at Cambridge University led by Magdalena Zernicka-Goetz claimed to have developed a 
method of culturing live human embryos for thirteen days, only stopping their experiment 
at this point to comply with the 14-day rule. This possibility of culturing embryos up to the 
legal limit, as well as the potential therapeutic benefits to be gained from rapidly-advancing 
technologies, such as embryo editing through CRISPR/Cas9, has led policy-makers and 
scientists in Britain to ask whether it is logical to continue to protect the ‘special status’ of 
the embryo up to 14 days (Hurlbut et al., 2017). 
Despite the apparent reluctance of some of my interviewees to include their prior 
policy work in their scientific remit, when asked for their views on extending the 14-day 
rule, there was a widespread implicit acknowledgement, acceptance and continued support 
for the Warnock principles carried forward by the pro-lobby and contained in the HF&E 
Act. This is witnessed in the fact that the scientists I interviewed – both those involved with 
the pro-research lobby and those who knew McLaren in other capacities – invoked the 
social contract established by Warnock’s framing as well as the need for a convincing 
clinical case, as carried forward by McLaren. Interviewees such as Jim Smith, Marcus 
Pembrey and Virginia Bolton (interviews with author, 2018) all agreed that a convincing 
case for the extension of the rule based on real clinical possibilities, and on extensive basic 
research, would be required.  
This framing of the task as one of building a case, evidently very much a part of 
how scientists themselves see the task at hand, is distorted by the framing of the discussion 
itself as one about the possible extension of a rule. In one sense, this framing is testament 
to the strong and generally positive legacy of the 14-day rule as a policy innovation. Even 
those who criticise the rule using that common misnomer, ‘arbitrary’, discuss it as such. 
David Baird, Emeritus Professor of Reproductive Endocrinology, who also worked at the 
same MRC Unit as McLaren in Edinburgh, said in an interview with me, “The 14-day rule 
is a political issue. It is ridiculous to have an arbitrary limit, and it is arbitrary, but it is not 
ridiculous to start by discussing this rule” (11 September 2018).  
Yet I argue, in what follows, that this framing of the question as one of simply 
picking a point in development performs the same amnesia, the scientific literalism that I 
noted in scientists’ recollections of the debates in Chapter 1, by which the process 
necessitated in arriving at this line in the 1980s is forgotten. More useful, I will argue, 
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would be to recapitulate the process itself by exploring clinical possibilities through public 
deliberation.  
Translating lines in biomedicine today  
The 14-day rule served explicitly as the point of departure at a two-day meeting that I 
attended in December 2018, held at the Brocher Foundation in Geneva. At this meeting, 
titled Drawing the Line: Assessing & Analysing International Guidelines on Human 
Embryo research, the conclusion of the two-day discussion was, especially for the scientists 
and sociologists in attendance, that perhaps it was no longer a line that we are really looking 
for at all. This conclusion emerged especially from the scientists’ accounts of the 
relationship between the rule and their practice. Scientists, especially those working on the 
cutting edge, were often wary of crossing the line in situations that were so different from 
the research being done in the 1980s, that the 14-day limit no longer seemed to apply. 
Professor Ali H. Brivanlou, for example, spoke about his work on embryo-like structures 
at the Rockefeller University. Brivanlou uses in vitro attached human embryos and genome-
edited ‘synthetic embryos’ derived from human embryonic stem cells to unveil the 
molecular, cellular, and embryological basis of early human development. He claimed that 
his work was testament to the fact that technology has now surpassed the law, that the 14-
day rule becomes redundant when you can bypass this limit by creating synthetic embryos 
by means other than fertilisation. Biologists, now, he said, ‘make things work to show they 
understand’. This makes it hard, he says, to discuss fields only connected by the notion of 
the ‘embryo’, or ‘pre-embryo’, up to 14 days, because these entities may resemble embryos 
only in part and were created by means other than fertilisation – in short, they challenge 
the ontological basis of the embryo as an entity in the first place. Like the Warnock 
Committee, then, it seems that an approach that asks how biological material is being used 
is more apt than setting rules on how to treat a presupposed coherent entity. Yet this 
becomes more complicated given the plethora of uses and approaches surrounding embryo-
like entities in laboratories today.  
The scientists I interviewed for this project, particularly those still practicing, 
emphasised a similar point about the redundancy of the 14-day rule in light of the kind of 
work they were doing. Often, they emphasised this as an argument against changing the 
14-day rule. Jim Smith, for example, said,  
Now that we can go up to 14 days, we are in a position to try mouse model 
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experiments in the human and ask, “Are the signals acting at the same time? Are 
they the same signals? Are they acting in the same way?” You know, there’s a lot of 
basic stuff you can do. And I think let’s get that stuff done before we think of going 
further ... there are opportunities with stem cells for instance in regenerative 
medicine. Regenerative medicine, stem cells, populating embryos with stem cells – 
that’ll be the way to go.  
Smith, interview with author, 23 October 2018 
 
In sketching the research possibilities and questions that can be asked within the 
14-day period, Smith points to the research avenues that challenge any sense of temporally 
linear development. When stem cells can be derived from somatic tissue, when embryonic 
stem cells are used towards regeneration in adults, the notion of 14 days ‘into development’ 
makes fairly little sense. British clinical geneticist, Professor Marcus Pembrey similarly 
says,  
It’s not a good time to change it [the 14-day rule], that’s the point. It may be justified 
in the future. Don’t forget that we now can take development backwards, as it were, 
you start with somatic cells and go back to stem cells… 
Pembrey, interview with author, 17 October 2018 
Again, Pembrey refers to the possibility of altering the temporality of development 
to suggest that a change to the 14-day rule is unnecessary and is not the question to be 
asking given the state of the field. Perhaps then, the legacy of the line that we need to evoke, 
is not of its literal image, but of the intersections between clinical, scientific, legal, affective 
and ethical processes that it demarcates.  
Our shared biological model demonstrably looks different from the IVF model that 
formed the point of reference in the HF&E debates, and this is expressed in a range of uses 
and applications across the private and public sectors globally. Instead of discussing a 
change to the rule, perhaps we first need to ask, “What research is being done and how and 
where? What are the research possibilities going forward?”  
The time is ripe, participants at the 2018 Brocher meeting suggested, for new 
metaphors. The favoured image, suggested by Dr Guiseppe Testa, director of the Stem Cell 
Epigenetics Unit at the European Institute of Oncology, in his presentation to the group, 
was that of the ‘matrix’. It would make more sense, he argued, to speak, when discussing 
a field filled with embryo-like entities, in terms of their context: as nodes in a matrix of 
intersecting lines, lines that represent different fields, different research projects, different 
aims. This consensus seems to be widespread, also evident in the interviews conducted with 
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a range of members of the embryo research community. In a 2017 interview (Hurlbut et al., 
2017), in which most emphasise the need for case-by-case assessment and the articulation 
of new “ethical principles”, rather than new “lines in the sand” (Huyn, in Hurlbut et al., 
2017, p. 1032).  
Given the complexity of uses and parties involved in research today, the attendees 
at Brocher concluded the ‘line’ was an outdated metaphor for discussing a regulatory future. 
Procedural descriptions would be more useful because these will encompass a broader 
context for understanding how these biological entities are being used and will thus 
contribute to a relational definition of their contested, conflicted, multiple meanings that 
will be more complex but also, crucially, much more representative of their place in society 
today. 
Metaphors and dialogue  
Interestingly, though, discussions at the Brocher conference largely skirted around how this 
re-evaluation of the 14-day rule might involve the public beyond the scientific community. 
It seems that in returning to the 14-day rule, a key aspect of its meaning was neglected, 
namely, that it was the outcome of a process of deliberation much broader than the practices 
within science itself. The line never described the process of deliberation, which was one 
in which the very relationship between science and society, the divide between experiment 
and application, was negotiated. We might take note here, of McLaren’s version of the 
matrix, which was one based on the superimposition of science with social, affective, 
ethical, and legal considerations in order broaden the discussion of the ethics of research 
practice as a social one.  
We also return to the role that clinical application can play in this process of 
deliberation. What if the matrix of uses of ‘embryo-like entities’ is instead constructed as a 
series of possible clinical agendas, broad ‘bioscapes’, to use Thompson’s terms, that can be 
presented to the public and explored in terms of their social, affective, ethical, and legal 
implications through public engagement of scientists with the public as they work through 
the biology necessary to make each of these ‘work’. In this way, clinical applications 
become part of a process of broadening the scope of discussion, rather than reaffirming the 
status-quo by mapping existing practices under the guise of a ‘new metaphor’. In other 
words, we need a non-literal, sense-for-sense translation of the Warnock-McLaren process 
of superimposition, which we find in a broader conceptualisation of translation as a multi-
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faceted process.  
Luckily, as we have seen, scientists are adept to the kind of thinking required to 
perform the work of using, rather that describing science in order to understand. What 
Brivanlou is describing in reference to his synthetic embryos, is the epistemological model 
of synthetic biology also described by Sarah Franklin in Biological Relatives (2013a). 
Embryology now operates according to an ethos in which the embryologist creates in order 
to understand; where technology always surpasses what is known about biological systems, 
and where the biological model thereby becomes a fusion: “what is biological, what is a 
biological mechanism, what is an experimental apparatus, and what is an experimental tool 
are deliberately rendered opaque” (Franklin, 2013a, p. 134).  
These entities are created and might or might not translate into clinical applications, 
yet this possibility is always very much in the background, marking a shift in practice in 
which basic science and clinical translation are closely entwined. I have shown using the 
case of McLaren and the ‘pre-embryo’ in the HF&E debates, and by reference to her career 
more broadly, how this ethos of synthetic biology can be usefully applied to policy-making 
as well as basic science. McLaren pushed for the clinical translation of PGD in order to 
substantiate a biological model that was more relative, that was assisted, and that came to 
be widely accepted because it could be demonstrably used towards successful therapies. 
The clinical application came to stand for a shared goal, expressed in a hybridised 
biological model that incorporated both the trajectory from embryo to child, as well as the 
possibility of technological intervention in a continuous biological process. The process of 
‘making work’, then, needs to be seen to incorporate the social work of public deliberation, 
which needs to be factored into the research agendas that drive science – often, as Franklin 
(2013a) emphasises, our instruments reach beyond the current state of knowledge, and 
these instruments include not only the state of the art synthetic embryological models in 
laboratories, but also the social technologies to which they are inextricably linked.  
Here then, is another sense in which clinical applications can provide a conceptual 
reference point for deliberation on science policy. Like the biological models that are built 
using tools to explore a set of relations, policy too might model a set of potential 
relationships, drawing on the propensity of technology to probe beyond what is known, to 
expand the scope of reference points in discussions about future research horizons. 
Synthetic biology provides another model for thinking through the policy work that needs 
to be done today to responsibly regulate in the field of biomedicine in the best interest of 
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society, by posing the positive, affirmative question of what we are trying to create.  
Conclusion 
In short, then, this is a timely moment to draw on McLaren’s problem-solving ethos. As 
much as the policy innovation of the 14-day rule itself may no longer be relevant, its 
underlying logic is still very much applicable today. It is this underlying logic that scientists 
in Britain and abroad still recognise, although in some cases they seem to have forgotten 
the implications this held for their role as scientists in the debates. It is also the very logic 
being used at the cutting edge of embryology, namely the synthetic biology that Brivanlou 
describes. In order to develop legislation that is attuned to the current state of practices 
around human fertilisation and embryology, we will need to look at intersections between 
fields, sectors and domains, in order to broaden our reference points in a properly public 
debate. The answer to the question, ‘How do we make this work?’ turns out to be neither 
strictly scientific nor sociological, ethical, affective or legal, but hybrid – and it comes not 
in the shape of a line, but as a process that works reflexively on the fractured ground of 




In this thesis, I set out on the unprecedented task of writing a sociological biography, of 
telling the story of Dr Anne McLaren’s personal, scientific and political formation, in order 
to map the debates on human embryo research in Britain between 1982 and 1990. Anne 
McLaren (1927–2007) was a developmental biologist renowned, among other things, for 
her pioneering work in mammalian embryo development and on the techniques that made 
IVF in humans possible, and was the key scientist on the Warnock Committee tasked with 
advising government on legislation following the clinical translation of IVF to humans with 
the birth of Louise Brown in 1978. McLaren’s varied and pervasive role as both a scientist 
and as member of various committees throughout the debates meant that she provided an 
indexical view onto the intersections between the legal, social, ethical and scientific 
questions as they arose. I aimed to bring this role to light through a series of contextual 
readings of her writing, taken from a range of previously under-researched archives, as well 
as interviews with former collaborators. The resulting analysis is a portrait of an era in 
policy-making, drawn as a set of intersecting concerns about the relation between science 
and society that serves ultimately as an ethical model for science policy-making framed as 
a translational question.  
I will now outline the key conclusions of this dissertation.  
Relative biology and the role of the scientist  
In Chapters 1 and 2, I offered a description, through close readings of McLaren’s own 
arguments as well as interviews with scientists about the debates, of the precise uses of 
biological facts by scientists during the debates, leading to an analysis of a dimension, 
largely under-developed in previous scholarship on the debates, of the role of biological 
facts and the scientists themselves in this public deliberation, and the specific model for 
policy-making that this instantiated. In doing so, I have charted the rise of a more relativistic 
biology in the wake of the clinical translation of IVF. Drawing on the examples of the use 
of the term ‘pre-embryo’ used to delineate the entity before the appearance of the primitive 
streak around 14 days after conception (Chapter 1), and the development of PGD (Chapter 
2), I showed how scientists and their interlocutors over the course of the debates moved 
from discussions of the status of the embryo, to decision-making based on the idea that 
biology can be used. In this process, a developmental model based on a continuous 
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biological cycle, in which developmental potential is largely determined by its 
environmental context, began to displace the teleological model of development as 
predetermined to produce human babies used by the anti-research lobby. The potential harm 
that might be done to a developing human by manipulating early life thereby went from 
presenting a reason for the protection of the early human embryo, to a justification for 
further life-giving research on them.  
This inversion also points to just how closely the biological model and clinical aims 
were connected in the arguments for research. My analysis shows that the biological case 
built for the ‘pre-embryo’ cannot be separated from those for genetic screening or the hopes 
presented by other future clinical applications. The term became part of an iterative process 
of rallying support in favour of research and, in doing so, the biological model denoted by 
the term ‘pre-embryo’ represented a set of facts that was used to make a case in favour of 
research that was justified in terms of the good it could do for society. The case of PGD in 
Chapter 2, in particular, shows how talking about basic science increasingly became a case 
of encouraging clinical applications as a proof of concept to validate a biological image of 
contingent development in the public eye. The pro-lobby case, therefore, hinged not on the 
ontological distinction between ‘pre-embryo’ and embryo-proper, but on an ethical 
argument based on a notion of the social good, instantiated by Mary Warnock’s framing of 
the debate in the Warnock Report (1984).  
My analysis thus differs from previous interpretations that treat the ontological 
distinction made using a biological model and arguments for clinical translation as 
separable factors (e.g. Gunning and English, 1993; Jasanoff, 2005; Mulkay, 1997), or those 
that see the role of the term only as one of bolstering the argument for research by 
delineating a suitable experimental subject (e.g. Lee and Morgan, 2001; Crowe, 1990; 
Spallone, 1987). I show how the pre-embryo factored into a revised ethical model, and a 
changing understanding of the biological facts as relative, and lasting, as evident from the 
public response to proposed changes to the Act since 1990, both in terms of widespread 
support, and in the nature of the concerns raised. Given that I did not have scope to cover 
the legacy of this changed biological vision in this thesis, I invite future research to examine 
how public perceptions of biology have evolved since the 1990 Act.  
The model as I describe it can be used to deduce wide-ranging implications about 
the role of the scientist in public debate: the relationship between science, society, law and 
ethics; the public perception of the biological facts of reproduction and the role of science 
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in reproduction; and the legacy of the debates in policy discussions about reproduction 
today. Most importantly, it allowed me to reflect on the relationships between the scientific 
model used in public debate and the role of clinical translation, which led me to develop 
the theme of translation, and to cast McLaren and her role in the HF&E debates as a case 
study in broadening the conventional use of the term in the post-millennial, ‘translational’ 
climate of biomedicine, in order to shift the focus of discussions of clinical application to 
the social infrastructure on which it relies.  
I also tied the changing, ‘relative’ biological model to McLaren’s expertise. I show 
how McLaren combined authoritative scientific understanding with the idea of moral 
purpose and social good, necessitating a language that could reflect both. Key to this 
analysis was the concept of superimposition, which I take from McLaren’s own 
descriptions of her practice, as well as the writing of C. H. Waddington (1905-1975), who 
was a key inspiration to her as a scientist. This metaphor helps to describe McLaren’s 
method of layering social, legal, clinical, emotional and scientific arguments in order to 
build a consensus based on overlapping concerns. This allowed me in turn to draw together 
McLaren’s particular role and my analysis of the debates more broadly, by showing how 
she orchestrated the debates through this model of doing science policy. The idiom of 
superimposition also contributes to my broader conceptualisation of the process of arriving 
at a clinical translation, showing that this is never a linear process and should be conceived 
of as a fractured, deliberative settlement. I argue that incongruences always remain in these 
temporary settlements, and that these should serve as the basis for ongoing re-evaluation 
of legislation today. 
Style of practice  
The concept of superimposition also allowed me to connect McLaren’s broader formation 
as a scientist and a Marxist to her role in the HF&E debates in Chapter 3. I identified the 
same pragmatic approach, centred around a search for analogies of a problem, a non-literal 
translation, in constant reference to an overarching model. I avoided, in this biographical 
chapter, essentialising generalisations about McLaren’s character that would do little to 
challenge dominant models for doing science and policy, but tried to root my description 
in the same understanding of her idiosyncratic approach described in Chapters 1 and 2. This 
methodological focus was developed largely as a result of my substantive contribution to 
scholarship, namely the vast original archival and interview material that forms the basis 
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of this thesis.  
My archival material was drawn predominantly from two tranches of McLaren’s 
personal papers newly opened to researchers at the British Library, as well as material taken 
from the archives at the Royal College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians, the National 
Archives at Kew, in addition to my 22 interviews, several unprecedented, with McLaren’s 
former collaborators, including one of the last with Dame Mary Warnock (1924–2018). The 
breadth and mass of material used for my research led me to bring to light McLaren’s very 
distinctive method, or style of practice, a term used by the historian of science Evelyn Fox 
Keller (1983) to describe her approach in her biography of geneticist Barbara McClintock, 
that describes the idiosyncratic approach taken by a scientist to making sense of their 
findings and includes how they engage with their research object, how they conduct, devise 
and interpret their experiments, and how they discuss that process. I show how a distinctive 
style characterises McLaren’s entire oeuvre as a scientist, policy-maker, communist and 
campaigner for social change.  
My analysis of McLaren’s overarching approach to problem-solving develops my 
understanding of the ways in which she enacted a concern with social benefit and human 
problems throughout her life. By looking at McLaren’s personal biography, describing her 
academic and political lineage in relation to thinking about the intersections of ‘science’ 
and ‘society’, I show how McLaren belongs to a legacy of socialist scientists, particularly 
the embryologist C. H. Waddington, whose practice was premised on an epistemology in 
which knowledge is gained by drawing analogies that represent the intersections between 
sub-systems. By describing how McLaren made similar characteristic use of 
superimposition in a scientific and political context, I show how her approach represents a 
distinctive ethos of problem solving that is scientific as well as social and political, that is 
premised on communication across disciplines and domains of knowledge.  
I extend this demonstration, vis-à-vis as of yet unarchived material collected from 
McLaren’s daughter, Susan Michie, to a discussion of McLaren’s scientific interests in 
epigenetic inheritance, revealing how this led her to cross the Iron Curtain at the height of 
the Cold War to exchange ideas with the notorious agrobiologist Trofim Lysenko, and to 
advocate a fair evaluation of Russian science in the West. In doing so, I distil the social 
implications and the particular role the model of translation I described in the context of 
the debates in the 1980s dictates for the scientist, showing how a similar broad, integrative 
process that relies centrally on communication and feeling is needed to advance science 
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and the good it can do for society.  
This leads me to thematise the role of communication and comparison, which are 
key to McLaren’s approach across her policy and science. Her faculties for communication 
and comparison allowed her to build her iterative model for gene–environment interactions, 
as well as common ground in the HF&E debates, and to uphold her commitment to 
reconciling the domains of policy, society and science for the benefit of society as a whole. 
The importance of these activities to her practice leads me to challenge literalist paradigms 
of doing science, that still seem to prevail in scientists’ descriptions of their role in public 
debate today, and to argue that McLaren’s model is more attuned to the realities of science 
as well as policy-making, and is, therefore, more ethical.  
My exploration of the role of the scientist in Chapter 3 also led me to analyse how 
McLaren, an active Marxist and trade union member throughout her life, reconciled her 
views with those of the Conservative government with which she had to collaborate to 
move legislation forward in the 1980s. I did this vis-à-vis historian of science Duncan 
Wilson’s analysis of the ideological resonances between Mary Warnock, chair of the 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
in office for the duration of the debates. This led me to make an original argument about 
the role that science played in aligning these individuals with diverging political 
commitments.  
I argue that the literal connection between Warnock’s and Thatcher’s ‘anti-expert’ 
commitment to individual choice appears superficial given the fact that there is no evidence 
that Warnock, always committed to the ideas of social benefit and the common good, shared 
Thatcher’s neoliberalism. I argue that a shared commitment to science, given Thatcher’s 
own scientific training, better explains the collaboration between these individuals. This 
commonality forms the basis of a causal, substantial relationship between Thatcher, 
Warnock and McLaren, which, I show, by reference to correspondence between Thatcher 
and McLaren, contributed to moving the pro-research case forward. This argument adds to 
the case I make for the role that science and scientific facts can play in an iterative approach 
to scientific policy-building, based on deliberation and communication through the 
biological model.  
In Chapter 4, I draw on the description of McLaren’s problem-solving model 
developed throughout the dissertation, to evaluate how it might pertain to science policy 
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questions in the UK today, as well as the question of the extension of the 14-day rule. I use 
McLaren to direct attention to the process of arriving at the 14-day rule, arguing that the 
legacy of the rule should be in this model, rather than in the resulting metaphor of a ‘line’. 
In describing the use of the biological model, and of clinical translation with a focus on 
McLaren’s role, I show that the case developed by the pro-research lobby represented more 
than an alternative ‘moral argument’ to the anti-research emphasis on the sanctity of life, 
as has been posited in previous analyses of the debates (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Mulkay, 1997), 
but a veritable shift towards a model in which biological facts were used to make a social 
argument in favour of research.  
This led me to develop my model for a different kind of approach to the ethical 
discussions on the governance of embryo research, in which the role of science in society 
is central, thereby contributing to studies that have explored how biotechnology can be 
drawn upon to posit new models of governance (e.g. Banchoff, 2001; Jasanoff, 2005; 
Thompson, 2013). ‘Relative’ biology, I showed, has ethical implications for the scientist’s 
role in public debate, and I drew on this to posit a model for doing what the sociologist 
Charis Thompson (2013) has called ‘good science’. I suggest that a focus on clinical 
translations as a starting point for developing research agendas, based on the intersecting 
domains of ethics, law, feeling, and science, makes the work of public engagement central 
to scientific professionalism.  
Methodological parallels  
As I have described, my understanding of biology as relative, and the role of the scientist 
as a communicator and integrator, emerges through a description of McLaren’s style of 
practice and how this is palpable across the entire body of her career. This process of tracing 
a particular style of practice, through a method based on close readings, across domains, 
reveals a parallel between my own method and that of McLaren. What I call a 
‘hermeneutics of practice’ links McLaren’s style of practice with my own method, which 
has in common the same assumptions, namely that repeatedly bringing an underlying 
understanding, or interpretation, to a situation is transformative and that this effect is 
cumulative. By reading McLaren’s texts across sectors, in the context of the HF&E debates, 
of her scientific work, and of her political writing, I show how her life can be summarised 
as a pattern that results from her distinctive approach of feeling, communicating, 
connecting and facilitating in specific contexts. I show how this constituted a distinctive 
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pro-research argument and how this provided a model for the relations between science and 
society more broadly. I myself enact this process in order to explicate it. A close reading of 
individual acts of persuasion that accumulate to build a view of McLaren’s style of practice 
allows me to trace her specific negotiation of the scientific facts in a public debate, to ask 
how the tensions in these texts reveal modes of thinking and doing that ran counter to 
dominant notions of the scientific at the time, and to place these in their historical context 
to ask what these reflect about the changing relationship between science and society. I 
repeatedly bring this interpretive practice of close reading to the question of McLaren’s 
style of intervention, offering a reading of a life through the lenses of cultural and political 
worlds, fulfilling the credo to “display the power of disclosure implied in” the author’s 
“discourse beyond the limited horizon of his own existential situation” of the interpretive 
school of social science (Ricoeur, cited in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 100).  
This hermeneutic reading, furthermore, foregrounds the sense in which I am 
describing McLaren’s role in terms of her interconnectedness in a web of discourses by 
showing how McLaren herself performed a similar process of contextualising scientific 
problems in relation to society. I therefore draw on McLaren as a case study to show how 
this interpretive method provides a model for both scientific and sociological knowledge. 
In terms of feminist cultural analysis, I am entering into the “contest for public 
knowledge” through a “recontextualization” of discourses by taking McLaren’s own 
language and context as a point of departure. Reading, I demonstrate with this 
methodology, is “a creative act that translates seemingly incompatible discourses into a 
cohesive symbolic representation” (van Dyck, 1995, p.60). I am therefore also pushing a 
feminist cultural textual interpretation practice to draw a picture of a life and to help us 
understand that life in its deeply embedded context, shifting the terms of discussion around 
the history of the human fertilisation and embryology debates, while offering a perspective 
on that life that is intimate, interconnected, and coherent, and that we would not get any 
other way.  
Legacy  
I finally make a point about McLaren’s legacy as a scientist. Although never marginal to 
the scientific community by any means, continuing to hold eminent posts at the Royal 
Institution, The Gurdon Institute and the Medical Research Council throughout her life, 
McLaren’s legacy is tainted by a sense of misunderstanding, which, much like the legacy 
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of the ‘pre-embryo’, needs to be explained as a failure to adhere to dominant scientific 
literalist paradigms. My hermeneutics of practice foregrounds how the meaning of 
McLaren’s life only emerges from a broad, encompassing description of the ways in which 
she exercised her style across domains and throughout her life. This interpretive reading 
falls outside of a scientific convention that demands that key discoveries are explained in 
the language of a single field – as an objective finding.  
The ambivalence around McLaren’s science can be explained and connected to the 
ambivalent legacy of the ‘pre-embryo’, by means of two central maxims that guided 
McLaren’s practice. The first is, her distinctive definition of her field of study as 
‘everything involved in getting the embryo from one generation to the next’, and the 
second, is her self-fashioning as a facilitator of science rather than conceiver of big ideas 
or new discoveries – as a ‘midwife’, as Elizabeth Simpson puts it (2001). These two points 
stand in curious relation to one another. The breadth of her field as the study of life’s 
regeneration, on the one hand, suggests that McLaren’s field is fundamental to all branches 
of science. Yet the latter seems to diminish this contribution as somehow lesser, not ground-
breaking. The latter resonates with the recollections in many of my interviews.  
McLaren is repeatedly credited by her former scientific colleagues for her ability to 
move easily in any social circle. While in the context of policy-making this is considered a 
great strength, these same scientists seemed unable to see how this same ability moved 
McLaren’s science forward. The disregard for McLaren’s legacy as a scientist mirrors the 
relative amnesia surrounding the use of the biological facts in the debates. Her contributions 
to uncovering the mechanism of epigenetic effects and developing the method to deduce 
these, as I argued in Chapter 3, for which the body of her work is one well-developed 
argument, is discredited as primarily ‘reproductive’ biology – not of ‘Nobel standard’ – by 
many of her former scientific community. In these accounts, her distinctive and pragmatic 
approach of crossing between fields and models, as well as applying herself so fully to 
policy-work, serves to discredit her as a scientist. I show in this dissertation, how the scope 
of her work depended centrally on her international, interdisciplinary collaborations, which 
served to move her from one experiment to the next, constituting over time the proper 
subject of her life’s work as the gross sum of these experiments.  
In a sense, McLaren’s legacy highlights some of the lessons ‘not-learned’ from the 
history of legislating around IVF in Britain – forgotten policy models, as well as forgotten 
science. I argue that this represents a failure to read an epistemological model based on 
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interpretation, and the shifting between cumulative analogies, in which meaning is never 
definitive, and always defined by a particular context facilitated by the relations between 
scientist, community and tools. McLaren’s style of practice depended through-and-through 
on a broad, integrative view and this is reflected in the policy model she helped invent, in 
which the biological model is relative to clinical, ethical, legal and affective demands. In 
this model, the distinction between ‘social’ and ‘scientific’ work is much less clear-cut than 
the statements by some scientists on her role imply.  
For McLaren, at least, the social and scientific represented two necessary aspects 
of solving a problem. The processing required to integrate evidence into her internal model, 
for McLaren also means doing the social work of communicating, connecting and 
translating, because society is very much a part of this machine. Indeed, McLaren’s 
commitment to policy work reveals how deeply her conviction that science was a social 
project ran, and how she saw the work of developing a social infrastructure to support her 
scientific aims as an essential part of facilitating science for the social good. As I showed 
in Chapter 4, this point presents an imperative for the scientist to contribute definitions and 
distinctions to public deliberation on clinical aims.  
In this dissertation, I make a methodological, substantive and analytical 
contribution to the literature on the human embryology and fertilisation debates, and to the 
feminist cultural analysis of public debates more generally. I hope that McLaren’s model, 
as I have described it, will serve primarily as a reminder of the work that was done by the 
1980s pro-research lobby in order to arrive at legislation, and incite scientists today to 
engage openly in the process of deliberation, acknowledging that ‘non-scientific’ language 
is necessarily a part of the process of arriving at scientific applications. The work of 
fostering an environment that is conducive to research can and should involve the work of 
finding models to take on board the views of a wider constituency beyond the scientific 
community; these views should be implemented, practically, in the form of new scientific 
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